Cultic Studies Review, Vol. 3, Nos. 2 &3, 2004, Page 43
On perusing it you will see that the opinions which we have discussed, though
at present singular, are not novel, nor are they without authority, for they are
deduced from the only authentic source. To that source let me direct your
attention. Be more disposed to form your sentiments upon religion from that,
than to adopt and interpret it to your opinions. (Correspondence 115)
This quotation not only reveals the fears of a master losing his disciple but also touches the
nerve of liberty of conscience. The master based the force of his argument on the fact that
the matters discussed are neither novel nor without authority, but based on an authority,
the book of Beveridge. ―Not novel‖ is an appeal to tradition, which begs the question, what
authority has that tradition got? Whereas, the second appeal to authority as the ―only
authentic source‖ is equally empty, if not dangerous. The implication is that Bishop
Beveridge is authoritative in religious matters, and, hence, is the voice of God. Mayers‘
command to be ―more disposed‖ to Beveridge begs the final question of Mayers‘ own
authority to command, and the limits thereof. His rejection of Newman's opinions in favor of
Beveridge‘s without giving reasons why smacks of religious despotism. This reflects a
reference to cult-tactics described in the Confessions of St. Augustine:
If Faustus were so sure of his postulates, why was he so afraid of questions .
..This implies that either Faustus did not have all the answers or the very
fact of his not having all the answers did not fit in with the cult‘s credo. His
rejection of ―the give and take of argument‖ would imply no argument, except
the authority of Faustus to allow no argument. (A Toast to Conscience 24)
Unamuno, in his Recuerdos de niñez y mocedad, never tires in the hunt for ideas initially
escaping his grasp. Reading Kant, Fichte and Hegel, causes him vertigo, but the critical
skills, seen later in his life, are also present in the young Unamuno's reading of Balmes and
Donoso. The difficulty of understanding philosophy motivates Unamuno to seek deeper
insight (Recuerdos 105-06):
As with Newman vis-à-vis Mayers, Unamuno begins to think critically about his masters.
Their readings bring him to knowledge of greater philosophers, but also to a critical analysis
of his initial masters. Soon they who opened his eyes to philosophy also enable him to see
their limits, especially in the philosophers they presented. In fact, their very reading of
Kant, Fichte and Hegel seems inadequate to the searching mind of Unamuno.
Oversimplification leads to infidelity to the authors:
La desilusión de Balmes fué lo que empezó a abrirme los ojos. El espíritu del
publicista catalán, una especie de escocés de quinta mano, tenía no poco de
infantil simplicificaba todo lo que criticaba, ganando la discusión en claridad
cuanto perdía en exactitud la exposición de las doctrinas criticadas. (106)
My disillusionment with Balmes was what opened my eyes. The Catalan
publicist‘s spirit, a kind of fifth-hand Scottish species, had not little
childishness he simplified all he criticized, winning the argument in clarity
while losing out on exactness of the exposition of the criticized doctrines.
Even worse was the fact that Balmes himself did not seem to have direct knowledge of the
texts of the philosophers he criticized. Reflecting on this medieval experience of second-
hand readings, Unamuno learnt then the importance of faithful translations and direct
contact with the texts themselves. Possibly his love for languages and his yearning for
reading writers in the original came from this experience with Balmes (106).
Nonetheless, Unamuno did discover a reality by studying Balmes‘ interpretation of Hegel.
Though Balmes was superficial, merely skimping the surface of Hegel, out of these readings
came pulp, ―de ellas brotó pulpa‖ (106).
On perusing it you will see that the opinions which we have discussed, though
at present singular, are not novel, nor are they without authority, for they are
deduced from the only authentic source. To that source let me direct your
attention. Be more disposed to form your sentiments upon religion from that,
than to adopt and interpret it to your opinions. (Correspondence 115)
This quotation not only reveals the fears of a master losing his disciple but also touches the
nerve of liberty of conscience. The master based the force of his argument on the fact that
the matters discussed are neither novel nor without authority, but based on an authority,
the book of Beveridge. ―Not novel‖ is an appeal to tradition, which begs the question, what
authority has that tradition got? Whereas, the second appeal to authority as the ―only
authentic source‖ is equally empty, if not dangerous. The implication is that Bishop
Beveridge is authoritative in religious matters, and, hence, is the voice of God. Mayers‘
command to be ―more disposed‖ to Beveridge begs the final question of Mayers‘ own
authority to command, and the limits thereof. His rejection of Newman's opinions in favor of
Beveridge‘s without giving reasons why smacks of religious despotism. This reflects a
reference to cult-tactics described in the Confessions of St. Augustine:
If Faustus were so sure of his postulates, why was he so afraid of questions .
..This implies that either Faustus did not have all the answers or the very
fact of his not having all the answers did not fit in with the cult‘s credo. His
rejection of ―the give and take of argument‖ would imply no argument, except
the authority of Faustus to allow no argument. (A Toast to Conscience 24)
Unamuno, in his Recuerdos de niñez y mocedad, never tires in the hunt for ideas initially
escaping his grasp. Reading Kant, Fichte and Hegel, causes him vertigo, but the critical
skills, seen later in his life, are also present in the young Unamuno's reading of Balmes and
Donoso. The difficulty of understanding philosophy motivates Unamuno to seek deeper
insight (Recuerdos 105-06):
As with Newman vis-à-vis Mayers, Unamuno begins to think critically about his masters.
Their readings bring him to knowledge of greater philosophers, but also to a critical analysis
of his initial masters. Soon they who opened his eyes to philosophy also enable him to see
their limits, especially in the philosophers they presented. In fact, their very reading of
Kant, Fichte and Hegel seems inadequate to the searching mind of Unamuno.
Oversimplification leads to infidelity to the authors:
La desilusión de Balmes fué lo que empezó a abrirme los ojos. El espíritu del
publicista catalán, una especie de escocés de quinta mano, tenía no poco de
infantil simplicificaba todo lo que criticaba, ganando la discusión en claridad
cuanto perdía en exactitud la exposición de las doctrinas criticadas. (106)
My disillusionment with Balmes was what opened my eyes. The Catalan
publicist‘s spirit, a kind of fifth-hand Scottish species, had not little
childishness he simplified all he criticized, winning the argument in clarity
while losing out on exactness of the exposition of the criticized doctrines.
Even worse was the fact that Balmes himself did not seem to have direct knowledge of the
texts of the philosophers he criticized. Reflecting on this medieval experience of second-
hand readings, Unamuno learnt then the importance of faithful translations and direct
contact with the texts themselves. Possibly his love for languages and his yearning for
reading writers in the original came from this experience with Balmes (106).
Nonetheless, Unamuno did discover a reality by studying Balmes‘ interpretation of Hegel.
Though Balmes was superficial, merely skimping the surface of Hegel, out of these readings
came pulp, ―de ellas brotó pulpa‖ (106).
