Cultic Studies Journal, Vol. 12, No. 1, 1995, page 17
beliefs. Finally, the court considered whether the statements with a religious character were
nonetheless made for a wholly secular purpose. More directly than in Van Schaick, the court
focused on the intent of the language used by the church, not merely the words themselves.
The ex-member in Christofferson was informed that a course at the church‟s school would
provide her with more knowledge than any psychologist or psychiatrist, that the course‟s
theories (dianetics) were scientifically provable to cure a variety of illnesses, and that
“auditing” increases intellect and cures physical and emotional problems. The court ruled
that not all of the challenged statements were clearly religious in nature, thus potentially
removing First Amendment projections. The court held that a question for the jury remained
on whether the offer of courses was actually a part of a religious practice or, instead, a
wholly secular activity. A wholly secular activity, the court noted, could include interests of
the church solely to solicit funds--even if, as in this case, a condition of attendance was
joining the church and religious materials were offered as course materials. A jury could
find, the court explained, that the course offerings were purely secular in nature with an
irrelevant religious designation merely “added on.” While the distinction between secular
and religious is not always clear, protection does not extend to purely secular
misrepresentations made by religious organizations. Thus, the court will not allow religious
language to serve as a First Amendment shield for fraudulent secular activity conducted by
a religious organization. While directing a verdict in favor of certain defendants for failure to
demonstrate actual knowledge or participation by them in the fraud, the court ruled against
the local church and church officials. Interestingly, the court used a business law “piercing
the corporate veil” analogy in its distinction as to liability of the defendants.
Freedom to exercise religion defenses can be attacked, though often unsuccessfully, by
directly questioning whether the church is a religious institution. This challenge was raised
in the Van Schaick case mentioned above.
The Church of Scientology argued in Van Schaick that it was entitled to judicial notice that it
was a religion with First Amendment protections. The court rejected the church‟s argument,
finding that Scientology was not an established religion at that time, and ordered the church
to prove that it was a religion. Specifically, the court requested information on whether the
church considered matters of “ultimate concern,” whether church doctrines are
comprehensive, and whether the church has formal external characteristics similar to those
of established religious organizations. The court further held that a prima facie showing by
the church was rebuttable. However, the court warned that while rebuttable, the church‟s
claim to be a religion protected by the First Amendment could not be attacked through
inquiry into the sincerity of church members‟ personal beliefs, but would be limited to
intrinsic evidence of the organization‟s secular nature.
Similar to the issue of whether an organization is a church entitled to First Amendment
protections is whether the plaintiff in a tort action against a church is or was a recent church
member. Courts have held that an individual presumably consents to religiously motivated
discipline or chastisement by being a member of a church. Membership is, in effect, a
contract with the church. Damages resulting from discipline issued under the terms of the
membership contract is nontortious.
Church elders‟ public discussions of a church member who alleged emotional distress from
the experience were held to be absolutely protected by the freedom to exercise clause.
Guinn v. Church of Christ of Collinsville, 775 P.2d 766 (Ok. 1989). In Guinn, the public
disciplinary proceedings exposing the person‟s private life were protected, even though the
individual disavowed church membership (church doctrine viewed all members as family,
without the ability to disassociate from the family).
In Paul v. Watchtower Bible and Tract Soc., 819 F.2d 875 (Ninth Cir. 1987) cert. denied 108
S. Ct. 289, a church decision to “shun” or disassociate from a former member was upheld
beliefs. Finally, the court considered whether the statements with a religious character were
nonetheless made for a wholly secular purpose. More directly than in Van Schaick, the court
focused on the intent of the language used by the church, not merely the words themselves.
The ex-member in Christofferson was informed that a course at the church‟s school would
provide her with more knowledge than any psychologist or psychiatrist, that the course‟s
theories (dianetics) were scientifically provable to cure a variety of illnesses, and that
“auditing” increases intellect and cures physical and emotional problems. The court ruled
that not all of the challenged statements were clearly religious in nature, thus potentially
removing First Amendment projections. The court held that a question for the jury remained
on whether the offer of courses was actually a part of a religious practice or, instead, a
wholly secular activity. A wholly secular activity, the court noted, could include interests of
the church solely to solicit funds--even if, as in this case, a condition of attendance was
joining the church and religious materials were offered as course materials. A jury could
find, the court explained, that the course offerings were purely secular in nature with an
irrelevant religious designation merely “added on.” While the distinction between secular
and religious is not always clear, protection does not extend to purely secular
misrepresentations made by religious organizations. Thus, the court will not allow religious
language to serve as a First Amendment shield for fraudulent secular activity conducted by
a religious organization. While directing a verdict in favor of certain defendants for failure to
demonstrate actual knowledge or participation by them in the fraud, the court ruled against
the local church and church officials. Interestingly, the court used a business law “piercing
the corporate veil” analogy in its distinction as to liability of the defendants.
Freedom to exercise religion defenses can be attacked, though often unsuccessfully, by
directly questioning whether the church is a religious institution. This challenge was raised
in the Van Schaick case mentioned above.
The Church of Scientology argued in Van Schaick that it was entitled to judicial notice that it
was a religion with First Amendment protections. The court rejected the church‟s argument,
finding that Scientology was not an established religion at that time, and ordered the church
to prove that it was a religion. Specifically, the court requested information on whether the
church considered matters of “ultimate concern,” whether church doctrines are
comprehensive, and whether the church has formal external characteristics similar to those
of established religious organizations. The court further held that a prima facie showing by
the church was rebuttable. However, the court warned that while rebuttable, the church‟s
claim to be a religion protected by the First Amendment could not be attacked through
inquiry into the sincerity of church members‟ personal beliefs, but would be limited to
intrinsic evidence of the organization‟s secular nature.
Similar to the issue of whether an organization is a church entitled to First Amendment
protections is whether the plaintiff in a tort action against a church is or was a recent church
member. Courts have held that an individual presumably consents to religiously motivated
discipline or chastisement by being a member of a church. Membership is, in effect, a
contract with the church. Damages resulting from discipline issued under the terms of the
membership contract is nontortious.
Church elders‟ public discussions of a church member who alleged emotional distress from
the experience were held to be absolutely protected by the freedom to exercise clause.
Guinn v. Church of Christ of Collinsville, 775 P.2d 766 (Ok. 1989). In Guinn, the public
disciplinary proceedings exposing the person‟s private life were protected, even though the
individual disavowed church membership (church doctrine viewed all members as family,
without the ability to disassociate from the family).
In Paul v. Watchtower Bible and Tract Soc., 819 F.2d 875 (Ninth Cir. 1987) cert. denied 108
S. Ct. 289, a church decision to “shun” or disassociate from a former member was upheld
