Cultic Studies Review, Vol. 3, Nos. 2 &3, 2004, Page 95
manipulated in such groups such arousal is thought itself to deplete attentional capacity
(Eysenck, 1977).
Baron (1986, 2000) has argued that such stress and capacity depletion heightens the
various social psychological processes alluded to above (see also Bodenhousen, 1993).
Several studies indicate that fear and arousal decrease the likelihood that individuals will
notice and react to logical flaws in a persuasive message while elevating the tendency of
individuals to be influenced by superficial aspects of a message such as the reactions of the
audience, or the presumed credentials of the speaker (e.g., Baron, Inman, Kao &Logan,
1992 Sanbonmatus &Kardis, 1988). Similarly, fear has been shown to elevate
stereotyping (Baron, Inman, Kao, &Logan, 1992 Keinan, Friedland, &Even-Haim, 2000),
compliance (Dolinski &Nawrat, 1998), conformity (Darley, 1966), and cognitive dissonance
generated attitude change (Pittman, 1975).
Given that life in totalist groups often entails emotional manipulations, sleep deprivation,
high levels of regimented and required activity, and inadequate nutrition, there is ample
reason to assume that attentional capacity is compromised in such groups, thereby
heightening group members‘ susceptibility to a variety of persuasion manipulations. It is
likely that such stress and the attentional depletion it causes, will also affect leadership
dynamics in such groups. This argument is based on several key assumptions. The first is
that low capacity increases the power differential between members and leader regarding
expert and informational power. If stress does lower attentional capacity (or even if it just
decreases confidence in one‘s capacity) one is rendered more dependent on a confident,
informed, and well-credentialed leader to provide interpretations of events, as well as pre-
packaged solutions and decisions.
The second assumption is that the stress of indoctrination lowers the self-confidence and
self-efficacy of group members. Numerous reports support this view (e.g., Singer, 1995).
Thus, a common indoctrination feature within totalist groups are recurrent instances where
individuals must submit to detailed criticism, confession and other acts of mortification
(e.g., Baron, 2000 Hinkle &Wolff, 1956). Moreover, members in totalist groups are often
placed in the position of having to adjust to unusual group norms while trying to master an
unfamiliar and complex doctrine or skill set, be it political, quasi-scientific, or religious. This
confusion, coupled with criticism of the individual member from within the group, is
sufficient to shake the confidence of all but the most self-resilient (Lifton, 1961). Such
attacks on self-efficacy and self-esteem make identification with the group very attractive.
It has been assumed for some time that group identification is a very effective means of
bolstering self-esteem or of ―escaping‖ from an inadequate self (Hoffer, 1951). It follows
that the more inadequate one feels about oneself, the greater the allure of a totalist group.
A related idea is that these attacks on the member‘s confidence and self-efficacy, render the
member more dependent on the group (in cults this means the group leader) for guidance,
interpretation, explanation and normative control over activity and choices. As Hogg (2001)
points out, one benefit of committed group membership and identification is that group
norms reduce uncertainty regarding what to think, feel and do. Hogg (in press) extends this
logic by arguing that people who experience uncertainty regarding their self-concept should
be particularly attracted to distinctive groups characterized by unique, clear norms that
produce high group entitativity—a common feature of totalist groups. Thus, uncertainty is
viewed as a factor that heightens normative power. Interestingly, normative control has
been found to be particularly strong in cases in which group members‘ task confidence is
low (Bond &Smith, 1996) and the salience of group membership is very high (Abrams,
Wetherall, Cochrane, Hogg, &Turner, 1990), as is the case in totalist groups. Indeed,
recent research indicates that the more one conforms to the dictates of such highly salient,
confident and self-referential groups, the better one feels about oneself (Pool, Wood, &
manipulated in such groups such arousal is thought itself to deplete attentional capacity
(Eysenck, 1977).
Baron (1986, 2000) has argued that such stress and capacity depletion heightens the
various social psychological processes alluded to above (see also Bodenhousen, 1993).
Several studies indicate that fear and arousal decrease the likelihood that individuals will
notice and react to logical flaws in a persuasive message while elevating the tendency of
individuals to be influenced by superficial aspects of a message such as the reactions of the
audience, or the presumed credentials of the speaker (e.g., Baron, Inman, Kao &Logan,
1992 Sanbonmatus &Kardis, 1988). Similarly, fear has been shown to elevate
stereotyping (Baron, Inman, Kao, &Logan, 1992 Keinan, Friedland, &Even-Haim, 2000),
compliance (Dolinski &Nawrat, 1998), conformity (Darley, 1966), and cognitive dissonance
generated attitude change (Pittman, 1975).
Given that life in totalist groups often entails emotional manipulations, sleep deprivation,
high levels of regimented and required activity, and inadequate nutrition, there is ample
reason to assume that attentional capacity is compromised in such groups, thereby
heightening group members‘ susceptibility to a variety of persuasion manipulations. It is
likely that such stress and the attentional depletion it causes, will also affect leadership
dynamics in such groups. This argument is based on several key assumptions. The first is
that low capacity increases the power differential between members and leader regarding
expert and informational power. If stress does lower attentional capacity (or even if it just
decreases confidence in one‘s capacity) one is rendered more dependent on a confident,
informed, and well-credentialed leader to provide interpretations of events, as well as pre-
packaged solutions and decisions.
The second assumption is that the stress of indoctrination lowers the self-confidence and
self-efficacy of group members. Numerous reports support this view (e.g., Singer, 1995).
Thus, a common indoctrination feature within totalist groups are recurrent instances where
individuals must submit to detailed criticism, confession and other acts of mortification
(e.g., Baron, 2000 Hinkle &Wolff, 1956). Moreover, members in totalist groups are often
placed in the position of having to adjust to unusual group norms while trying to master an
unfamiliar and complex doctrine or skill set, be it political, quasi-scientific, or religious. This
confusion, coupled with criticism of the individual member from within the group, is
sufficient to shake the confidence of all but the most self-resilient (Lifton, 1961). Such
attacks on self-efficacy and self-esteem make identification with the group very attractive.
It has been assumed for some time that group identification is a very effective means of
bolstering self-esteem or of ―escaping‖ from an inadequate self (Hoffer, 1951). It follows
that the more inadequate one feels about oneself, the greater the allure of a totalist group.
A related idea is that these attacks on the member‘s confidence and self-efficacy, render the
member more dependent on the group (in cults this means the group leader) for guidance,
interpretation, explanation and normative control over activity and choices. As Hogg (2001)
points out, one benefit of committed group membership and identification is that group
norms reduce uncertainty regarding what to think, feel and do. Hogg (in press) extends this
logic by arguing that people who experience uncertainty regarding their self-concept should
be particularly attracted to distinctive groups characterized by unique, clear norms that
produce high group entitativity—a common feature of totalist groups. Thus, uncertainty is
viewed as a factor that heightens normative power. Interestingly, normative control has
been found to be particularly strong in cases in which group members‘ task confidence is
low (Bond &Smith, 1996) and the salience of group membership is very high (Abrams,
Wetherall, Cochrane, Hogg, &Turner, 1990), as is the case in totalist groups. Indeed,
recent research indicates that the more one conforms to the dictates of such highly salient,
confident and self-referential groups, the better one feels about oneself (Pool, Wood, &
