Cultic Studies Journal, Vol. 12, No. 1, 1995, page 36
there are really only two classes of players or decision makers: the leader and the followers.
The transfer of this assumption to cults is problematic.
There are no officially recognized problem-solving groups in a cult. Unlike government
bureaucracies or corporate structures which clearly designate decision-making functions,
replete with responsibility to particular departments or groups, the same cannot be said for
cults. Cults are opaque. The secrecy that shrouds them is part of their adaptation to a world
they believe to be hostile to their beliefs. The very ideological and/or religious
underpinnings of cults as formal organizations often muddy efforts to locate and understand
precisely which group of men or women within a cult are responsible for its key decisions.
Then, too, the decision-making group within cults cannot be as easily divided into leader
and follower groupings as can the policy advisory groups that inform Janis‟s groupthink
model. In the policy groups, the hierarchy of expertise, following from the first assumption,
is clearly rooted in decision-making responsibility. Thus, to have power within Janis‟s
decision-making or problem-solving groups is to have decision power. To have power in
cults is to have influence, not only on the decision-making processes of the cult members,
but to have referent power over many of the beliefs of cult members and their families.
Referent power refers to the desire of members to be like or model after the charismatic
head of the cult.
This general influence over members rather than the direct decision power that prevails in
Janis‟s advisory groups means that charismatic cult heads often influence their members in
varying degrees. Not all followers are equally committed. The class structure within a cult is
complex, and factors like proximity to the charismatic head or the select members of the
cult mean that the simple distinction between leader and follower used in Janis‟s advisory
group must be attenuated and filled in. There is the cult leader, the cult elite or the leaders‟
key figures, the senior cult members, recent members, probationary members, and
aspirants. The robustness of classes of followers in a cult requires at least the recognition
that to study groupthink within a cult, one must be able to identify the members who make
up the cult‟s decision elite.
The third assumption on which the groupthink model is buttressed arises out of the
distinction between economic and social psychological models of decision making by groups
of individuals. The economists‟ models, essentially following the work of Arrow (1951),
utilize an axiomatic approach to group decision making nested within a framework of either
social choice or game theory. While this literature is rooted in the assumptions of
economics, the implications are political and strategically self-serving. Certain players
capitalize on their knowledge of the game and its structure to serve interests which may be
hidden from others within the group.
On the other hand, social psychological models like Janis‟s ignore the strategic and
intentionally manipulative aspects of the manner in which group decisions are structured
and focus on the unintended consequences of unbridled social influence, particularly
excessive or overpowering group identity. Thus in Janis‟s groupthink model, the excessive
group cohesiveness, structural faults or lapses, and stressful or provocative context are not
orchestrated by some at the expense of others. Rather, in Janis‟s groupthink model, these
antecedents evolve. They are not directed by the cunning of a few.
In cults there is, as students of cults well know, an ongoing and at times shrill debate about
whether cults are well-intentioned experiments in our species‟ quest for a more fulfilling or
spiritual path, which at times unintentionally go astray, or whether cults are traps designed
by the cunning to catch unsuspecting seekers. Janis‟s model suits the former designation,
but fails to capture the latter. Thus the topic of brainwashing or deprogramming of cult
members (Dubrow-Eichel, 1989 Langone, 1993) is possible in the strategic model, but
actually is circumvented in social-psychological models. In the latter, as in Janis, the
there are really only two classes of players or decision makers: the leader and the followers.
The transfer of this assumption to cults is problematic.
There are no officially recognized problem-solving groups in a cult. Unlike government
bureaucracies or corporate structures which clearly designate decision-making functions,
replete with responsibility to particular departments or groups, the same cannot be said for
cults. Cults are opaque. The secrecy that shrouds them is part of their adaptation to a world
they believe to be hostile to their beliefs. The very ideological and/or religious
underpinnings of cults as formal organizations often muddy efforts to locate and understand
precisely which group of men or women within a cult are responsible for its key decisions.
Then, too, the decision-making group within cults cannot be as easily divided into leader
and follower groupings as can the policy advisory groups that inform Janis‟s groupthink
model. In the policy groups, the hierarchy of expertise, following from the first assumption,
is clearly rooted in decision-making responsibility. Thus, to have power within Janis‟s
decision-making or problem-solving groups is to have decision power. To have power in
cults is to have influence, not only on the decision-making processes of the cult members,
but to have referent power over many of the beliefs of cult members and their families.
Referent power refers to the desire of members to be like or model after the charismatic
head of the cult.
This general influence over members rather than the direct decision power that prevails in
Janis‟s advisory groups means that charismatic cult heads often influence their members in
varying degrees. Not all followers are equally committed. The class structure within a cult is
complex, and factors like proximity to the charismatic head or the select members of the
cult mean that the simple distinction between leader and follower used in Janis‟s advisory
group must be attenuated and filled in. There is the cult leader, the cult elite or the leaders‟
key figures, the senior cult members, recent members, probationary members, and
aspirants. The robustness of classes of followers in a cult requires at least the recognition
that to study groupthink within a cult, one must be able to identify the members who make
up the cult‟s decision elite.
The third assumption on which the groupthink model is buttressed arises out of the
distinction between economic and social psychological models of decision making by groups
of individuals. The economists‟ models, essentially following the work of Arrow (1951),
utilize an axiomatic approach to group decision making nested within a framework of either
social choice or game theory. While this literature is rooted in the assumptions of
economics, the implications are political and strategically self-serving. Certain players
capitalize on their knowledge of the game and its structure to serve interests which may be
hidden from others within the group.
On the other hand, social psychological models like Janis‟s ignore the strategic and
intentionally manipulative aspects of the manner in which group decisions are structured
and focus on the unintended consequences of unbridled social influence, particularly
excessive or overpowering group identity. Thus in Janis‟s groupthink model, the excessive
group cohesiveness, structural faults or lapses, and stressful or provocative context are not
orchestrated by some at the expense of others. Rather, in Janis‟s groupthink model, these
antecedents evolve. They are not directed by the cunning of a few.
In cults there is, as students of cults well know, an ongoing and at times shrill debate about
whether cults are well-intentioned experiments in our species‟ quest for a more fulfilling or
spiritual path, which at times unintentionally go astray, or whether cults are traps designed
by the cunning to catch unsuspecting seekers. Janis‟s model suits the former designation,
but fails to capture the latter. Thus the topic of brainwashing or deprogramming of cult
members (Dubrow-Eichel, 1989 Langone, 1993) is possible in the strategic model, but
actually is circumvented in social-psychological models. In the latter, as in Janis, the
