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Therefore, as with Aum Shinrikyo, one must distinguish between and separate religious and
ideological factors that shape the group‘s short-term and long-term objectives.
Unlike Aum, al Qaeda‘s influence has extended to groups with known or alleged connections
to al Qaeda, including the Jemaah Islamiyah in Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore Abu
Sayyaf in the Philippines, al-Gama‘a al-Islamiyya in Egypt Harakat ul-Maujahidin in
Pakistan the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan in Central Asia Jaish-e-Mohammed in India
and Pakistan and, al-Jihad in Egypt.xxviii But al Qaeda and its regional surrogate groups
differ in that al Qaeda possesses a global view whereas the concerns of these various
groups are more local. Likewise, these local groups have gone to considerable lengths to
justify their support within the local population and would be less inclined towards resorting
to mass violence. While al Qaeda may agree that an attack on the U.S. is justified, a similar
response locally would be counterproductive to the group‘s cause. Yet, to the extent that
these corollary groups support al Qaeda directly or through more indirect means, an
understanding of the overall network is critical to determining the groups‘ vulnerabilities and
potential opportunities to influence, deny, degrade, or disrupt threats of extreme violence.
Arguably, in the case of a group like al Qaeda, the framing of such religious zeal serves to
promote the group‘s ideological objectives as well as justify the use of collective violence.xxix
According to Hafez,
Muslims rebel because they encounter an ill-fated combination of political
and institutional exclusion, on the one hand, and reactive and indiscriminate
repression on the other. When states do not provide their Islamist
opposition movements opportunities for institutional participation, and
employ repression indiscriminately against these movements after a period
of prior mobilization, Islamists will most probably rebel.xxx
Hafez describes how radical Islamists organize themselves and demand strict ideological
and behavioral adherence from each of their members. In a similar way, Aum used threat,
fear, murder, and intimidation to mitigate dissention within the group. This radicalized
view, however, further isolated the organization from the rest of society.
A similar, though somewhat different, process occurred with respect to Al Qaeda. Islamists‘
initial failure to change states such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia from within led to a ―spiral of
encapsulation‖ that gradually isolated the extremists from government and Muslim leaders
and caused the group to become more extreme in its views. The experience gained by
these extremists would later become the core of al Qaeda‘s belief system. However, unlike
Aum, Al Qaeda was successful in modifying its message to elicit sympathy and support from
the Muslim masses, especially when it directed its ire toward the ―far away enemy,‖
specifically the United States. ―Organizers of violence must align their tactics with cultural
norms, symbols, and ethics that give moral meaning to acts of violence. Culture provides a
―tool kit‖ of concepts, myths, and symbols from which militant organizations could
selectively draw to construct strategies of action.‖xxxi When a society places a premium on
self- sacrifice, cultural framing can succeed in intensifying and reinforcing extreme use of
violence, such as suicide terrorism, by playing to those self-sacrificing themes. Thus,
martyrdom through suicide terror becomes the weapon of choice for producing mass
violence. While nation-states apply the threat of economic sanctions and conventional
firepower as a means of coercion, terrorists use suicide terror as the instrument of choice to
advance their strategic objectives because their power lies in their ability to resonate with
and manipulate cultural and religious frames, rather than ability to control economic and
military institutions.xxxii
Unlike Aum Shinrikyo, al Qaeda used a technologically conservative weapon that combined
variants of familiar tactics of hijacking, bombing, and martyrdom as suicide terror in a
highly innovative way doctrinally.xxxiii This tactic, however, reflected al Qaeda‘s capacity to

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recognize and live within the strategic limitations of reality. Like Aum, al Qaeda expressed a
strong interest in acquiring weapons of mass destruction. In fact, bin Laden has called the
acquisition of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) a ―religious duty.‖xxxiv Ayman al
Zawahiri, a senior leader in al Qaeda and leader of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ), expands
bin Laden‘s views by stating that the objective of the global jihad against the United States
and its allies is to:
1. To inflict maximum casualties against the opponent.
2. To concentrate on the method of martyrdom operations as the most successful way
of inflicting damage against the opponent and the least costly to the Mujahedin in
terms of casualties.
3. Targets as well as the type and method of weapons used must be chosen to have an
impact on the structure of the enemy.
4. To reiterate that focusing on the domestic enemy alone will not be feasible at this
stage.xxxv
Like Aum, Al Qaeda demonstrated its intent and at least limited capacity to self-develop a
WMD capability. In fact, al-Qaeda devoted an entire volume of their 5,000-page
Encyclopedia of Jihad to methods by which chemical and biological weapons may be
developed and constructed.xxxvi During operations in Afghanistan in August 2002, US led
coalition forces discovered traces of ricin and anthrax at five or six sites.xxxvii Additionally,
evidence and videotapes were discovered demonstrating the group‘s interest in bubonic
plague, cyanide, and botulinum toxin. The tapes included video-training manuals for
terrorists instructing them on how to assemble explosive devices. The tapes also showed
chemical tests being performed on three dogs. In one scene, a group of unidentified men
are seen leaving an enclosure in which the dogs are penned. A few moments later, a white
gas appears to seep in from the left, when, after a few seconds, the dogs begin to display
physical reactions.xxxviii
According to a report prepared by the Center for Nonproliferation Studies, on January 5,
2003, seven men were arrested in London, UK for producing ricin in an apartment. British
authorities indicated that at least one of the individuals arrested had attended an al-Qaeda
training camp in Afghanistan. It was later discovered that the remaining individuals had
undergone similar training in Chechnya and Georgia. Within a week, five more men and one
woman were taken into custody for involvement in the plot.xxxix Additionally, Abu Khabab
who was a known al-Qaeda operative was identified as the man responsible for training
members of the plot in London.xl
In April 2004, Jordanian authorities arrested six individuals and killed four in a raid to pre-
empt a pending attack by a small cell linked to Abu Musa al-Zarqawi, who allegedly
provided $170,000 through messengers from Syria.xli According to a witness‘s testimony,
suspects were found with instructions on preparing germ and conventional weapons.xlii The
cell‘s plan was to conduct a suicide attack using trucks filled with 20 tons of industrial
chemicals and explosives to crash into the Jordanian intelligence agency headquarters in the
country‘s capital of Amman. The original plan called for simultaneous attacks against the
U.S. Embassy as well as the prime minister‘s office. The estimated number of casualties
were anywhere from as low as 20,000 up to 80,000 lives.xliii
Finally, in August 2004, eight men were arrested in the UK and charged with ―conspiracy to
use weapons of mass destruction, providing material support and resources to terrorists,
and conspiracy to damage and destroy buildings used in interstate and foreign
commerce.‖xliv They were discovered with information on chemicals, explosives, and
radiological materials. Their plans were to target U.S. financial institutions, including the
Citigroup Building in New York, the New York Stock Exchange, the Prudential Building in