Cultic Studies Review, Vol. 3, Nos. 2 &3, 2004, Page 9
395) or, I would add, self-preservation. It does so, in many instances, by substituting faith
for reason and obedience for questioning. To support this claim, one need not rely only
upon Karl Marx‘s quip about religion being ―the opium of the people‖ (Marx 1964:42 see
van Uden and Pieper 1996:44), since the less offensive observations of Max Weber will do.
In his 1915 essay on ―Religious Rejections of the World and Their Directions,‖ Weber
observed, ―[t]here is absolutely no ‗unbroken‘ religion working as a vital force which is not
compelled at some point to demand the credo non quod sed quia absurdum—the sacrifice of
the intellect‖ (Weber 1915:352). Now one should object immediately by pointing out that
billions of people believe in faiths, and most of them never show violent tendencies. But for
people whose cognitive capacities are dulled or compromised by biogenetic imbalances,
social-psychological stressors, chemical alterations, or aggressive theologies, violence may
(and often does) flare up. When it flares up in religious contexts, the results can be
especially severe.
II. Interpersonal Contributors to Religious Dangers
A. Mental Illnesses
Biopsychosocial debilitations likely will hinder interpersonal relationships. Roy emphasizes
that (what he calls) ―a pool of anger‖ within some individuals can poison their ability to
socially interact (Roy 2000:394-395), but mental and personality disorders also inhibit
people‘s ability to enter into social exchanges. Psychopaths or sociopaths (probably like
Charles Manson) have no consciences and lack the ability to feel empathy (American
Psychiatric Association 1994:645-650 Emmons 1986:202 Sanders 1989:12), while
narcissists demand asymmetrical, constant adulation (American Psychiatric Association
1994:658-662). Schizophrenics distort social and personal reality, and interact according to
delusional notions about themselves and others‘ relationships to them (see American
Psychiatric Association 1994:287). Manic depression (now called bipolar disorder) involves
―a chronic pattern of unpredictable mood episodes and fluctuating, unreliable interpersonal
or occupational functioning‖ (American Psychiatric Association 1994:359). Paranoids, of
course, demonstrate ―a pattern of pervasive distrust and suspiciousness of others such that
their motives are interpreted as malevolent.... [They] assume that other people will exploit,
harm, or deceive them, even if no evidence exists to support their expectation‖ (American
Psychiatric Association 1994:634).
Even among groups whose leaders lack demonstrations of diagnosable mental-health
problems, the social distance between leaders and followers facilitates violence by
diminishing leader accountability. Moreover, groups sanctify that social distance through
divine claims. Gurus, reputedly enlightened masters, and religious virtuosi of all types claim
special spiritual gifts that set them apart from others (at least when others accept their
claims). Removed from the flock, these charismatic leaders can direct, facilitate, or justify
violence, making divine or transcendent assertions that few can challenge but all must
accept. If leaders become deified, then followers get diminished, and it is easier to strike
out at one‘s underlings than it is against one‘s peers or superiors. Said succinctly about
family violence but also applicable to religion, ―abuse tends to gravitate toward the
relationships of greatest power differential‖ (Finkelhor 1983:18, italics in original).
B. Shared Drug Experiences
If mental illnesses and social distances distort the ways in which some leaders relate to
followers, then shared drug experiences create even more complex interpersonal dynamics
that often contribute to violence. Drugs alter (among other things) judgment, cognition, and
sensation, so people under their influence may engage in actions that they otherwise would
avoid. Likewise, they also may adopt the interpretations about their altered consciences that
their leaders provide about them, thereby relinquishing considerable autonomy to persons
395) or, I would add, self-preservation. It does so, in many instances, by substituting faith
for reason and obedience for questioning. To support this claim, one need not rely only
upon Karl Marx‘s quip about religion being ―the opium of the people‖ (Marx 1964:42 see
van Uden and Pieper 1996:44), since the less offensive observations of Max Weber will do.
In his 1915 essay on ―Religious Rejections of the World and Their Directions,‖ Weber
observed, ―[t]here is absolutely no ‗unbroken‘ religion working as a vital force which is not
compelled at some point to demand the credo non quod sed quia absurdum—the sacrifice of
the intellect‖ (Weber 1915:352). Now one should object immediately by pointing out that
billions of people believe in faiths, and most of them never show violent tendencies. But for
people whose cognitive capacities are dulled or compromised by biogenetic imbalances,
social-psychological stressors, chemical alterations, or aggressive theologies, violence may
(and often does) flare up. When it flares up in religious contexts, the results can be
especially severe.
II. Interpersonal Contributors to Religious Dangers
A. Mental Illnesses
Biopsychosocial debilitations likely will hinder interpersonal relationships. Roy emphasizes
that (what he calls) ―a pool of anger‖ within some individuals can poison their ability to
socially interact (Roy 2000:394-395), but mental and personality disorders also inhibit
people‘s ability to enter into social exchanges. Psychopaths or sociopaths (probably like
Charles Manson) have no consciences and lack the ability to feel empathy (American
Psychiatric Association 1994:645-650 Emmons 1986:202 Sanders 1989:12), while
narcissists demand asymmetrical, constant adulation (American Psychiatric Association
1994:658-662). Schizophrenics distort social and personal reality, and interact according to
delusional notions about themselves and others‘ relationships to them (see American
Psychiatric Association 1994:287). Manic depression (now called bipolar disorder) involves
―a chronic pattern of unpredictable mood episodes and fluctuating, unreliable interpersonal
or occupational functioning‖ (American Psychiatric Association 1994:359). Paranoids, of
course, demonstrate ―a pattern of pervasive distrust and suspiciousness of others such that
their motives are interpreted as malevolent.... [They] assume that other people will exploit,
harm, or deceive them, even if no evidence exists to support their expectation‖ (American
Psychiatric Association 1994:634).
Even among groups whose leaders lack demonstrations of diagnosable mental-health
problems, the social distance between leaders and followers facilitates violence by
diminishing leader accountability. Moreover, groups sanctify that social distance through
divine claims. Gurus, reputedly enlightened masters, and religious virtuosi of all types claim
special spiritual gifts that set them apart from others (at least when others accept their
claims). Removed from the flock, these charismatic leaders can direct, facilitate, or justify
violence, making divine or transcendent assertions that few can challenge but all must
accept. If leaders become deified, then followers get diminished, and it is easier to strike
out at one‘s underlings than it is against one‘s peers or superiors. Said succinctly about
family violence but also applicable to religion, ―abuse tends to gravitate toward the
relationships of greatest power differential‖ (Finkelhor 1983:18, italics in original).
B. Shared Drug Experiences
If mental illnesses and social distances distort the ways in which some leaders relate to
followers, then shared drug experiences create even more complex interpersonal dynamics
that often contribute to violence. Drugs alter (among other things) judgment, cognition, and
sensation, so people under their influence may engage in actions that they otherwise would
avoid. Likewise, they also may adopt the interpretations about their altered consciences that
their leaders provide about them, thereby relinquishing considerable autonomy to persons
