Cultic Studies Journal, Vol. 12, No. 1, 1995, page 26
exercising their own judgments and unable to respond upon learning of the deceptive
recruitment practices. The state supreme court reversed, allowing the testimony. In doing
so, the court reviewed conflicting authorities on the topic of brainwashing. While not
resolving the controversies surrounding the issue, it [the court] concluded that the
existence of conflicting opinions by experts on the existence and effects of brainwashing
raises a factual issue. The testimony would be allowed for consideration.
In Kropinski v. World Plan Executive Council, 853 F.2d 948 (D.D.C. 1988), the trial court
allowed expert testimony that transcendental meditation was a “thought reform” system
which changed the plaintiff practitioner‟s perspective or “world view” even without physical
threats or coercion. The defense challenged the admission as irrelevant, inflammatory, and
scientifically unsupported. The defense relied on the Frye rule, which held that scientific
evidence can be offered only upon a showing that the type of evidence is generally accepted
in the field. See, Frye v. United States, 293 F.2d 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). The appellate court
noted that Frye had only been applied in the jurisdiction in criminal cases, and that civil
cases require a less stringent standard, indicating that a scientific theory with a “significant
following” in the field would probably qualify. The court, however, rejected the expert
testimony finding that even this lesser standard had not been proven and ordered that the
admissibility issue would be reconsidered at trial.
In 1990, a federal district court reviewed the Frye standard in light of expert testimony on
coercive persuasion and cults. In United States v. Fishman, 743 F. Supp. 713 (N.D. Cal.
1990), a criminal case, the defendant intended to plead insanity as a defense to mail fraud
on the basis that he was brainwashed by the Church of Scientology, allegedly behind the
fraud scheme. A forensic scientist was allowed to testify as to the defendant‟s state of mind
at the time of the charged offenses. The court rejected, however, testimony on coercive
persuasion in religious cults as a thought reform theory not generally accepted within the
scientific community. In addition, the court also rejected testimony proffered from a
sociology professor who taught graduate courses on thought reform. The court found the
sociologist lacked expertise to address the defendant‟s state of mind or the church
members‟ as a group.
Whether, how, and to what degree expert testimony on the mental state of individuals in
cult cases was permitted have unclear guidelines. These standards have recently once again
been reopened for interpretation as a result of a general review of the federal rules
governing admissibility of expert scientific testimony.
The United States Supreme Court decision in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,
113 S.Ct. 2786 (1993) governs all expert testimony in federal court, rejecting the Frye rule
in favor of a more complex formulation. Although not directly binding on state courts, the
Supreme Court‟s reasoning is likely to make matters related to psychiatric and psychological
evidence in many jurisdictions more complicated than they once were.
Daubert overturned the seventy-year-old threshold federal standard for admitting scientific
evidence which was established in Frye. At the same time, the state court standard was left
in limbo as many state courts reexamine their rules in light of Daubert.
As Justice Blackmun‟s opinion in Daubert explains, until 1993 most courts, federal and
state, followed the Frye rule that psychiatric, psychological, or other scientific evidence
could be offered in the courtroom only upon the showing that the type of evidence was
generally accepted in the field. That general principle has been called into question with the
determination that, at least in the federal courts, Federal Rule 702 supersedes Frye and
does away with the “general acceptance” prerequisite. Instead, the new standard for federal
courts is whether “scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of
fact to understand the evidence to determine a fact in issue.”
exercising their own judgments and unable to respond upon learning of the deceptive
recruitment practices. The state supreme court reversed, allowing the testimony. In doing
so, the court reviewed conflicting authorities on the topic of brainwashing. While not
resolving the controversies surrounding the issue, it [the court] concluded that the
existence of conflicting opinions by experts on the existence and effects of brainwashing
raises a factual issue. The testimony would be allowed for consideration.
In Kropinski v. World Plan Executive Council, 853 F.2d 948 (D.D.C. 1988), the trial court
allowed expert testimony that transcendental meditation was a “thought reform” system
which changed the plaintiff practitioner‟s perspective or “world view” even without physical
threats or coercion. The defense challenged the admission as irrelevant, inflammatory, and
scientifically unsupported. The defense relied on the Frye rule, which held that scientific
evidence can be offered only upon a showing that the type of evidence is generally accepted
in the field. See, Frye v. United States, 293 F.2d 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). The appellate court
noted that Frye had only been applied in the jurisdiction in criminal cases, and that civil
cases require a less stringent standard, indicating that a scientific theory with a “significant
following” in the field would probably qualify. The court, however, rejected the expert
testimony finding that even this lesser standard had not been proven and ordered that the
admissibility issue would be reconsidered at trial.
In 1990, a federal district court reviewed the Frye standard in light of expert testimony on
coercive persuasion and cults. In United States v. Fishman, 743 F. Supp. 713 (N.D. Cal.
1990), a criminal case, the defendant intended to plead insanity as a defense to mail fraud
on the basis that he was brainwashed by the Church of Scientology, allegedly behind the
fraud scheme. A forensic scientist was allowed to testify as to the defendant‟s state of mind
at the time of the charged offenses. The court rejected, however, testimony on coercive
persuasion in religious cults as a thought reform theory not generally accepted within the
scientific community. In addition, the court also rejected testimony proffered from a
sociology professor who taught graduate courses on thought reform. The court found the
sociologist lacked expertise to address the defendant‟s state of mind or the church
members‟ as a group.
Whether, how, and to what degree expert testimony on the mental state of individuals in
cult cases was permitted have unclear guidelines. These standards have recently once again
been reopened for interpretation as a result of a general review of the federal rules
governing admissibility of expert scientific testimony.
The United States Supreme Court decision in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,
113 S.Ct. 2786 (1993) governs all expert testimony in federal court, rejecting the Frye rule
in favor of a more complex formulation. Although not directly binding on state courts, the
Supreme Court‟s reasoning is likely to make matters related to psychiatric and psychological
evidence in many jurisdictions more complicated than they once were.
Daubert overturned the seventy-year-old threshold federal standard for admitting scientific
evidence which was established in Frye. At the same time, the state court standard was left
in limbo as many state courts reexamine their rules in light of Daubert.
As Justice Blackmun‟s opinion in Daubert explains, until 1993 most courts, federal and
state, followed the Frye rule that psychiatric, psychological, or other scientific evidence
could be offered in the courtroom only upon the showing that the type of evidence was
generally accepted in the field. That general principle has been called into question with the
determination that, at least in the federal courts, Federal Rule 702 supersedes Frye and
does away with the “general acceptance” prerequisite. Instead, the new standard for federal
courts is whether “scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of
fact to understand the evidence to determine a fact in issue.”
