Cultic Studies Review, Vol. 5, No. 2, 2006, Page 57
together from various religious and non-religious beliefs, including the writings of
Nostradamus. Second, unlike individuals immersed in a predominantly Islamic culture, Aum
Shinrikyo‘s teachings were not necessarily reinforced by everyday surroundings, societal
contacts, and interactions. Unless a follower of Aum lived in one of its communities,
individuals‘ beliefs could be corroded by external influences. To some degree, this
constraint contributed to the need to suppress dissent within the group.
Conclusion
The likelihood of terrorist use of weapons of mass destruction in the post-9/11 era remains
unclear. The scale of attack on 9/11, however, suggests that the goal of perpetrating
extreme violence will keep strategically oriented and pragmatic terrorist groups open to
unconventional means, such as WMD. Increasingly, terrorism experts and specialists in
social movement theory, suggest that increased dialogue between academic and
government communities will help us all better understand the potential for extremism and
violence within social movements and the groups that they spawn.lvi Such dialogue would
help policy-makers identify and distinguish groups that approach terrorism from an
organizational or instrumental perspective.
Pressures applied to a group dominated by pathological internal dynamics might compel the
organization to implode, as exemplified in the discussion of Aum Shinrikyo above. Within
the context of Aum‘s value system, the cult‘s actions appeared logical. In lieu of achieving
political power through legitimate means, the group ultimately sought to achieve its
objectives through extreme violence. However, the group‘s internal dynamics, inextricably
linked to the leader‘s psychopathology, led to the organization‘s demise, but not before
society had paid a terrible price in human suffering. In contrast, a group rationally
choosing terrorism among other alternatives will calculate actions based on perceived
benefits and costs. Presenting such a group with a set of different alternatives as
substitutes or increasing costs to the degree that any benefits gained through extreme
violence would not be worth the costs might lead the group to a less destructive destination.
In the case of al Qaeda, the pursuit of weapons of mass destruction was simply one in a
range of options available for instrumental purposes. Aum‘s obsession with WMD
technology combined with the permissive environment of the Japanese legal system
enabled Asahara‘s followers to pursue WMD technology, despite numerous failed
experiments. Today, changes in the legal system and law enforcement techniques would
make the duplication of Aum‘s extensive WMD apparatus more difficult. In other words, the
changes adopted by Japan‘s legal system and experience gained from Asahara and his cult
have raised the costs and risks of pursuing such tactics, thus decreasing the likelihood that
another group might replicate Aum‘s program in Japan.
Although since 9/11 an attack using chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear weapons
has not occurred, the potential for such an attack is undeniable. Technical challenges will
continue to impede terrorists who seek WMD hence, conventional weapons applied in an
asymmetric approach will probably remain the primary means of causing mass disruption
and destruction. Consequently, our long-term goal should be continued emphasis on
enforcing constraints and controls on the proliferation of sensitive materials, including
commercially available fissile matter and not solely weapons-grade material. Experts
contend that a radiological dispersal device (RDD), or ―dirty bomb,‖ a combination of both
conventional explosives with low-grade radiological material, is a greater threat than a
nuclear weapon.lvii However, future terrorist groups may examine both cases and draw
from them the next most probable course of action. For example, while Aum failed to hire
the expertise necessary for a nuclear weapon‘s program, an instrumentalist group like al
Qaeda may stand a better chance of recruiting Islamic extremists with the requisite skills.
together from various religious and non-religious beliefs, including the writings of
Nostradamus. Second, unlike individuals immersed in a predominantly Islamic culture, Aum
Shinrikyo‘s teachings were not necessarily reinforced by everyday surroundings, societal
contacts, and interactions. Unless a follower of Aum lived in one of its communities,
individuals‘ beliefs could be corroded by external influences. To some degree, this
constraint contributed to the need to suppress dissent within the group.
Conclusion
The likelihood of terrorist use of weapons of mass destruction in the post-9/11 era remains
unclear. The scale of attack on 9/11, however, suggests that the goal of perpetrating
extreme violence will keep strategically oriented and pragmatic terrorist groups open to
unconventional means, such as WMD. Increasingly, terrorism experts and specialists in
social movement theory, suggest that increased dialogue between academic and
government communities will help us all better understand the potential for extremism and
violence within social movements and the groups that they spawn.lvi Such dialogue would
help policy-makers identify and distinguish groups that approach terrorism from an
organizational or instrumental perspective.
Pressures applied to a group dominated by pathological internal dynamics might compel the
organization to implode, as exemplified in the discussion of Aum Shinrikyo above. Within
the context of Aum‘s value system, the cult‘s actions appeared logical. In lieu of achieving
political power through legitimate means, the group ultimately sought to achieve its
objectives through extreme violence. However, the group‘s internal dynamics, inextricably
linked to the leader‘s psychopathology, led to the organization‘s demise, but not before
society had paid a terrible price in human suffering. In contrast, a group rationally
choosing terrorism among other alternatives will calculate actions based on perceived
benefits and costs. Presenting such a group with a set of different alternatives as
substitutes or increasing costs to the degree that any benefits gained through extreme
violence would not be worth the costs might lead the group to a less destructive destination.
In the case of al Qaeda, the pursuit of weapons of mass destruction was simply one in a
range of options available for instrumental purposes. Aum‘s obsession with WMD
technology combined with the permissive environment of the Japanese legal system
enabled Asahara‘s followers to pursue WMD technology, despite numerous failed
experiments. Today, changes in the legal system and law enforcement techniques would
make the duplication of Aum‘s extensive WMD apparatus more difficult. In other words, the
changes adopted by Japan‘s legal system and experience gained from Asahara and his cult
have raised the costs and risks of pursuing such tactics, thus decreasing the likelihood that
another group might replicate Aum‘s program in Japan.
Although since 9/11 an attack using chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear weapons
has not occurred, the potential for such an attack is undeniable. Technical challenges will
continue to impede terrorists who seek WMD hence, conventional weapons applied in an
asymmetric approach will probably remain the primary means of causing mass disruption
and destruction. Consequently, our long-term goal should be continued emphasis on
enforcing constraints and controls on the proliferation of sensitive materials, including
commercially available fissile matter and not solely weapons-grade material. Experts
contend that a radiological dispersal device (RDD), or ―dirty bomb,‖ a combination of both
conventional explosives with low-grade radiological material, is a greater threat than a
nuclear weapon.lvii However, future terrorist groups may examine both cases and draw
from them the next most probable course of action. For example, while Aum failed to hire
the expertise necessary for a nuclear weapon‘s program, an instrumentalist group like al
Qaeda may stand a better chance of recruiting Islamic extremists with the requisite skills.
