Cultic Studies Review, Vol. 3, Nos. 2 &3, 2004, Page 16
perceived opponents—they nonetheless allow researchers to connect group conflict with
group structures and ideologies that reflect the biospsychosocial issues of many group
leaders.
Among the clearest attempts to connect the mentality of a leader with potentially dangerous
group conflict appeared in a 1984 court decision against Scientology. In his ―Memorandum
of Intended Decision,‖ California Superior Judge Paul Breckenridge, Jr., concluded that the
Scientology
organization clearly is schizophrenic and paranoid, and this bizarre
combination seems to be a reflection of its founder LRH [L. Ron Hubbard].
The evidence portrays a man who has been virtually a pathological liar when
it comes to his history, background, and achievements. The writings and
documents in evidence additionally reflect his egoism, greed, avarice, lust for
power, and vindictiveness and aggressiveness against persons perceived by
him to be disloyal or hostile.... Obviously, he is and has been a very complex
person, and that complexity is further reflected in his alter ego, the Church of
Scientology (Breckenridge 1984b:7-8).
While part of the "diagnosis" that Breckenridge gave almost certainly was incorrect
(Hubbard was far more likely to have been bipolar with paranoid tendencies or narcissistic
than schizophrenic), the connection that the judge made between the mind of the founder
and Scientology‘s organization and its aggressive policies rings true. He reached these
conclusions in a case in which the organization had "fair gamed" former member Gerald
Armstrong, and Breckenridge saw a direct connection between Hubbard‘s paranoia and the
organization‘s reaction to someone whom leaders perceived to be an enemy.
Scientology applies the same "fair game" policy to organizations, including governments,
against which it struggles. As the author of a review of Scientology‘s litigation strategies
concluded, ―[m]uch to the Church‘s chagrin, opponents frequently cite its own founder, L.
Ron Hubbard, for the ‗fair game doctrine,‘ a revealing statement that may explain the
ferocity and zeal of the organization‘s litigation stance‖ (Kumar 1997:748). While providing
examples of that ferocity against individuals, the author (J.P. Kumar) also reported that
Scientology‘s application of fair game ―can frustrate the largest of adversaries. Large media
defendants and multinational corporations have learned that even a successful battle
against the Church is something of a Pyrric victory after the costs of litigation are tallied‖
(Kumar 1997:750). Even the American government has experienced the force of
Scientology‘s ―hardball‖ tactics (Kumar 1997:747-748). Persons suffering from paranoid
personality disorder often are ―litigious and frequently become involved in legal disputes‖
(American Psychiatric Association 1994:635), but this characteristic also fits the
organizational alter ego of Scientology‘s founder.
Other examples of (what appears to be) organizational paranoia that originated in the minds
of leaders have led to dire consequences. Jim Jones‘s paranoia escalated (with fatal
consequences) when some members tried to defect and leave with visiting Congressman
Leo Ryan, and the assassination squad that killed five members of the departing party
foreshadowed the mass murder and killing of 913 people that soon followed in the
compound (Reiterman and Jacobs 1982:527-529, 556-560). In yet another group example,
by 1994 the apocalyptic warning of Aum‘s leader, Shoko Asahara, led a former foreign
correspondent to conclude that the mindset of that organization ―was a classic paranoia in
the making, striking out at an imagined enemy before the enemy has a chance to strike
first‖ (Brackett 1996:105). In part, a delusional Asahara and Aum leaders saw the sarin
attack in the Tokyo subway as a preemptive strike against enemies (i.e., Japanese and
American officials) who were poised to assault their organization.
perceived opponents—they nonetheless allow researchers to connect group conflict with
group structures and ideologies that reflect the biospsychosocial issues of many group
leaders.
Among the clearest attempts to connect the mentality of a leader with potentially dangerous
group conflict appeared in a 1984 court decision against Scientology. In his ―Memorandum
of Intended Decision,‖ California Superior Judge Paul Breckenridge, Jr., concluded that the
Scientology
organization clearly is schizophrenic and paranoid, and this bizarre
combination seems to be a reflection of its founder LRH [L. Ron Hubbard].
The evidence portrays a man who has been virtually a pathological liar when
it comes to his history, background, and achievements. The writings and
documents in evidence additionally reflect his egoism, greed, avarice, lust for
power, and vindictiveness and aggressiveness against persons perceived by
him to be disloyal or hostile.... Obviously, he is and has been a very complex
person, and that complexity is further reflected in his alter ego, the Church of
Scientology (Breckenridge 1984b:7-8).
While part of the "diagnosis" that Breckenridge gave almost certainly was incorrect
(Hubbard was far more likely to have been bipolar with paranoid tendencies or narcissistic
than schizophrenic), the connection that the judge made between the mind of the founder
and Scientology‘s organization and its aggressive policies rings true. He reached these
conclusions in a case in which the organization had "fair gamed" former member Gerald
Armstrong, and Breckenridge saw a direct connection between Hubbard‘s paranoia and the
organization‘s reaction to someone whom leaders perceived to be an enemy.
Scientology applies the same "fair game" policy to organizations, including governments,
against which it struggles. As the author of a review of Scientology‘s litigation strategies
concluded, ―[m]uch to the Church‘s chagrin, opponents frequently cite its own founder, L.
Ron Hubbard, for the ‗fair game doctrine,‘ a revealing statement that may explain the
ferocity and zeal of the organization‘s litigation stance‖ (Kumar 1997:748). While providing
examples of that ferocity against individuals, the author (J.P. Kumar) also reported that
Scientology‘s application of fair game ―can frustrate the largest of adversaries. Large media
defendants and multinational corporations have learned that even a successful battle
against the Church is something of a Pyrric victory after the costs of litigation are tallied‖
(Kumar 1997:750). Even the American government has experienced the force of
Scientology‘s ―hardball‖ tactics (Kumar 1997:747-748). Persons suffering from paranoid
personality disorder often are ―litigious and frequently become involved in legal disputes‖
(American Psychiatric Association 1994:635), but this characteristic also fits the
organizational alter ego of Scientology‘s founder.
Other examples of (what appears to be) organizational paranoia that originated in the minds
of leaders have led to dire consequences. Jim Jones‘s paranoia escalated (with fatal
consequences) when some members tried to defect and leave with visiting Congressman
Leo Ryan, and the assassination squad that killed five members of the departing party
foreshadowed the mass murder and killing of 913 people that soon followed in the
compound (Reiterman and Jacobs 1982:527-529, 556-560). In yet another group example,
by 1994 the apocalyptic warning of Aum‘s leader, Shoko Asahara, led a former foreign
correspondent to conclude that the mindset of that organization ―was a classic paranoia in
the making, striking out at an imagined enemy before the enemy has a chance to strike
first‖ (Brackett 1996:105). In part, a delusional Asahara and Aum leaders saw the sarin
attack in the Tokyo subway as a preemptive strike against enemies (i.e., Japanese and
American officials) who were poised to assault their organization.
