Cultic Studies Journal, Vol. 12, No. 1, 1995, page 16
fraud. The alleged fraud developed from misrepresentations made to induce the ex-
members to join the church. A variety of deceptive tactics were involved including denial by
those proselytizing of the Unification Church connection.
Molko reviewed the ex-members‟ charges and found that their claims did not attack the
validity of church doctrines nor even the validity of the beliefs of the converted. Instead, the
fraud charges challenged the church practice of concealing or misrepresenting its identity so
unsuspecting outsiders could more easily be brought into the church. The church practice is
not belief, but conduct. The court, however, rejected the ex-members‟ argument that the
conduct was secular and not religious. The church‟s practice of misrepresentation as
experienced by the ex-members was founded on a church doctrine called “Heavenly
Deception.” The doctrine taught that it is acceptable to lie to someone in order to give him
the opportunity to hear the teachings of the church. While perhaps appearing secular on its
face, the church‟s fraudulent behavior was found to be “rooted in religious belief.” While this
distinction did not absolutely protect the practice from state restrictions, it did require that
any restrictions imposed survive a constitutional freedom to exercise religion test justifying
the restrictions.
The Molko court cited Cantwell in reasoning that while religious beliefs are absolutely
protected, action, even if compelled by belief, remains subject to restrictions imposed for
the protection of society. The court then considered a balancing test, weighing the state
interest to protect society against the burden that would be imposed on the religion. The
court explained that the greater the burden imposed by the state, the greater the state‟s
interest must be to justify the burden. In addition, the state‟s imposed burden must be no
more imposing than necessary, non-discriminating between religions, and non-
discriminating between religious and non-religious institutions. See Employment Div. Dep’t
of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (prohibiting use of peyote in
religious ceremonies).
The Molko test became whether the state‟s interest in allowing tort liability for church
deceptive recruiting practices is important enough to outweigh the burdens such liability
would impose on the church‟s conduct. The court recognized the reality of the burden --the
avenue for church recruitment would be somewhat closed--but concluded the burden was
“marginal.” The court found the state interest, to protect its citizens from being deceived
into unknowing submission into a potentially damaging atmosphere of coercive persuasion,
compelling. Finally, the court concluded that permitting private action for fraud constituted
the least restrictive means available to advance the state‟s interest.
In Anderson v. Worldwide Church of God, 661 F. Supp 1400 (D.C.Minn. 1987), later
proceed., 661 F. Supp. 1401, an ex-church member charged that the church committed
fraud in misrepresenting that the world would end. In an attempt to avoid the First
Amendment defense, the plaintiff argued the insincerity of the church‟s beliefs and as
evidence showed that the church continued to take actions protecting fiscal assets and
inaction to prepare for the world‟s end. The court held, however, that the freedom to
exercise clause protection was justified, noting that under the official church doctrine church
members and the church itself were taught to continue to lead normal lives in the areas of
fiscal responsibility. The court also cited plaintiff‟s admission of his belief that certain church
ministers sincerely believed that the world was soon to end.
In Christofferson v. Church of Scientology, 644 P.2d 577 (or. 1982), an ex-member of the
Church of Scientology filed a fraud action alleging that fraudulent misrepresentations were
made to induce her into joining the organization. The church claimed freedom to exercise
religion protection. As in Van Schaick, the ex-member alleged that the First Amendment did
not apply because the challenged church conduct was purely secular. After recognizing the
church as a religion, the court found that the church‟s statements related to religious
fraud. The alleged fraud developed from misrepresentations made to induce the ex-
members to join the church. A variety of deceptive tactics were involved including denial by
those proselytizing of the Unification Church connection.
Molko reviewed the ex-members‟ charges and found that their claims did not attack the
validity of church doctrines nor even the validity of the beliefs of the converted. Instead, the
fraud charges challenged the church practice of concealing or misrepresenting its identity so
unsuspecting outsiders could more easily be brought into the church. The church practice is
not belief, but conduct. The court, however, rejected the ex-members‟ argument that the
conduct was secular and not religious. The church‟s practice of misrepresentation as
experienced by the ex-members was founded on a church doctrine called “Heavenly
Deception.” The doctrine taught that it is acceptable to lie to someone in order to give him
the opportunity to hear the teachings of the church. While perhaps appearing secular on its
face, the church‟s fraudulent behavior was found to be “rooted in religious belief.” While this
distinction did not absolutely protect the practice from state restrictions, it did require that
any restrictions imposed survive a constitutional freedom to exercise religion test justifying
the restrictions.
The Molko court cited Cantwell in reasoning that while religious beliefs are absolutely
protected, action, even if compelled by belief, remains subject to restrictions imposed for
the protection of society. The court then considered a balancing test, weighing the state
interest to protect society against the burden that would be imposed on the religion. The
court explained that the greater the burden imposed by the state, the greater the state‟s
interest must be to justify the burden. In addition, the state‟s imposed burden must be no
more imposing than necessary, non-discriminating between religions, and non-
discriminating between religious and non-religious institutions. See Employment Div. Dep’t
of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (prohibiting use of peyote in
religious ceremonies).
The Molko test became whether the state‟s interest in allowing tort liability for church
deceptive recruiting practices is important enough to outweigh the burdens such liability
would impose on the church‟s conduct. The court recognized the reality of the burden --the
avenue for church recruitment would be somewhat closed--but concluded the burden was
“marginal.” The court found the state interest, to protect its citizens from being deceived
into unknowing submission into a potentially damaging atmosphere of coercive persuasion,
compelling. Finally, the court concluded that permitting private action for fraud constituted
the least restrictive means available to advance the state‟s interest.
In Anderson v. Worldwide Church of God, 661 F. Supp 1400 (D.C.Minn. 1987), later
proceed., 661 F. Supp. 1401, an ex-church member charged that the church committed
fraud in misrepresenting that the world would end. In an attempt to avoid the First
Amendment defense, the plaintiff argued the insincerity of the church‟s beliefs and as
evidence showed that the church continued to take actions protecting fiscal assets and
inaction to prepare for the world‟s end. The court held, however, that the freedom to
exercise clause protection was justified, noting that under the official church doctrine church
members and the church itself were taught to continue to lead normal lives in the areas of
fiscal responsibility. The court also cited plaintiff‟s admission of his belief that certain church
ministers sincerely believed that the world was soon to end.
In Christofferson v. Church of Scientology, 644 P.2d 577 (or. 1982), an ex-member of the
Church of Scientology filed a fraud action alleging that fraudulent misrepresentations were
made to induce her into joining the organization. The church claimed freedom to exercise
religion protection. As in Van Schaick, the ex-member alleged that the First Amendment did
not apply because the challenged church conduct was purely secular. After recognizing the
church as a religion, the court found that the church‟s statements related to religious
