Cultic Studies Review, Vol. 5, No. 2, 2006, Page 48
Terrorist Motivations, Extreme Violence, and the Pursuit of
Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)
Jaime Gomez, Jr.
Abstract
This essay examines the rationale behind terrorists‘ attempts to use weapons
of mass destruction. The essay explores this theme by comparing Aum
Shinrikyo and al Qaeda in order to assess the extent to which their actions
were the result of strategic choice or the expression of internal group
dynamics. Groups such as al Qaeda, which are motivated by strategic
choice, are more predictable, if their goals are properly understood, and
more likely to respond rationally than are groups such as Aum, which can
reflect the idiosyncratic psychopathology of the leader. However, since both
types of groups can pursue weapons of mass destruction, the most important
goal in counterterrorism should be to make WMD technology and existing
nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons more difficult to obtain.
Succeeding in this goal will reduce the probability of a catastrophe however,
it will not eliminate the lesser but nonetheless horrific destruction achievable
through conventional weapons, especially when creatively used as on 9/11.
To make progress on this front, we must continue to increase our
understanding of how the varieties of terrorist and other destructive groups
operate, psychologically as well as politically and strategically.
Mohammed Hafez cautions that ―Western responses to Islamist violence must be measured
and well thought out. Misconstruing the underlying causes of Islamist rage or overacting to
Islamist violence may only intensify militancy, not temperate it.‖i For policy-makers,
understanding the source or cause of discontent serves as the best hope to remedy the ills
that lie beneath what some refer to as ―sacred‖ terrorism or religious terrorism. Basic
questions arise: What would extremists hope to achieve by resorting to such violent acts?
Is terrorism ever rational? Can terrorism be deterred? All too often, our analysis of
extremist motives begins with our reaction to the terrorist act itself. However, for certain
extremist organizations, successful efforts to identify and isolate the root cause of such
events rests on a deeper understanding of the subtle processes that foment such profound
actions, in particular suicide terrorism and the use of a weapon of mass destruction.
In a recent review of Jessica Stern‘s Terror in the Name of God, Jeff Goodwin stated that
few studies probe deeply into the cause of terrorism and, as a result,
...it remains a mystery. A contributing factor is that social movement
scholars with very few exceptions have said little about terrorism. Nor have
they paid sustained attention to the more general question of how movement
organizations make strategic choices, of which terrorism is one.ii
To resolve group level problems we need to view them from a group level or movement
level perspective. At that point we can craft more tailored solutions to counter the
extremist threat. The central theme of this essay is to examine the rationale behind
terrorists‘ attempts to use weapons of mass destruction. I explore this theme by comparing
Aum Shinrikyo and al Qaeda in order to assess the extent to which their actions were the
result of strategic choice or the expression of internal group dynamics.
In brief, Aum Shinrikyo‘s decision to attack civilians on a Japanese subway reflects an
organization in a desperate fight for survival. According to Martha Crenshaw‘s
organizational perspective, ―terrorist actions often appear inconsistent, erratic, and

Cultic Studies Review, Vol. 5, No. 2, 2006, Page 49
unpredictable‖ and terrorist acts might occur as a result of internal group dynamics.iii The
group‘s ultimate decision to strike a Tokyo subway system was as much an attack on
Japan‘s political culture as it was an act by a desperate group. In contrast, al Qaeda‘s
methodical planning and extensive preparation reflect an instrumental approach where the
act of terrorism is that of strategic choice advancing collective values. According to
Crenshaw, such an organization ultimately fails when the group is unable to reach its
political objectives or when the cost of conducting such terrorist acts exceeds any
foreseeable benefits.
Aum Shinrikyo
One of today‘s abiding fears is that 9/11 was only the first act of ―megaterrorism‖ and that
those that follow might use weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Authors such as Graham
Allison, Bruce Hoffman, Walter Laqueur, and others have written about the prospects of
such actions. In fact, Thomas Schelling in 1979 said:
Sometime in the 1980s an organization that is not a national government
may acquire a few nuclear weapons…. By ―organization‖ I mean a political
movement, a government in exile, a separatist or secessionist party, a
military rebellion, adventurers from the underground or the underworld, or
even some group of people merely bent on showing that it can be done.iv
Schelling‘s statement implies that distinctions exist among terrorist groups. If terrorist
groups are distinctive in their motives, it would stand to reason that in order to deter or
influence such organizations, one must also be able to isolate and differentiate the group‘s
goals and objectives from their rhetoric. For example, in comparing the Japanese terrorist
cult Aum Shinrikyo to al Qaeda, we find distinctions in orientation and ideology, yet both
have used religious extremism to serve ideological objectives.
Before the events of 9/11, Aum Shinrikyo unleashed fears of extreme terror with the release
of sarin gas in a Japanese subway in 1995. Led by a religious mystic, Shoko Asahara,
followers of the movement had come to believe that ―Armageddon will come at the end of
this century and…only a merciful, godly race will survive. The leader of this race will
emerge in Japan.‖v Asahara, characterized as a charismatic, highly ambitious individual,
methodically built a cult that, at its peak, reached 40,000 members worldwide with an
estimated 30,000 followers in Russia and other areas, including Australia, Sri Lanka, and
the United States.vi The group capitalized on millennial visions and apocalyptic predictions
to frame their group‘s doctrine, which was deeply influenced by the works of Nostradamus,
whose work serves as a cornerstone of the group‘s teachings.vii Aum‘s followers actively
recruited students and professionals in the fields of medicine, science, computers,
engineering, and other technical areas. Asahara‘s charisma and message seemed to have a
great appeal to many who felt alienated by the industrialized, secular, and conformist
aspects of Japanese society.viii
At its peak, it is estimated that Aum Shinrikyo‘s worth was as much as $1.5 billion.ix With
such great financial resources, Aum Shinrikyo invested capital to support high-tech, state-
of-the-art laboratories and funded its own research, circumventing restrictions normally
associated with larger corporate research laboratories.x In addition to collecting monies
through donations, tithing, and sales of religious materials, Aum conducted seminars and
courses in the cult‘s teachings, charging hundreds to tens of thousands of dollars to
participate in these sessions. In fact, Aum Shinrikyo diversified its enterprises by running a
chain of restaurants in Tokyo as well as a computer-manufacturing firm that assembled and
sold computers in Japan with parts imported from Taiwan.xi Other more surreptitious
practices included the manufacturing of illegal drugs, which was supported by the Japanese
mafia (the Yakuza) with a marketing agreement. Further, Aum engaged in a practice
referred to as ―green mail‖ where Aum would extort community leaders by threatening to