Cultic Studies Journal, Vol. 12, No. 1, 1995, page 7
context is, when does the relationship between the advisor in a cult and the recipient of the
advice rise to the presumption of confidentiality that would require the advisor to defend an
undue influence charge.
Early cases involving church, spiritual, or religious leaders indicated that a confidential
relationship is presumed per se in all religious situations. See Corigan v. Pironi, 23 A. 355
(N.J. 1891) and McClellan v. Grant, 82 N.Y.S. 208 (4th Dep‟t 1903), aff’d 74 N.E. 119
(1905). While rebuttable, the relationship automatically gave rise to the presumption. See
also, Ryan v. Saint Michael’s Roman Catholic Church of Whitlemore, 216 N.W. 713 (Iowa
1927) (finding no undue influence after shift of burden).
Other cases, even some from the late 1800s, cite factors in addition to the relationship itself
as necessary before granting the presumption. In Muller v. Saint Louis Hospital Asso., 5
Mo.App. 390 (Mo. 1878), aff’d 73 Mo. 242, for example, the presumption (and subsequent
decision) rested on the court finding that the patient who named the hospital as chief
beneficiary in his will made the will in favor of his chief spiritual advisor‟s organization, while
within a facility owned and operated by the organization, and with the assistance of the
organization‟s employees.
The Muller court‟s method of investigation beyond the mere priest-parishioner relationship
has been adopted by the courts. The courts have generally concluded that the simple
existence of the relationship does not evoke the presumption. See Guill v. Wolport, 218
N.W.2d 224 (Neb. 1974) (expressly rejecting Corigan) and see also Else v. Freemont
Methodist Church, 73 N.W.2d 50 (Iowa 1955).
Traditionally, the evidence courts consider to determine whether a confidential relationship
exists has included the mental and physical state of the donor. See Good v. Zook, 88 N.W.
376 (Iowa 1901). Frequently, as in testamentary cases and those in which transactions
occur shortly before the actor‟s death, available evidence on mental health and condition is
circumstantial. While courts will consider other factors such as age and forgetfulness,
standing alone these will probably not prove undue influence.
A crucial consideration in undue influence contests is the donor‟s receipt of independent
advice. In Klaber v. Unity School of Christianity, 51 S.W.2d 30 (Mo. 1932), a sizeable gift to
the school was upheld even though the ninety-year-old donor was unquestionably both
mentally and physically infirm. The school successfully defended the undue influence charge
in large measure because they provided evidence that the woman had received independent
advice on the gift.
On the independent advice issue, most courts have not restricted the advice in terms of its
legality. The focus is on the independence and competence of the adviser. In a split
decision, In Re Estate of Riley, 479 P.2d 1 (Wash. 1970) held that an attorney on retainer
for a church nursing home operated by the sisters of the church was sufficiently
disassociated from the church to provide some degree of independent advice. The court
approved Riley‟s change of wills, disinheriting two relatives, in part by recognizing Riley‟s
long history of limiting business discussions with others. While the advice she received may
not have been sufficient to help overcome an undue influence charge involving many other
individuals, it was sufficient in Riley‟s case perhaps because her actions reflected her
established character.
In another early undue influence case, a local Rhode Island religious sect directed by a
married couple, the Dodges, compelled church members to transfer possessions to the sect
and live in the sect‟s house/church. Nelson v. Dodge, 68 A.2d 51 (R.I. 1949). A member,
also the Dodges‟ son-in-law, gave everything he owned, including his children‟s life
insurance policies, to the Dodges. Eight years later, he and his family were expelled from
the church and left destitute. The issue before the court was whether by inducing the
context is, when does the relationship between the advisor in a cult and the recipient of the
advice rise to the presumption of confidentiality that would require the advisor to defend an
undue influence charge.
Early cases involving church, spiritual, or religious leaders indicated that a confidential
relationship is presumed per se in all religious situations. See Corigan v. Pironi, 23 A. 355
(N.J. 1891) and McClellan v. Grant, 82 N.Y.S. 208 (4th Dep‟t 1903), aff’d 74 N.E. 119
(1905). While rebuttable, the relationship automatically gave rise to the presumption. See
also, Ryan v. Saint Michael’s Roman Catholic Church of Whitlemore, 216 N.W. 713 (Iowa
1927) (finding no undue influence after shift of burden).
Other cases, even some from the late 1800s, cite factors in addition to the relationship itself
as necessary before granting the presumption. In Muller v. Saint Louis Hospital Asso., 5
Mo.App. 390 (Mo. 1878), aff’d 73 Mo. 242, for example, the presumption (and subsequent
decision) rested on the court finding that the patient who named the hospital as chief
beneficiary in his will made the will in favor of his chief spiritual advisor‟s organization, while
within a facility owned and operated by the organization, and with the assistance of the
organization‟s employees.
The Muller court‟s method of investigation beyond the mere priest-parishioner relationship
has been adopted by the courts. The courts have generally concluded that the simple
existence of the relationship does not evoke the presumption. See Guill v. Wolport, 218
N.W.2d 224 (Neb. 1974) (expressly rejecting Corigan) and see also Else v. Freemont
Methodist Church, 73 N.W.2d 50 (Iowa 1955).
Traditionally, the evidence courts consider to determine whether a confidential relationship
exists has included the mental and physical state of the donor. See Good v. Zook, 88 N.W.
376 (Iowa 1901). Frequently, as in testamentary cases and those in which transactions
occur shortly before the actor‟s death, available evidence on mental health and condition is
circumstantial. While courts will consider other factors such as age and forgetfulness,
standing alone these will probably not prove undue influence.
A crucial consideration in undue influence contests is the donor‟s receipt of independent
advice. In Klaber v. Unity School of Christianity, 51 S.W.2d 30 (Mo. 1932), a sizeable gift to
the school was upheld even though the ninety-year-old donor was unquestionably both
mentally and physically infirm. The school successfully defended the undue influence charge
in large measure because they provided evidence that the woman had received independent
advice on the gift.
On the independent advice issue, most courts have not restricted the advice in terms of its
legality. The focus is on the independence and competence of the adviser. In a split
decision, In Re Estate of Riley, 479 P.2d 1 (Wash. 1970) held that an attorney on retainer
for a church nursing home operated by the sisters of the church was sufficiently
disassociated from the church to provide some degree of independent advice. The court
approved Riley‟s change of wills, disinheriting two relatives, in part by recognizing Riley‟s
long history of limiting business discussions with others. While the advice she received may
not have been sufficient to help overcome an undue influence charge involving many other
individuals, it was sufficient in Riley‟s case perhaps because her actions reflected her
established character.
In another early undue influence case, a local Rhode Island religious sect directed by a
married couple, the Dodges, compelled church members to transfer possessions to the sect
and live in the sect‟s house/church. Nelson v. Dodge, 68 A.2d 51 (R.I. 1949). A member,
also the Dodges‟ son-in-law, gave everything he owned, including his children‟s life
insurance policies, to the Dodges. Eight years later, he and his family were expelled from
the church and left destitute. The issue before the court was whether by inducing the
