Cultic Studies Journal, Vol. 12, No. 1, 1995, page 9
The Dovydenas court expressly stated that its decision was not based on any general
presumption of undue influence. The court required a finding of more than the confidential
relationship. In fact, Dovydenas was required to demonstrate how undue influence
specifically affected each donation. Stevens‟ clear undue influence in one gift transaction did
not substantially taint other separate transactions. The court inferred that had Stevens been
truthful in his disclosures throughout, and had he not so isolated Dovydenas from outside
advice, the ruling might have been entirely in TBS‟s favor. Later obtained wisdom or a
change in mind alone will not, in and of itself, serve to void unwise donations made to those
in a confidential relationship. The Dovydenas court did note that its ruling on confidential
relationships applies to non-religious undue influence situations as well.
In a similar case, Whitmire v. Kroelinger, 42 F.2d 699 (W.D.S.C. 1930), the court also
distinguished between various gifts to a pastor. Gifts determined to be the result of the
donor‟s own choice were upheld. Other donations made after the pastor had become aware
of the donor‟s religious fervor and had begun concerted solicitation efforts were set aside.
However, religious fanaticism and actions based on religious fervor have not, in themselves,
been held as grounds to find undue influence. In Held v. Florida Conference Assn. of
Seventh Day Adventists, 193 So. 828 (Fla. 1940), the court in a split decision on appeal
summarily upheld a lower court ruling allowing the donations. The donor in Held became a
church member late in life and thereafter made a substantial testamentary donation to the
church. The decision quotes the lower court: AA careful consideration of this record ...may
indicate that [the donor] was what some people call a religious fanatic. However, his
peculiarities and conduct fail to disclose a state of mind which would indicate that, in
contemplation of the law, he was insane, or that he was subject to any undue influence.”
The Held court found no evidence that the donor did not understand his business dealings or
appreciate the significance of his actions. In fact, the donor‟s religious fanaticism and
devotion may have influenced the court to not find undue influence by the church in receipt
of the large donation. The religious fervor pro-vided a logical basis for the donation.
When gifts provided to an organization are radically different from previously expressed
intentions of the donor, however, undue influence may be indicated. For example, in In Re
Hampton’s Estate, 103 P.2d 611 (Cal. App. 1940) and In Re Rupert’s Estate, 54 P.2d 274
(Or. 1936) (noncult cases), the courts set aside granting the bulk of the deceased‟s estates
to recently hired caretakers. No previous gifts to the parties were evidenced, nor was
evidence presented to demonstrate that the donor had acted so spontaneously in giving in
the past. But see Klaber.
Gifts to religious organizations have also been challenged on the basis that the donor either
becomes impoverished through the gift or fails to adequately provide for his family. The
focus in these cases is not on the size of the gift itself, but on the relative value of the gift
to the estate. In Longenecker v. Zion Evangelical Lutheran Church, 50 A. 244 (Pa. 1901),
for example, the court found a $5000 donation not out of proportion to the individual‟s
$60,000 estate.
In Redman v. Watchtower Bible and Tract Soc. of Pa., 630 N.E.2d 676 (Ohio 1994), sisters
of the decedent contested a sixteen-year-old will which left most of the estate to the parent
organization of the Jehovah‟s Witnesses church. While finding that the extended period
between execution of the will and the death did not bar an undue influence challenge, the
period provided nonpresumptive evidence of the testator‟s freedom from undue influence.
The court also found the trial court had erred in its examination of witness religious beliefs
to impeach a witness‟s credibility. The religious beliefs of a witness can be used to show
witness bias, but religious affiliation or beliefs (even beliefs alleged to justify
misrepresentation) cannot be used to attack the credibility of the witness.
The Dovydenas court expressly stated that its decision was not based on any general
presumption of undue influence. The court required a finding of more than the confidential
relationship. In fact, Dovydenas was required to demonstrate how undue influence
specifically affected each donation. Stevens‟ clear undue influence in one gift transaction did
not substantially taint other separate transactions. The court inferred that had Stevens been
truthful in his disclosures throughout, and had he not so isolated Dovydenas from outside
advice, the ruling might have been entirely in TBS‟s favor. Later obtained wisdom or a
change in mind alone will not, in and of itself, serve to void unwise donations made to those
in a confidential relationship. The Dovydenas court did note that its ruling on confidential
relationships applies to non-religious undue influence situations as well.
In a similar case, Whitmire v. Kroelinger, 42 F.2d 699 (W.D.S.C. 1930), the court also
distinguished between various gifts to a pastor. Gifts determined to be the result of the
donor‟s own choice were upheld. Other donations made after the pastor had become aware
of the donor‟s religious fervor and had begun concerted solicitation efforts were set aside.
However, religious fanaticism and actions based on religious fervor have not, in themselves,
been held as grounds to find undue influence. In Held v. Florida Conference Assn. of
Seventh Day Adventists, 193 So. 828 (Fla. 1940), the court in a split decision on appeal
summarily upheld a lower court ruling allowing the donations. The donor in Held became a
church member late in life and thereafter made a substantial testamentary donation to the
church. The decision quotes the lower court: AA careful consideration of this record ...may
indicate that [the donor] was what some people call a religious fanatic. However, his
peculiarities and conduct fail to disclose a state of mind which would indicate that, in
contemplation of the law, he was insane, or that he was subject to any undue influence.”
The Held court found no evidence that the donor did not understand his business dealings or
appreciate the significance of his actions. In fact, the donor‟s religious fanaticism and
devotion may have influenced the court to not find undue influence by the church in receipt
of the large donation. The religious fervor pro-vided a logical basis for the donation.
When gifts provided to an organization are radically different from previously expressed
intentions of the donor, however, undue influence may be indicated. For example, in In Re
Hampton’s Estate, 103 P.2d 611 (Cal. App. 1940) and In Re Rupert’s Estate, 54 P.2d 274
(Or. 1936) (noncult cases), the courts set aside granting the bulk of the deceased‟s estates
to recently hired caretakers. No previous gifts to the parties were evidenced, nor was
evidence presented to demonstrate that the donor had acted so spontaneously in giving in
the past. But see Klaber.
Gifts to religious organizations have also been challenged on the basis that the donor either
becomes impoverished through the gift or fails to adequately provide for his family. The
focus in these cases is not on the size of the gift itself, but on the relative value of the gift
to the estate. In Longenecker v. Zion Evangelical Lutheran Church, 50 A. 244 (Pa. 1901),
for example, the court found a $5000 donation not out of proportion to the individual‟s
$60,000 estate.
In Redman v. Watchtower Bible and Tract Soc. of Pa., 630 N.E.2d 676 (Ohio 1994), sisters
of the decedent contested a sixteen-year-old will which left most of the estate to the parent
organization of the Jehovah‟s Witnesses church. While finding that the extended period
between execution of the will and the death did not bar an undue influence challenge, the
period provided nonpresumptive evidence of the testator‟s freedom from undue influence.
The court also found the trial court had erred in its examination of witness religious beliefs
to impeach a witness‟s credibility. The religious beliefs of a witness can be used to show
witness bias, but religious affiliation or beliefs (even beliefs alleged to justify
misrepresentation) cannot be used to attack the credibility of the witness.
