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while reducing the likelihood of death or capture, particularly among the group‘s leaders.
Going underground would also isolate the movement from the outside world and would limit
the opportunity to add new recruits or replenish losses. Additionally, this act had the added
effect of further radicalizing the group‘s tactics and ideology. As a result, Aum‘s behavior
began to reflect the internal dynamics of the organization rather than the pursuit of a
specific strategic objective.xxi The group began to develop a tight identity, social
connections, interpersonal bonds, and a sense of cohesion. The move towards greater
isolation intensified the group‘s resolve to shift toward more violent activity.xxii The
organization‘s decision-making began to reflect the group‘s internal dynamics as groupthink
eliminated dissent within the leadership‘s inner core. Loyalty to the peer group took on a
more profound meaning and became an important motive as activists shifted toward a
deepening commitment to the cause of group survival.xxiii
What began as an apocalyptic strategy, however bizarre in nature, degenerated into an
irrational act of mass violence that reflected the paranoid desperation of the group‘s
leadership. The leadership abandoned its pursuit of nuclear weapons and opted for a less
catastrophic chemical weapon—a weapon of mass disruption, rather than mass destruction.
The Tokyo subway attack, then, was not so much an ―act‖ of terrorism linked to a strategic
objective of hastening Armageddon through weapons of mass destruction as it was a violent
―acting out‖ of a leader‘s psychopathological need to hurt the countrymen who had
frustrated his grandiose and delusional goals.
The group was renamed in 2000 to Aleph (meaning ―to start anew‖), but it has yet to
relinquish its ties with Shoko Asahara. According to a New York Times article, when asked
about its relationship with Asahara, Aleph‘s current leader Fumihiro Joyu, stated that "Just
like you wouldn't stop your connection with physical fathers and mothers who commit a
crime, we will not sever our connection with our spiritual father."xxiv The psychological bond
to the charismatic leader endures, despite his utter failure to bring about the changes that
he once promised to his followers.
Al-Qaeda
Like Asahara, Osama bin Laden developed antisystem frames to provide an ethical
justification for Al Qaeda‘s violence against civilians. For example, on 23 Feb 1998, Osama
bin Laden released his Jihad Against the Jews and Crusaders, where he states his three
major grievances with the United States: first, the occupation of ―the lands of Islam in the
holiest places, the Arabian peninsula‖ second, ―the crusader-Zionist alliance‖ third, ―[the
United States‘ intent] to fragment all the (Arab) states of the region such as Iraq, Saudi
Arabia, Egypt, and Sudan into paper statelets and through their disunion and weakness to
guarantee Israel‘s survival and the continuation of the brutal crusade occupation of the
peninsula.‖xxv Released by the World Islamic Front, al Qaeda‘s fatwa ―became the manifesto
of the full-fledged global Salafi jihad‖ and heralded bin Laden‘s call to carry out the jihad
against ―far enemy.‖xxvi
By tapping into a populist pan-Islamic theme, bin Laden attempts to draw support from the
broader Muslim community. His message strives to appeal to a wider global audience and
rally a Muslim population of over 1 billion people to al Qaeda‘s cause. His effort is intended
to reduce the psychological cost of participating in an extremist cause. Bin Laden‘s words
seem to echo della Porta‘s observation that ―The ideology of the terrorist organizations
offered (1) a justification of political violence, including murder (2) an image of the
external world that masked the failures of the armed struggle and (3) a positive evaluation
of the role of individual action.‖xxvii Similar to Aum, al Qaeda has drawn support from those
sympathetic to its cause. Although Aum‘s idiosyncratic framing of its cause limited its
appeal, Bin Laden leveraged common cultural and religious frames to serve the group‘s
strategic ideological objectives and thereby gained much wider support than Aum.

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Therefore, as with Aum Shinrikyo, one must distinguish between and separate religious and
ideological factors that shape the group‘s short-term and long-term objectives.
Unlike Aum, al Qaeda‘s influence has extended to groups with known or alleged connections
to al Qaeda, including the Jemaah Islamiyah in Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore Abu
Sayyaf in the Philippines, al-Gama‘a al-Islamiyya in Egypt Harakat ul-Maujahidin in
Pakistan the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan in Central Asia Jaish-e-Mohammed in India
and Pakistan and, al-Jihad in Egypt.xxviii But al Qaeda and its regional surrogate groups
differ in that al Qaeda possesses a global view whereas the concerns of these various
groups are more local. Likewise, these local groups have gone to considerable lengths to
justify their support within the local population and would be less inclined towards resorting
to mass violence. While al Qaeda may agree that an attack on the U.S. is justified, a similar
response locally would be counterproductive to the group‘s cause. Yet, to the extent that
these corollary groups support al Qaeda directly or through more indirect means, an
understanding of the overall network is critical to determining the groups‘ vulnerabilities and
potential opportunities to influence, deny, degrade, or disrupt threats of extreme violence.
Arguably, in the case of a group like al Qaeda, the framing of such religious zeal serves to
promote the group‘s ideological objectives as well as justify the use of collective violence.xxix
According to Hafez,
Muslims rebel because they encounter an ill-fated combination of political
and institutional exclusion, on the one hand, and reactive and indiscriminate
repression on the other. When states do not provide their Islamist
opposition movements opportunities for institutional participation, and
employ repression indiscriminately against these movements after a period
of prior mobilization, Islamists will most probably rebel.xxx
Hafez describes how radical Islamists organize themselves and demand strict ideological
and behavioral adherence from each of their members. In a similar way, Aum used threat,
fear, murder, and intimidation to mitigate dissention within the group. This radicalized
view, however, further isolated the organization from the rest of society.
A similar, though somewhat different, process occurred with respect to Al Qaeda. Islamists‘
initial failure to change states such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia from within led to a ―spiral of
encapsulation‖ that gradually isolated the extremists from government and Muslim leaders
and caused the group to become more extreme in its views. The experience gained by
these extremists would later become the core of al Qaeda‘s belief system. However, unlike
Aum, Al Qaeda was successful in modifying its message to elicit sympathy and support from
the Muslim masses, especially when it directed its ire toward the ―far away enemy,‖
specifically the United States. ―Organizers of violence must align their tactics with cultural
norms, symbols, and ethics that give moral meaning to acts of violence. Culture provides a
―tool kit‖ of concepts, myths, and symbols from which militant organizations could
selectively draw to construct strategies of action.‖xxxi When a society places a premium on
self- sacrifice, cultural framing can succeed in intensifying and reinforcing extreme use of
violence, such as suicide terrorism, by playing to those self-sacrificing themes. Thus,
martyrdom through suicide terror becomes the weapon of choice for producing mass
violence. While nation-states apply the threat of economic sanctions and conventional
firepower as a means of coercion, terrorists use suicide terror as the instrument of choice to
advance their strategic objectives because their power lies in their ability to resonate with
and manipulate cultural and religious frames, rather than ability to control economic and
military institutions.xxxii
Unlike Aum Shinrikyo, al Qaeda used a technologically conservative weapon that combined
variants of familiar tactics of hijacking, bombing, and martyrdom as suicide terror in a
highly innovative way doctrinally.xxxiii This tactic, however, reflected al Qaeda‘s capacity to