Cultic Studies Journal, Vol. 12, No. 1, 1995, page 18
as not actionable. The court decided that it could not interfere with the church-member (or
recent member) relationship.
However, in Hester v. Barnett, 723 S.W.2d 544 (Mo. App. 1987), a tort action was upheld
against a Baptist clergyman when the minister failed to produce sufficient evidence that the
plaintiff was a church member.
The Watchtower case also provides an example of the limitations in court evaluation of
church doctrines. When the church member in Watchtower had disassociated from the
church, the “shunning” practice by church doctrine only applied to members who were
formally excommunicated. After the plaintiff‟s voluntary disassociation, the church changed
its doctrine, applying “shunning” to disassociated former members as well. The court
protected the “shunning” practice in this case, even though the doctrine permitting it was
never in effect at the time the injured, complaining party was a church member.
In another similar shunning case, however, the court held that the First Amendment‟s
protections did not apply. In Bear v. Reformed Mennonite Church, 341 A.2d 105 (Pa. 1975),
an ex-church member alleged that the shunning had extensive secular effects beyond
personal emotional damages. He argued that as a result of the shunning, he was unable to
hire employees, obtain business loans, or market his product. The plaintiff also alleged that
the shunning extended within his family home, causing his wife and children to disassociate
from him. The court reasoned that the shunning in this case caused damages through
excessive interference with areas of paramount state interest and concern--both the
continuation of commerce and the maintenance of the family structure. First Amendment
protection was denied.
Interest to protect the family was addressed in the Molko decision as well. The Molko court
recognized that when a person is unknowingly subjected to coercion and undue influence,
frequently the family of that person suffers stress accompanied on occasion by significant
financial loss. The damage fraud can cause extends beyond the individual directly injured.
While third party claims to fraud are not generally recognized without an agency
relationship, protection of the individual and the family can be considered in any weighing or
balancing test where the aim is to expand church liability.
As the court in Bear provided civil protection once the negative secular effects of shunning
extended beyond the emotional level of damages demonstrated in the Guinn and
Watchtower cases, judicial interpretation of criminal statutes in coercion cases involving
fraud have frequently more tangible or more objective evidence than victim testimony of
emotional or mental coercion. In United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931 (1988), the U.S.
Supreme Court held that for purposes of criminal prosecution of farm operators accused of
conspiring to hold two persons with mental disabilities in involuntary servitude “threatened
use of physical or legal coercion” is required. Evidence of other coercion and the victim‟s
special vulnerabilities were found relevant only insofar as they can be used to substantiate
disputed testimony regarding threats of physical or legal coercion.
While agreeing with the result the majority reached in Kozminski, Justice Brennan filed a
concurring opinion, joined by Justice Marshall, which challenged the appropriateness of the
majority‟s reliance on threats of a physical or legal nature as the trigger for criminal
culpability.
To the contrary, it would seem that certain psychological, economic, and social
means of coercion can be just as effective as physical or legal means, particularly
where the victims are especially vulnerable.... Hypnosis, blackmail, fraud, deceit,
and isolation are also illustrative methods --but it is unnecessary here to canvas
the entire spectrum of nonphysical machinations by which humans coerce each
other.... Indeed, this case and others readily reveal that the typical techniques
as not actionable. The court decided that it could not interfere with the church-member (or
recent member) relationship.
However, in Hester v. Barnett, 723 S.W.2d 544 (Mo. App. 1987), a tort action was upheld
against a Baptist clergyman when the minister failed to produce sufficient evidence that the
plaintiff was a church member.
The Watchtower case also provides an example of the limitations in court evaluation of
church doctrines. When the church member in Watchtower had disassociated from the
church, the “shunning” practice by church doctrine only applied to members who were
formally excommunicated. After the plaintiff‟s voluntary disassociation, the church changed
its doctrine, applying “shunning” to disassociated former members as well. The court
protected the “shunning” practice in this case, even though the doctrine permitting it was
never in effect at the time the injured, complaining party was a church member.
In another similar shunning case, however, the court held that the First Amendment‟s
protections did not apply. In Bear v. Reformed Mennonite Church, 341 A.2d 105 (Pa. 1975),
an ex-church member alleged that the shunning had extensive secular effects beyond
personal emotional damages. He argued that as a result of the shunning, he was unable to
hire employees, obtain business loans, or market his product. The plaintiff also alleged that
the shunning extended within his family home, causing his wife and children to disassociate
from him. The court reasoned that the shunning in this case caused damages through
excessive interference with areas of paramount state interest and concern--both the
continuation of commerce and the maintenance of the family structure. First Amendment
protection was denied.
Interest to protect the family was addressed in the Molko decision as well. The Molko court
recognized that when a person is unknowingly subjected to coercion and undue influence,
frequently the family of that person suffers stress accompanied on occasion by significant
financial loss. The damage fraud can cause extends beyond the individual directly injured.
While third party claims to fraud are not generally recognized without an agency
relationship, protection of the individual and the family can be considered in any weighing or
balancing test where the aim is to expand church liability.
As the court in Bear provided civil protection once the negative secular effects of shunning
extended beyond the emotional level of damages demonstrated in the Guinn and
Watchtower cases, judicial interpretation of criminal statutes in coercion cases involving
fraud have frequently more tangible or more objective evidence than victim testimony of
emotional or mental coercion. In United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931 (1988), the U.S.
Supreme Court held that for purposes of criminal prosecution of farm operators accused of
conspiring to hold two persons with mental disabilities in involuntary servitude “threatened
use of physical or legal coercion” is required. Evidence of other coercion and the victim‟s
special vulnerabilities were found relevant only insofar as they can be used to substantiate
disputed testimony regarding threats of physical or legal coercion.
While agreeing with the result the majority reached in Kozminski, Justice Brennan filed a
concurring opinion, joined by Justice Marshall, which challenged the appropriateness of the
majority‟s reliance on threats of a physical or legal nature as the trigger for criminal
culpability.
To the contrary, it would seem that certain psychological, economic, and social
means of coercion can be just as effective as physical or legal means, particularly
where the victims are especially vulnerable.... Hypnosis, blackmail, fraud, deceit,
and isolation are also illustrative methods --but it is unnecessary here to canvas
the entire spectrum of nonphysical machinations by which humans coerce each
other.... Indeed, this case and others readily reveal that the typical techniques
