Cultic Studies Review, Vol. 5, No. 2, 2006, Page 57
together from various religious and non-religious beliefs, including the writings of
Nostradamus. Second, unlike individuals immersed in a predominantly Islamic culture, Aum
Shinrikyo‘s teachings were not necessarily reinforced by everyday surroundings, societal
contacts, and interactions. Unless a follower of Aum lived in one of its communities,
individuals‘ beliefs could be corroded by external influences. To some degree, this
constraint contributed to the need to suppress dissent within the group.
Conclusion
The likelihood of terrorist use of weapons of mass destruction in the post-9/11 era remains
unclear. The scale of attack on 9/11, however, suggests that the goal of perpetrating
extreme violence will keep strategically oriented and pragmatic terrorist groups open to
unconventional means, such as WMD. Increasingly, terrorism experts and specialists in
social movement theory, suggest that increased dialogue between academic and
government communities will help us all better understand the potential for extremism and
violence within social movements and the groups that they spawn.lvi Such dialogue would
help policy-makers identify and distinguish groups that approach terrorism from an
organizational or instrumental perspective.
Pressures applied to a group dominated by pathological internal dynamics might compel the
organization to implode, as exemplified in the discussion of Aum Shinrikyo above. Within
the context of Aum‘s value system, the cult‘s actions appeared logical. In lieu of achieving
political power through legitimate means, the group ultimately sought to achieve its
objectives through extreme violence. However, the group‘s internal dynamics, inextricably
linked to the leader‘s psychopathology, led to the organization‘s demise, but not before
society had paid a terrible price in human suffering. In contrast, a group rationally
choosing terrorism among other alternatives will calculate actions based on perceived
benefits and costs. Presenting such a group with a set of different alternatives as
substitutes or increasing costs to the degree that any benefits gained through extreme
violence would not be worth the costs might lead the group to a less destructive destination.
In the case of al Qaeda, the pursuit of weapons of mass destruction was simply one in a
range of options available for instrumental purposes. Aum‘s obsession with WMD
technology combined with the permissive environment of the Japanese legal system
enabled Asahara‘s followers to pursue WMD technology, despite numerous failed
experiments. Today, changes in the legal system and law enforcement techniques would
make the duplication of Aum‘s extensive WMD apparatus more difficult. In other words, the
changes adopted by Japan‘s legal system and experience gained from Asahara and his cult
have raised the costs and risks of pursuing such tactics, thus decreasing the likelihood that
another group might replicate Aum‘s program in Japan.
Although since 9/11 an attack using chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear weapons
has not occurred, the potential for such an attack is undeniable. Technical challenges will
continue to impede terrorists who seek WMD hence, conventional weapons applied in an
asymmetric approach will probably remain the primary means of causing mass disruption
and destruction. Consequently, our long-term goal should be continued emphasis on
enforcing constraints and controls on the proliferation of sensitive materials, including
commercially available fissile matter and not solely weapons-grade material. Experts
contend that a radiological dispersal device (RDD), or ―dirty bomb,‖ a combination of both
conventional explosives with low-grade radiological material, is a greater threat than a
nuclear weapon.lvii However, future terrorist groups may examine both cases and draw
from them the next most probable course of action. For example, while Aum failed to hire
the expertise necessary for a nuclear weapon‘s program, an instrumentalist group like al
Qaeda may stand a better chance of recruiting Islamic extremists with the requisite skills.
Cultic Studies Review, Vol. 5, No. 2, 2006, Page 58
Another worrisome scenario is that one or more terrorist groups may shift from an
instrumentalist to an organizational perspective that becomes increasingly cult-like as a
charismatic leader‘s decision-making becomes more and more idiosyncratic and irrational.
If such a group obtained a WMD device such as a nuclear bomb, altering the cost-benefit
calculus would not be a deterrent, for the group would no longer be operating according to
an instrumentalist paradigm. A scenario whereby non-state actors acquired a nuclear
capability would not only threaten the security of the United States, but would destabilize
the Westphalian notion of the primacy of nation-states within the international system.
Therefore, the most important goal in counterterrorism should be to make WMD technology
and existing nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons more difficult to obtain. Succeeding
in this goal will reduce the probability of a catastrophe however, it will not eliminate the
lesser but nonetheless horrific destruction achievable through conventional weapons,
especially when creatively used as on 9/11. To make progress on this front, we must
continue to increase our understanding of how the varieties of terrorist and other
destructive groups operate, psychologically as well as politically and strategically.
Notes
i Mohammed Hafez, Why do Muslims Rebel, (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003), p.
199.
ii Jeff Goodwin, ―Review Essay: What Must We Explain to Explain Terrorism,” Social Movement Studies,
Carfax Publishing, Taylor &Franklin Group, (October 2004), Vol. 3, No. 2.
iii Martha Crenshaw, ―Theories of Terrorism: Instrumental &Organizational Approaches,‖ located in
Inside Terrorist Organizations, ed. by David Rapoport, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988),
pp. 27
iv Thomas Schelling, ―Thinking about Nuclear Terrorism,‖ International Security, (Spring 1983), Vol. 6
No. 4.
v David E. Kaplan and Andrew Marshall, the Cult at the End of the World, Crown Publishers, Inc, 1996,
p. 12.
vi David E. Kaplan, ―Aum Shinrikyo,‖ in Jonathan B. Tucker‘s Toxic Terror: Assessing Terrorist Use of
Chemical and Biological Weapons, (MA: MIT Press, 2000), p. 209.
vii Kyle B. Olson, ―Once and Future Threat?‖ Available from:
http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/EID/vol5no4/pdf/olson.pdf ,(last accessed on 30 Aug 06), p. 515.
viii Sage Publications, Aum Shinrikyo, located at
http://www.sagepub.com/Terrorism%20samples_2788.pdf, (last accessed on 30 Aug 06), p. 1.
ix Olson, ―Once and Future Threat?‖ p. 514
x Daniel A. Metraux, Aum Shinrikyo’s Impact on Japanese Society, (New York: The Edwin Mellen Press,
2000), p. 78.
xi Olson, ―Once and Future Threat?‖ pp. 514-515.
xii Ibid, p. 515.
xiii Sage Publications, Aum Shinrikyo, p. 1
xiv Gavin Cameron, Nuclear Terrorism, (Great Britain: MacMillan Press, 1999), 5.
xv Sara Daly, John Parachini, and William Rosenau, Aum Shinrikyo, and the Kinchasa Reactor, (Santa
Monica, CA: RAND, DB-458-AF, 2005), 13.
xvi Ibid., 12.
xvii Gavin Cameron, ―Terrorism and Weapons of Mass Destruction: Prospects and Problems,‖ in The
New Terrorism by Andrew Tan and Kumar Ramakrishna, (Singapore: Eastern Universities Press,
2002), p. 63.
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