Cultic Studies Review, Vol. 5, No. 2, 2006, Page 58
Another worrisome scenario is that one or more terrorist groups may shift from an
instrumentalist to an organizational perspective that becomes increasingly cult-like as a
charismatic leader‘s decision-making becomes more and more idiosyncratic and irrational.
If such a group obtained a WMD device such as a nuclear bomb, altering the cost-benefit
calculus would not be a deterrent, for the group would no longer be operating according to
an instrumentalist paradigm. A scenario whereby non-state actors acquired a nuclear
capability would not only threaten the security of the United States, but would destabilize
the Westphalian notion of the primacy of nation-states within the international system.
Therefore, the most important goal in counterterrorism should be to make WMD technology
and existing nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons more difficult to obtain. Succeeding
in this goal will reduce the probability of a catastrophe however, it will not eliminate the
lesser but nonetheless horrific destruction achievable through conventional weapons,
especially when creatively used as on 9/11. To make progress on this front, we must
continue to increase our understanding of how the varieties of terrorist and other
destructive groups operate, psychologically as well as politically and strategically.
Notes
i Mohammed Hafez, Why do Muslims Rebel, (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003), p.
199.
ii Jeff Goodwin, ―Review Essay: What Must We Explain to Explain Terrorism,” Social Movement Studies,
Carfax Publishing, Taylor &Franklin Group, (October 2004), Vol. 3, No. 2.
iii Martha Crenshaw, ―Theories of Terrorism: Instrumental &Organizational Approaches,‖ located in
Inside Terrorist Organizations, ed. by David Rapoport, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988),
pp. 27
iv Thomas Schelling, ―Thinking about Nuclear Terrorism,‖ International Security, (Spring 1983), Vol. 6
No. 4.
v David E. Kaplan and Andrew Marshall, the Cult at the End of the World, Crown Publishers, Inc, 1996,
p. 12.
vi David E. Kaplan, ―Aum Shinrikyo,‖ in Jonathan B. Tucker‘s Toxic Terror: Assessing Terrorist Use of
Chemical and Biological Weapons, (MA: MIT Press, 2000), p. 209.
vii Kyle B. Olson, ―Once and Future Threat?‖ Available from:
http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/EID/vol5no4/pdf/olson.pdf ,(last accessed on 30 Aug 06), p. 515.
viii Sage Publications, Aum Shinrikyo, located at
http://www.sagepub.com/Terrorism%20samples_2788.pdf, (last accessed on 30 Aug 06), p. 1.
ix Olson, ―Once and Future Threat?‖ p. 514
x Daniel A. Metraux, Aum Shinrikyo’s Impact on Japanese Society, (New York: The Edwin Mellen Press,
2000), p. 78.
xi Olson, ―Once and Future Threat?‖ pp. 514-515.
xii Ibid, p. 515.
xiii Sage Publications, Aum Shinrikyo, p. 1
xiv Gavin Cameron, Nuclear Terrorism, (Great Britain: MacMillan Press, 1999), 5.
xv Sara Daly, John Parachini, and William Rosenau, Aum Shinrikyo, and the Kinchasa Reactor, (Santa
Monica, CA: RAND, DB-458-AF, 2005), 13.
xvi Ibid., 12.
xvii Gavin Cameron, ―Terrorism and Weapons of Mass Destruction: Prospects and Problems,‖ in The
New Terrorism by Andrew Tan and Kumar Ramakrishna, (Singapore: Eastern Universities Press,
2002), p. 63.
Another worrisome scenario is that one or more terrorist groups may shift from an
instrumentalist to an organizational perspective that becomes increasingly cult-like as a
charismatic leader‘s decision-making becomes more and more idiosyncratic and irrational.
If such a group obtained a WMD device such as a nuclear bomb, altering the cost-benefit
calculus would not be a deterrent, for the group would no longer be operating according to
an instrumentalist paradigm. A scenario whereby non-state actors acquired a nuclear
capability would not only threaten the security of the United States, but would destabilize
the Westphalian notion of the primacy of nation-states within the international system.
Therefore, the most important goal in counterterrorism should be to make WMD technology
and existing nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons more difficult to obtain. Succeeding
in this goal will reduce the probability of a catastrophe however, it will not eliminate the
lesser but nonetheless horrific destruction achievable through conventional weapons,
especially when creatively used as on 9/11. To make progress on this front, we must
continue to increase our understanding of how the varieties of terrorist and other
destructive groups operate, psychologically as well as politically and strategically.
Notes
i Mohammed Hafez, Why do Muslims Rebel, (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003), p.
199.
ii Jeff Goodwin, ―Review Essay: What Must We Explain to Explain Terrorism,” Social Movement Studies,
Carfax Publishing, Taylor &Franklin Group, (October 2004), Vol. 3, No. 2.
iii Martha Crenshaw, ―Theories of Terrorism: Instrumental &Organizational Approaches,‖ located in
Inside Terrorist Organizations, ed. by David Rapoport, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988),
pp. 27
iv Thomas Schelling, ―Thinking about Nuclear Terrorism,‖ International Security, (Spring 1983), Vol. 6
No. 4.
v David E. Kaplan and Andrew Marshall, the Cult at the End of the World, Crown Publishers, Inc, 1996,
p. 12.
vi David E. Kaplan, ―Aum Shinrikyo,‖ in Jonathan B. Tucker‘s Toxic Terror: Assessing Terrorist Use of
Chemical and Biological Weapons, (MA: MIT Press, 2000), p. 209.
vii Kyle B. Olson, ―Once and Future Threat?‖ Available from:
http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/EID/vol5no4/pdf/olson.pdf ,(last accessed on 30 Aug 06), p. 515.
viii Sage Publications, Aum Shinrikyo, located at
http://www.sagepub.com/Terrorism%20samples_2788.pdf, (last accessed on 30 Aug 06), p. 1.
ix Olson, ―Once and Future Threat?‖ p. 514
x Daniel A. Metraux, Aum Shinrikyo’s Impact on Japanese Society, (New York: The Edwin Mellen Press,
2000), p. 78.
xi Olson, ―Once and Future Threat?‖ pp. 514-515.
xii Ibid, p. 515.
xiii Sage Publications, Aum Shinrikyo, p. 1
xiv Gavin Cameron, Nuclear Terrorism, (Great Britain: MacMillan Press, 1999), 5.
xv Sara Daly, John Parachini, and William Rosenau, Aum Shinrikyo, and the Kinchasa Reactor, (Santa
Monica, CA: RAND, DB-458-AF, 2005), 13.
xvi Ibid., 12.
xvii Gavin Cameron, ―Terrorism and Weapons of Mass Destruction: Prospects and Problems,‖ in The
New Terrorism by Andrew Tan and Kumar Ramakrishna, (Singapore: Eastern Universities Press,
2002), p. 63.
