Cultic Studies Review, Vol. 5, No. 2, 2006, Page 52
Therefore, as with Aum Shinrikyo, one must distinguish between and separate religious and
ideological factors that shape the group‘s short-term and long-term objectives.
Unlike Aum, al Qaeda‘s influence has extended to groups with known or alleged connections
to al Qaeda, including the Jemaah Islamiyah in Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore Abu
Sayyaf in the Philippines, al-Gama‘a al-Islamiyya in Egypt Harakat ul-Maujahidin in
Pakistan the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan in Central Asia Jaish-e-Mohammed in India
and Pakistan and, al-Jihad in Egypt.xxviii But al Qaeda and its regional surrogate groups
differ in that al Qaeda possesses a global view whereas the concerns of these various
groups are more local. Likewise, these local groups have gone to considerable lengths to
justify their support within the local population and would be less inclined towards resorting
to mass violence. While al Qaeda may agree that an attack on the U.S. is justified, a similar
response locally would be counterproductive to the group‘s cause. Yet, to the extent that
these corollary groups support al Qaeda directly or through more indirect means, an
understanding of the overall network is critical to determining the groups‘ vulnerabilities and
potential opportunities to influence, deny, degrade, or disrupt threats of extreme violence.
Arguably, in the case of a group like al Qaeda, the framing of such religious zeal serves to
promote the group‘s ideological objectives as well as justify the use of collective violence.xxix
According to Hafez,
Muslims rebel because they encounter an ill-fated combination of political
and institutional exclusion, on the one hand, and reactive and indiscriminate
repression on the other. When states do not provide their Islamist
opposition movements opportunities for institutional participation, and
employ repression indiscriminately against these movements after a period
of prior mobilization, Islamists will most probably rebel.xxx
Hafez describes how radical Islamists organize themselves and demand strict ideological
and behavioral adherence from each of their members. In a similar way, Aum used threat,
fear, murder, and intimidation to mitigate dissention within the group. This radicalized
view, however, further isolated the organization from the rest of society.
A similar, though somewhat different, process occurred with respect to Al Qaeda. Islamists‘
initial failure to change states such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia from within led to a ―spiral of
encapsulation‖ that gradually isolated the extremists from government and Muslim leaders
and caused the group to become more extreme in its views. The experience gained by
these extremists would later become the core of al Qaeda‘s belief system. However, unlike
Aum, Al Qaeda was successful in modifying its message to elicit sympathy and support from
the Muslim masses, especially when it directed its ire toward the ―far away enemy,‖
specifically the United States. ―Organizers of violence must align their tactics with cultural
norms, symbols, and ethics that give moral meaning to acts of violence. Culture provides a
―tool kit‖ of concepts, myths, and symbols from which militant organizations could
selectively draw to construct strategies of action.‖xxxi When a society places a premium on
self- sacrifice, cultural framing can succeed in intensifying and reinforcing extreme use of
violence, such as suicide terrorism, by playing to those self-sacrificing themes. Thus,
martyrdom through suicide terror becomes the weapon of choice for producing mass
violence. While nation-states apply the threat of economic sanctions and conventional
firepower as a means of coercion, terrorists use suicide terror as the instrument of choice to
advance their strategic objectives because their power lies in their ability to resonate with
and manipulate cultural and religious frames, rather than ability to control economic and
military institutions.xxxii
Unlike Aum Shinrikyo, al Qaeda used a technologically conservative weapon that combined
variants of familiar tactics of hijacking, bombing, and martyrdom as suicide terror in a
highly innovative way doctrinally.xxxiii This tactic, however, reflected al Qaeda‘s capacity to
Therefore, as with Aum Shinrikyo, one must distinguish between and separate religious and
ideological factors that shape the group‘s short-term and long-term objectives.
Unlike Aum, al Qaeda‘s influence has extended to groups with known or alleged connections
to al Qaeda, including the Jemaah Islamiyah in Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore Abu
Sayyaf in the Philippines, al-Gama‘a al-Islamiyya in Egypt Harakat ul-Maujahidin in
Pakistan the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan in Central Asia Jaish-e-Mohammed in India
and Pakistan and, al-Jihad in Egypt.xxviii But al Qaeda and its regional surrogate groups
differ in that al Qaeda possesses a global view whereas the concerns of these various
groups are more local. Likewise, these local groups have gone to considerable lengths to
justify their support within the local population and would be less inclined towards resorting
to mass violence. While al Qaeda may agree that an attack on the U.S. is justified, a similar
response locally would be counterproductive to the group‘s cause. Yet, to the extent that
these corollary groups support al Qaeda directly or through more indirect means, an
understanding of the overall network is critical to determining the groups‘ vulnerabilities and
potential opportunities to influence, deny, degrade, or disrupt threats of extreme violence.
Arguably, in the case of a group like al Qaeda, the framing of such religious zeal serves to
promote the group‘s ideological objectives as well as justify the use of collective violence.xxix
According to Hafez,
Muslims rebel because they encounter an ill-fated combination of political
and institutional exclusion, on the one hand, and reactive and indiscriminate
repression on the other. When states do not provide their Islamist
opposition movements opportunities for institutional participation, and
employ repression indiscriminately against these movements after a period
of prior mobilization, Islamists will most probably rebel.xxx
Hafez describes how radical Islamists organize themselves and demand strict ideological
and behavioral adherence from each of their members. In a similar way, Aum used threat,
fear, murder, and intimidation to mitigate dissention within the group. This radicalized
view, however, further isolated the organization from the rest of society.
A similar, though somewhat different, process occurred with respect to Al Qaeda. Islamists‘
initial failure to change states such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia from within led to a ―spiral of
encapsulation‖ that gradually isolated the extremists from government and Muslim leaders
and caused the group to become more extreme in its views. The experience gained by
these extremists would later become the core of al Qaeda‘s belief system. However, unlike
Aum, Al Qaeda was successful in modifying its message to elicit sympathy and support from
the Muslim masses, especially when it directed its ire toward the ―far away enemy,‖
specifically the United States. ―Organizers of violence must align their tactics with cultural
norms, symbols, and ethics that give moral meaning to acts of violence. Culture provides a
―tool kit‖ of concepts, myths, and symbols from which militant organizations could
selectively draw to construct strategies of action.‖xxxi When a society places a premium on
self- sacrifice, cultural framing can succeed in intensifying and reinforcing extreme use of
violence, such as suicide terrorism, by playing to those self-sacrificing themes. Thus,
martyrdom through suicide terror becomes the weapon of choice for producing mass
violence. While nation-states apply the threat of economic sanctions and conventional
firepower as a means of coercion, terrorists use suicide terror as the instrument of choice to
advance their strategic objectives because their power lies in their ability to resonate with
and manipulate cultural and religious frames, rather than ability to control economic and
military institutions.xxxii
Unlike Aum Shinrikyo, al Qaeda used a technologically conservative weapon that combined
variants of familiar tactics of hijacking, bombing, and martyrdom as suicide terror in a
highly innovative way doctrinally.xxxiii This tactic, however, reflected al Qaeda‘s capacity to
