Cultic Studies Review, Vol. 7, No. 3, 2008, Page 45
formulated the standard framing by raising the question: ―Is it acceptable to limit individual
human rights due to abstract fears based on insufficient evidence and emotional loathing?‖
That is how the logic of fairness was introduced. In fact, at that time, the point in dispute
was not denying the human rights of Aleph members (discriminating against them) or
weighing those rights on a scale. And it was not about respecting the human rights of local
residents more than the human rights of Aleph members from the standpoint of public
welfare.
The local residents‘ fear was directed toward nothing other than the security threat posed
by Aleph (Aum). Unless the cult group disbanded, that fear would not disappear, so the
residents thought they had no incentive for meeting the cult members face-to-face. This
mindset was sustained by the memories of the sarin gas attack and media reports that Aum
followers are mentally controlled by the cult group. Naturally, there were individual
differences in their fears and degree of loathing, not to mention differences in residential
styles.
Aleph‘s supporters maintained that ―fear‖ would be reduced if residents recognized that they
were not really in danger. But residents‘ fears prevented them from engaging in dialogue
that might lead to a reduction of their fear. The residents‘ reluctance was, ironically,
strengthened by the condescending and disdainful way in which human-rights advocates
treated them. Thus, the Aleph supporters were able to gain a decided advantage in framing
the issue for the public by portraying the anti-Aum residents as obstinately and irrationally
afraid. Even had the residents successfully communicated their ―fear‖ to society in general,
the distance between their situation and that of the observing public would have made the
public‘s empathy low. Hence, it was easier for society to acknowledge the more normative
argument that there would be no exception in protecting human rights of minority people.
In terms of framing strategy, then, human-rights advocates defeated the residents.
Structure of Political Opportunity
The structure of political opportunities, the background of this verbal strategy, also turned
out to be a blessing for human-rights advocates. The structure of political opportunities
hinges on whether or not the national government would tolerate social movements. When
an anti-Aum movement was launched in Namino Village in Kumamoto, other local anti-Aum
movements were tolerated. This is because the municipality cooperated fully with the local
residents, and the national government also gave consideration to the Aum issue. In 1999,
the municipalities submitted a request to concerned government ministries and agencies, in
which they urged the government to crack down on Aum. This request gave some
momentum to the enactment of new anti-Aum laws. The framing from the local
communities was successful—―We cannot live in peace as long as cult activity is tolerated.‖
Because of court decisions, however, it became difficult after the year 2000 to take judicial
and administrative measures that go beyond surveillance (supervision by the Security Police
Agency) in regard to the residence of Aleph members. In other words, now there are no
special reasons to prevent Aum members‘ freedom of residence. In that respect, the refusal
of residence registration in municipalities was a countermeasure that lacked legitimacy. The
municipalities were aware of this and patiently waited until the Aum-related persons finally
left the municipality, and then switched the anti-Aum slogan from ―Get out!‖ to ―Break Up!‖
They proposed a fundamental resolution of the problem so that no one could accuse them of
local egoism or of avoiding the problem.
In spite of all this, some Japanese, especially some intellectuals and young people, began to
show empathy for the A and A2 instead of the anti-Aum movement (Miyadai, 2002
Ohsawa, 2005 Gardner, 2001). Those films were produced by Tatsuya Mori, who
documented Aum from within and tried to break its typical ―cult‖ image. They slowly began
to accept the argument that the new religious group (Aleph, not Aum) was not dangerous
Cultic Studies Review, Vol. 7, No. 3, 2008, Page 46
and its members were just ordinary people. In addition, the continuance of those anti-Aleph
movements appeared more oppressive than before, since anti-Aum movements of local
communities had all ended in reconciliation, although they were close to defeats. Thus,
Japan‘s structure of political opportunities on the ―cult‖ issue has changed so much that,
sometimes, even those statements accusing the Japanese public of Aum-bashing seem
refreshing.
Conclusions
The ―cult‖ problem described in this paper was a living world that stood paralyzed before
the law and the human-rights movement. The honest and unsatisfied part of residents was
saying, ―Why must we deal with such intractable problems and be forced to listen to those
who argue as if it were none of our business?‖ Such voices must be heard and understood,
for it is not realistic to expect society to accept Aleph members, whose positions have been
preserved simply by the letter of the law and arguments of fairness. Without fully
understanding the fear behind these anti-Aum voices, Aleph members might face tacit
―discrimination‖ in academic enrollment (Mihashi, 2005), employment, and everyday life,
even if they continue to enjoy the protection of law.
To better understand the position of the anti-Aum residents and the implications of that
position for Japanese society, I think it is useful to consider an analogy with the world‘s
current reaction to Japanese atrocities from the Second World War.
Ever since Prime Minister Nakasone made an official visit to the Yasukuni Shrine in the
1980s, Asian nations have harshly criticized Japan. Furthermore, South Korea has criticized
the history textbook issue centering on the forced transfer of Koreans and comfort women
(sex slaves for soldiers), as well as Japan‘s interpretation of the war. In contrast, the
reparations issue has been politically settled within Japanese-North Korean and Japanese-
South Korean relations. Can we simply dismiss the way those countries express their anger
or frustration over Japanese attitudes? Can we repeatedly insist that reflection on Japan‘s
actions 60 long years ago is an unreasonable interference or political strategy? Can we
erase the invasion by Japanese soldiers from the memories of war victims in Asia? We
perpetrated certain things in the war that deserve current criticism, and Japan cannot
escape that responsibility. Legally it is possible, but on a moral level it is not. As long as we
are Japanese, we all have to share the burden of Japan‘s history. If that is so, we have no
choice but to listen to other countries‘ criticisms about the remnants of state Shintoism,
which became a breeding ground for militarism, as manifested in history textbooks with a
strong nationalistic tinge and a political climate reminiscent of the National Mobilization Law.
The international community will not accept the brazen attitude of Japan demanding proof.
Just as the passage of time and legal details do not morally exonerate Japan from its past
actions, so too do current Aleph members bear some responsibility for the heinous crimes
their group perpetrated. And just as Japan is morally bound to listen respectfully to the
criticisms of those whom it once victimized, so too do current Aleph members and their
supporters have an obligation to respect the fears of those for whom the memories of Aum‘s
attacks are still vivid.
Current Aleph members should know what their former leader and some of their fellow
members did, and they should answer why and how the Aum dogma, training methods, and
organizational structure at the core of their faith managed to generate such an
unprecedented level of violence. They should conduct their current activities in a positive
manner by reflecting on their responsibility. Unfortunately, their behavior and
pronouncements seem to be irresponsible and indifferent to the expectations of the general
public. Therefore, people judge them to be human beings lacking in ordinary moral sense.
Human-rights activists who consider such views to be merely discrimination are locked in a
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