Cultic Studies Review, Vol. 3, Nos. 2 &3, 2004, Page 60
Kobe District Court Case: Jehovah’s Witnesses
In 1999 a lawsuit against a pastor was filed in Kobe District Court (Compensation Claim
number.3). The plaintiff was a woman who had been a Jehovah‘s Witnesses for seven years.
She lived apart from her husband and son because her husband did not approved of their
son being reared in the way of the Jehovah‘s Witnesses. Yet, she continued to meet her son
and teach him her religious beliefs. Her husband consulted with a pastor/deprogrammer
who had been accused of trying to disaffiliate the plaintiff from the Jehovah‘s Witnesses in
1994. Her husband and the pastor then cooperated to confine the woman for two weeks in
1995 in the pastor‘s lodge. As a result, she disaffiliated from the Jehovah‘s Witnesses, but
later returned to that religion, divorced, and then filed this suit in 1999.
The ruling in the case on March 30th, 2001 ordered the pastor to pay 300,000 yen for
psychological damages to the plaintiff and 100,000 yen for legal fees. The deprogramming
was judged as a confinement against the plaintiff‘s will and beyond the duty of the pastor in
granting individuals' requests. Because the pastor accepted approximately 925,000 yen in
payment (as a donation to his church) from the husband and because he utilized his lodge
only for deprogramming, the court determined that he did not take these actions as a
volunteer. The judgment also said that the husband could not use his right to keep his
young son away from Jehovah‘s Witness doctrine as a reason for forcing his wife to give up
her religious beliefs, and therefore he had no legitimate basis for such deprogramming.
The accused pastor appealed the ruling at the Osaka High Court in 2001. As the grounds of
this appeal, his attorneys claimed that the ruling failed to give any solutions to the
husband‘s self-searching: ―Then what should I have done at that time to rescue my son and
my wife from the Jehovah‘s Witnesses?‖ Moreover, the ruling did not consider Japanese
families whose members are involved in this religion and face several conflicts, such as child
discipline using a whip for corporal punishment and refusal of blood transfusion. The
accused insisted on the legality of deprogramming as self-help for the husband in this case.
The husband had the compelling reason that he did not want to divorce his wife and at the
same time, he could not accept her rearing his son as a child of Jehovah‘s Witnesses, and so
he conducted a deprogramming with the help of the pastor. Confinement and persuasion by
the family could be considered a legal basis of their action on the relatively flexible premise
that their motivation and means were legal, that they were in an emergency situation, and,
by comparison, the merit of self-help was more significant than the loss of a family
member. The attorneys argued that the actions of the husband and pastor were legal
according to any point of this self-help standard.
The plaintiff also appealed. Although she and her attorneys acknowledged the ruling as a
certain measure of victory, they argued that the amount of monetary compensation was
unnaturally low, favoring the account of the accused, and that the ruling did not fully
acknowledge freedom of religion. Referring to the ruling of Nagoya High Court (1998
number 299) that being a member of the Jehovah‘s Witnesses cannot take away a person‘s
parental authority, and that the teaching of this religion cannot be disqualified as education,
they argued that the plaintiff‘s beliefs and attitude towards her son should not be denied by
deprogramming that forced apostasy from a particular religion. As the mother, the plaintiff‘s
parental authority over her son was equal to that of her husband, and the appeal was that
the District Court ruling did not sufficiently consider this right. The appeal also included the
claim that the state should not intervene in religious and educational matters, if the beliefs
it supports are clearly shown to violate others‘ rights.
The points of this case are: (1) whether the deprogramming by professional
deprogrammers, aiming at apostasy from a particular religion, was practiced in an isolated
place, and whether the continued persuasion until the wife‘s decision to disaffiliate with the
Jehovah‘s Witness was legal action as self-help (2) whether the husband‘s parental
Kobe District Court Case: Jehovah’s Witnesses
In 1999 a lawsuit against a pastor was filed in Kobe District Court (Compensation Claim
number.3). The plaintiff was a woman who had been a Jehovah‘s Witnesses for seven years.
She lived apart from her husband and son because her husband did not approved of their
son being reared in the way of the Jehovah‘s Witnesses. Yet, she continued to meet her son
and teach him her religious beliefs. Her husband consulted with a pastor/deprogrammer
who had been accused of trying to disaffiliate the plaintiff from the Jehovah‘s Witnesses in
1994. Her husband and the pastor then cooperated to confine the woman for two weeks in
1995 in the pastor‘s lodge. As a result, she disaffiliated from the Jehovah‘s Witnesses, but
later returned to that religion, divorced, and then filed this suit in 1999.
The ruling in the case on March 30th, 2001 ordered the pastor to pay 300,000 yen for
psychological damages to the plaintiff and 100,000 yen for legal fees. The deprogramming
was judged as a confinement against the plaintiff‘s will and beyond the duty of the pastor in
granting individuals' requests. Because the pastor accepted approximately 925,000 yen in
payment (as a donation to his church) from the husband and because he utilized his lodge
only for deprogramming, the court determined that he did not take these actions as a
volunteer. The judgment also said that the husband could not use his right to keep his
young son away from Jehovah‘s Witness doctrine as a reason for forcing his wife to give up
her religious beliefs, and therefore he had no legitimate basis for such deprogramming.
The accused pastor appealed the ruling at the Osaka High Court in 2001. As the grounds of
this appeal, his attorneys claimed that the ruling failed to give any solutions to the
husband‘s self-searching: ―Then what should I have done at that time to rescue my son and
my wife from the Jehovah‘s Witnesses?‖ Moreover, the ruling did not consider Japanese
families whose members are involved in this religion and face several conflicts, such as child
discipline using a whip for corporal punishment and refusal of blood transfusion. The
accused insisted on the legality of deprogramming as self-help for the husband in this case.
The husband had the compelling reason that he did not want to divorce his wife and at the
same time, he could not accept her rearing his son as a child of Jehovah‘s Witnesses, and so
he conducted a deprogramming with the help of the pastor. Confinement and persuasion by
the family could be considered a legal basis of their action on the relatively flexible premise
that their motivation and means were legal, that they were in an emergency situation, and,
by comparison, the merit of self-help was more significant than the loss of a family
member. The attorneys argued that the actions of the husband and pastor were legal
according to any point of this self-help standard.
The plaintiff also appealed. Although she and her attorneys acknowledged the ruling as a
certain measure of victory, they argued that the amount of monetary compensation was
unnaturally low, favoring the account of the accused, and that the ruling did not fully
acknowledge freedom of religion. Referring to the ruling of Nagoya High Court (1998
number 299) that being a member of the Jehovah‘s Witnesses cannot take away a person‘s
parental authority, and that the teaching of this religion cannot be disqualified as education,
they argued that the plaintiff‘s beliefs and attitude towards her son should not be denied by
deprogramming that forced apostasy from a particular religion. As the mother, the plaintiff‘s
parental authority over her son was equal to that of her husband, and the appeal was that
the District Court ruling did not sufficiently consider this right. The appeal also included the
claim that the state should not intervene in religious and educational matters, if the beliefs
it supports are clearly shown to violate others‘ rights.
The points of this case are: (1) whether the deprogramming by professional
deprogrammers, aiming at apostasy from a particular religion, was practiced in an isolated
place, and whether the continued persuasion until the wife‘s decision to disaffiliate with the
Jehovah‘s Witness was legal action as self-help (2) whether the husband‘s parental
