Cultic Studies Review, Vol. 3, Nos. 2 &3, 2004, Page 155
origins and are qualitatively of the same nature, although their symbolic value is very
different.
Hence, in the minds of those who orchestrated the 9/11 tragedy, the aim was the symbolic
effect of such a huge atrocity stamped on the minds of both West and East. This symbolic
effect was accentuated by the rerunning media images of destruction. Dr. Erdely stimulates
further discussion, pointing out how little we know about those other victims that have been
slain for decades in countries such as Algiers and Indonesia by the same kind of factious
jihadist groups that killed more than two thousand people on 9/11. This in a way reminds us
of the Spanish judge Baltasar Garzón (2004) when he states: ―If the number of collateral
deaths in the different worldwide conflicts were counted, the resulting statistics would scare
even the most indifferent person.‖ That indifference, also related to ―moral disengagement‖
(Braginsky, 1986) is, according to Garzón, the best ally of all dictators, fundamentalists and
terrorists, and, I would add, manipulators.
This book encourages the reader to develop a better understanding of how normal people
can be recruited and indoctrinated to transform themselves into suicide hijackers in order to
follow a purportedly divine commandment. It doesn‘t end there, as it also stimulates
reflection on how our actions, presented as the fight against terrorism, have only treated
terrorism's consequences. Our actions, however, have been useless in reducing terrorism
and have contributed to the daily recruitment of new jihadists, even in our own countries.
But we could go even further because if we take only related cultic attributes into account,
we could easily conclude: ―Many pundits are saying that the eradication of bin Laden will be
fruitless unless certain ‗underlying causes‘ in the friction between East and West are
addressed. But that presumes a rational stance in modern terrorism, and there is none‖
(Pearson, 2001). We ought not to take only the terrorist mind into account when trying to
measure rationality, but should also analyze the cultural implications of the phenomenon.
Polk (2004) tells us that 73% of Lebanese people, 43% of Jordanians, 47% of Nigerians,
33% of Pakistanis and 27% of Indonesians approved of suicide attacks, if that could stop
Western ideas from being disseminated. This finding may cause in the West a similar
discomfort to that created in the Muslim world by Madeleine Albright‘s assertion that the
death of half a million Iraqi children was a ―hard choice‖ but ―the price is worth it‖ (Burgat,
2004 on Albright‘s 2001 response about U.S. sanctions against Iraq). These in a way remind
us of the Spanish judge, Baltasar Garzón (2004), when he states: "If the number of
collateral deaths in the different worldwide conflicts were counted, the resulting statistics
would scare even the most indifferent person." That indifference, also related to "moral
disengagement" (Braginsky, 1986) is, according to Garzon, the best ally of all dictators,
fundamentalists, and terrorists and, I would add, manipulators. It seems easy to find good
reasons for our own actions, which we justify based on the behavior of others. It is easy to
engage the general population in ―us vs. them‖ solutions. In doing so, however, not only are
we deafly ignoring the causes of terrorism, which begin at the very first stages of education,
but also we are day after day adding new reasons for supposedly ―moral justifications‖ to
violence. Meanwhile, why is it that the victims are always mostly innocent civilians,
sometimes very near, but other times so far removed from our humane interest and
compassion?
This book is based on well-documented research from a multidisciplinary approach. It is
written in a clear and readable form, intentionally avoiding the use of academic jargon.
Highly recommended.
References
Bandura, A. (2002). Selective moral disengagement in the exercise of moral agency. Journal
of Moral Education, 31 (2), 101-119.
origins and are qualitatively of the same nature, although their symbolic value is very
different.
Hence, in the minds of those who orchestrated the 9/11 tragedy, the aim was the symbolic
effect of such a huge atrocity stamped on the minds of both West and East. This symbolic
effect was accentuated by the rerunning media images of destruction. Dr. Erdely stimulates
further discussion, pointing out how little we know about those other victims that have been
slain for decades in countries such as Algiers and Indonesia by the same kind of factious
jihadist groups that killed more than two thousand people on 9/11. This in a way reminds us
of the Spanish judge Baltasar Garzón (2004) when he states: ―If the number of collateral
deaths in the different worldwide conflicts were counted, the resulting statistics would scare
even the most indifferent person.‖ That indifference, also related to ―moral disengagement‖
(Braginsky, 1986) is, according to Garzón, the best ally of all dictators, fundamentalists and
terrorists, and, I would add, manipulators.
This book encourages the reader to develop a better understanding of how normal people
can be recruited and indoctrinated to transform themselves into suicide hijackers in order to
follow a purportedly divine commandment. It doesn‘t end there, as it also stimulates
reflection on how our actions, presented as the fight against terrorism, have only treated
terrorism's consequences. Our actions, however, have been useless in reducing terrorism
and have contributed to the daily recruitment of new jihadists, even in our own countries.
But we could go even further because if we take only related cultic attributes into account,
we could easily conclude: ―Many pundits are saying that the eradication of bin Laden will be
fruitless unless certain ‗underlying causes‘ in the friction between East and West are
addressed. But that presumes a rational stance in modern terrorism, and there is none‖
(Pearson, 2001). We ought not to take only the terrorist mind into account when trying to
measure rationality, but should also analyze the cultural implications of the phenomenon.
Polk (2004) tells us that 73% of Lebanese people, 43% of Jordanians, 47% of Nigerians,
33% of Pakistanis and 27% of Indonesians approved of suicide attacks, if that could stop
Western ideas from being disseminated. This finding may cause in the West a similar
discomfort to that created in the Muslim world by Madeleine Albright‘s assertion that the
death of half a million Iraqi children was a ―hard choice‖ but ―the price is worth it‖ (Burgat,
2004 on Albright‘s 2001 response about U.S. sanctions against Iraq). These in a way remind
us of the Spanish judge, Baltasar Garzón (2004), when he states: "If the number of
collateral deaths in the different worldwide conflicts were counted, the resulting statistics
would scare even the most indifferent person." That indifference, also related to "moral
disengagement" (Braginsky, 1986) is, according to Garzon, the best ally of all dictators,
fundamentalists, and terrorists and, I would add, manipulators. It seems easy to find good
reasons for our own actions, which we justify based on the behavior of others. It is easy to
engage the general population in ―us vs. them‖ solutions. In doing so, however, not only are
we deafly ignoring the causes of terrorism, which begin at the very first stages of education,
but also we are day after day adding new reasons for supposedly ―moral justifications‖ to
violence. Meanwhile, why is it that the victims are always mostly innocent civilians,
sometimes very near, but other times so far removed from our humane interest and
compassion?
This book is based on well-documented research from a multidisciplinary approach. It is
written in a clear and readable form, intentionally avoiding the use of academic jargon.
Highly recommended.
References
Bandura, A. (2002). Selective moral disengagement in the exercise of moral agency. Journal
of Moral Education, 31 (2), 101-119.
