Cultic Studies Journal, Vol. 12, No. 1, 1995, page 15
As a result of the Employment v. Smith decision, Congress enacted the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act of 1993. P.L. 103-141. The Act reasserts Sherbert, “creating a statutory
prohibition against government action substantially burdening the exercise of religion, even
if the burden results from a rule of general applicability, unless the Government
demonstrates that the action is the least restrictive means of furthering a compelling
governmental interest.”
While Congress has statutorily recognized broad constitutional protections for the exercise
of religious freedom, restrictions on religious conduct nevertheless can be valid if the
compelling government interest standard is satisfied. Thus conduct, even religious conduct,
by its very nature remains subject to constraints imposed for the protection of society as a
whole. Not all activity, therefore, even when taken in the name of religion and in compliance
with religious beliefs, is protected by the free exercise clause, but may result in legal liability
for damages caused.
In Van Schaick v. Church of Scientology, Inc., 535 F. Supp. 1125 (D.C.Mass 1982), an
action brought by a former Church of Scientology member alleging fraud, the church argued
that the challenged representations were religious practices and beliefs and, as such,
protected by the First Amendment. The ex-member charged that the First Amendment
protection did not apply, alleging that the church was in fact a commercial organization not
truly religious in nature. The court avoided ruling on the church status issue, finding that
even religious institutions remain liable for damages resulting from secular activities. The
court reasoned that the freedom to exercise religion clause immunity is at least to some
degree dependent on whether the court would be required to offer a judicial determination
on the validity of the organization‟s religious beliefs --which it cannot do. If the court does
not have to reach a validity of belief issue, then the court may permit restrictions on the
organization‟s actions --as long as the restrictions are the least restrictive means to achieve
the compelling state interest of protecting the public.
The Van Schaick court then focused on the allegations that the allegedly injured party was
induced to participate in “auditing,” a practice of study related to dianetics, which in the
advertisements for the course was “scientifically guaranteed” to provide certain secular
benefits such as increased intellect and physical well-being. The court concluded that while
the distinction between secular and religious is not always clear, the First Amendment‟s
protection of religious beliefs does not extend to secular beliefs. The statements regarding
the effects of auditing guaranteed by science were held to be proper misrepresentations for
basing fraud action --even though the same guarantees without the evocation of science
would not. The court not only looked at the belief itself, but the secular nature of the
inducement which the allegedly injured individual was led to believe.
Similarly, in Kropinski v. World Plan Executive Council-U.S., 853 F.2d 948 (D.C. 1988), an
appeal was taken from the district court granting over $137,000 in damages to a former
student and instructor of Transcendental MeditationTM. Kropinski claimed that he was
induced through misrepresentations to study and practice the organization‟s methods of
meditation which caused him physical, financial, and psychological harm. While not invoking
the freedom to exercise religion protection, World Plan did argue protection for its
statements based on the First Amendment protection barring libel actions based on
opinions. The court held that the case challenged not opinions, but secular misstatement,
such as that practicing Transcendental Meditation could lead to levitation. The court also
held that evidence of fraud leading to thought reform could be admitted to show why
Kropinski did not detect the alleged fraud after his injuries, thus opening up the possibility
for the plaintiff to successfully defend a statute of limitations challenge.
In Molko v. Holy Spirit Assn., 762 P.2d 46 (Cal. 1988), two ex-Unification Church members
sued an individual, a church, and a related institution for a variety of tort offenses including
As a result of the Employment v. Smith decision, Congress enacted the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act of 1993. P.L. 103-141. The Act reasserts Sherbert, “creating a statutory
prohibition against government action substantially burdening the exercise of religion, even
if the burden results from a rule of general applicability, unless the Government
demonstrates that the action is the least restrictive means of furthering a compelling
governmental interest.”
While Congress has statutorily recognized broad constitutional protections for the exercise
of religious freedom, restrictions on religious conduct nevertheless can be valid if the
compelling government interest standard is satisfied. Thus conduct, even religious conduct,
by its very nature remains subject to constraints imposed for the protection of society as a
whole. Not all activity, therefore, even when taken in the name of religion and in compliance
with religious beliefs, is protected by the free exercise clause, but may result in legal liability
for damages caused.
In Van Schaick v. Church of Scientology, Inc., 535 F. Supp. 1125 (D.C.Mass 1982), an
action brought by a former Church of Scientology member alleging fraud, the church argued
that the challenged representations were religious practices and beliefs and, as such,
protected by the First Amendment. The ex-member charged that the First Amendment
protection did not apply, alleging that the church was in fact a commercial organization not
truly religious in nature. The court avoided ruling on the church status issue, finding that
even religious institutions remain liable for damages resulting from secular activities. The
court reasoned that the freedom to exercise religion clause immunity is at least to some
degree dependent on whether the court would be required to offer a judicial determination
on the validity of the organization‟s religious beliefs --which it cannot do. If the court does
not have to reach a validity of belief issue, then the court may permit restrictions on the
organization‟s actions --as long as the restrictions are the least restrictive means to achieve
the compelling state interest of protecting the public.
The Van Schaick court then focused on the allegations that the allegedly injured party was
induced to participate in “auditing,” a practice of study related to dianetics, which in the
advertisements for the course was “scientifically guaranteed” to provide certain secular
benefits such as increased intellect and physical well-being. The court concluded that while
the distinction between secular and religious is not always clear, the First Amendment‟s
protection of religious beliefs does not extend to secular beliefs. The statements regarding
the effects of auditing guaranteed by science were held to be proper misrepresentations for
basing fraud action --even though the same guarantees without the evocation of science
would not. The court not only looked at the belief itself, but the secular nature of the
inducement which the allegedly injured individual was led to believe.
Similarly, in Kropinski v. World Plan Executive Council-U.S., 853 F.2d 948 (D.C. 1988), an
appeal was taken from the district court granting over $137,000 in damages to a former
student and instructor of Transcendental MeditationTM. Kropinski claimed that he was
induced through misrepresentations to study and practice the organization‟s methods of
meditation which caused him physical, financial, and psychological harm. While not invoking
the freedom to exercise religion protection, World Plan did argue protection for its
statements based on the First Amendment protection barring libel actions based on
opinions. The court held that the case challenged not opinions, but secular misstatement,
such as that practicing Transcendental Meditation could lead to levitation. The court also
held that evidence of fraud leading to thought reform could be admitted to show why
Kropinski did not detect the alleged fraud after his injuries, thus opening up the possibility
for the plaintiff to successfully defend a statute of limitations challenge.
In Molko v. Holy Spirit Assn., 762 P.2d 46 (Cal. 1988), two ex-Unification Church members
sued an individual, a church, and a related institution for a variety of tort offenses including
