Cultic Studies Review, Vol. 7, No. 3, 2008, Page 45
formulated the standard framing by raising the question: ―Is it acceptable to limit individual
human rights due to abstract fears based on insufficient evidence and emotional loathing?‖
That is how the logic of fairness was introduced. In fact, at that time, the point in dispute
was not denying the human rights of Aleph members (discriminating against them) or
weighing those rights on a scale. And it was not about respecting the human rights of local
residents more than the human rights of Aleph members from the standpoint of public
welfare.
The local residents‘ fear was directed toward nothing other than the security threat posed
by Aleph (Aum). Unless the cult group disbanded, that fear would not disappear, so the
residents thought they had no incentive for meeting the cult members face-to-face. This
mindset was sustained by the memories of the sarin gas attack and media reports that Aum
followers are mentally controlled by the cult group. Naturally, there were individual
differences in their fears and degree of loathing, not to mention differences in residential
styles.
Aleph‘s supporters maintained that ―fear‖ would be reduced if residents recognized that they
were not really in danger. But residents‘ fears prevented them from engaging in dialogue
that might lead to a reduction of their fear. The residents‘ reluctance was, ironically,
strengthened by the condescending and disdainful way in which human-rights advocates
treated them. Thus, the Aleph supporters were able to gain a decided advantage in framing
the issue for the public by portraying the anti-Aum residents as obstinately and irrationally
afraid. Even had the residents successfully communicated their ―fear‖ to society in general,
the distance between their situation and that of the observing public would have made the
public‘s empathy low. Hence, it was easier for society to acknowledge the more normative
argument that there would be no exception in protecting human rights of minority people.
In terms of framing strategy, then, human-rights advocates defeated the residents.
Structure of Political Opportunity
The structure of political opportunities, the background of this verbal strategy, also turned
out to be a blessing for human-rights advocates. The structure of political opportunities
hinges on whether or not the national government would tolerate social movements. When
an anti-Aum movement was launched in Namino Village in Kumamoto, other local anti-Aum
movements were tolerated. This is because the municipality cooperated fully with the local
residents, and the national government also gave consideration to the Aum issue. In 1999,
the municipalities submitted a request to concerned government ministries and agencies, in
which they urged the government to crack down on Aum. This request gave some
momentum to the enactment of new anti-Aum laws. The framing from the local
communities was successful—―We cannot live in peace as long as cult activity is tolerated.‖
Because of court decisions, however, it became difficult after the year 2000 to take judicial
and administrative measures that go beyond surveillance (supervision by the Security Police
Agency) in regard to the residence of Aleph members. In other words, now there are no
special reasons to prevent Aum members‘ freedom of residence. In that respect, the refusal
of residence registration in municipalities was a countermeasure that lacked legitimacy. The
municipalities were aware of this and patiently waited until the Aum-related persons finally
left the municipality, and then switched the anti-Aum slogan from ―Get out!‖ to ―Break Up!‖
They proposed a fundamental resolution of the problem so that no one could accuse them of
local egoism or of avoiding the problem.
In spite of all this, some Japanese, especially some intellectuals and young people, began to
show empathy for the A and A2 instead of the anti-Aum movement (Miyadai, 2002
Ohsawa, 2005 Gardner, 2001). Those films were produced by Tatsuya Mori, who
documented Aum from within and tried to break its typical ―cult‖ image. They slowly began
to accept the argument that the new religious group (Aleph, not Aum) was not dangerous
formulated the standard framing by raising the question: ―Is it acceptable to limit individual
human rights due to abstract fears based on insufficient evidence and emotional loathing?‖
That is how the logic of fairness was introduced. In fact, at that time, the point in dispute
was not denying the human rights of Aleph members (discriminating against them) or
weighing those rights on a scale. And it was not about respecting the human rights of local
residents more than the human rights of Aleph members from the standpoint of public
welfare.
The local residents‘ fear was directed toward nothing other than the security threat posed
by Aleph (Aum). Unless the cult group disbanded, that fear would not disappear, so the
residents thought they had no incentive for meeting the cult members face-to-face. This
mindset was sustained by the memories of the sarin gas attack and media reports that Aum
followers are mentally controlled by the cult group. Naturally, there were individual
differences in their fears and degree of loathing, not to mention differences in residential
styles.
Aleph‘s supporters maintained that ―fear‖ would be reduced if residents recognized that they
were not really in danger. But residents‘ fears prevented them from engaging in dialogue
that might lead to a reduction of their fear. The residents‘ reluctance was, ironically,
strengthened by the condescending and disdainful way in which human-rights advocates
treated them. Thus, the Aleph supporters were able to gain a decided advantage in framing
the issue for the public by portraying the anti-Aum residents as obstinately and irrationally
afraid. Even had the residents successfully communicated their ―fear‖ to society in general,
the distance between their situation and that of the observing public would have made the
public‘s empathy low. Hence, it was easier for society to acknowledge the more normative
argument that there would be no exception in protecting human rights of minority people.
In terms of framing strategy, then, human-rights advocates defeated the residents.
Structure of Political Opportunity
The structure of political opportunities, the background of this verbal strategy, also turned
out to be a blessing for human-rights advocates. The structure of political opportunities
hinges on whether or not the national government would tolerate social movements. When
an anti-Aum movement was launched in Namino Village in Kumamoto, other local anti-Aum
movements were tolerated. This is because the municipality cooperated fully with the local
residents, and the national government also gave consideration to the Aum issue. In 1999,
the municipalities submitted a request to concerned government ministries and agencies, in
which they urged the government to crack down on Aum. This request gave some
momentum to the enactment of new anti-Aum laws. The framing from the local
communities was successful—―We cannot live in peace as long as cult activity is tolerated.‖
Because of court decisions, however, it became difficult after the year 2000 to take judicial
and administrative measures that go beyond surveillance (supervision by the Security Police
Agency) in regard to the residence of Aleph members. In other words, now there are no
special reasons to prevent Aum members‘ freedom of residence. In that respect, the refusal
of residence registration in municipalities was a countermeasure that lacked legitimacy. The
municipalities were aware of this and patiently waited until the Aum-related persons finally
left the municipality, and then switched the anti-Aum slogan from ―Get out!‖ to ―Break Up!‖
They proposed a fundamental resolution of the problem so that no one could accuse them of
local egoism or of avoiding the problem.
In spite of all this, some Japanese, especially some intellectuals and young people, began to
show empathy for the A and A2 instead of the anti-Aum movement (Miyadai, 2002
Ohsawa, 2005 Gardner, 2001). Those films were produced by Tatsuya Mori, who
documented Aum from within and tried to break its typical ―cult‖ image. They slowly began
to accept the argument that the new religious group (Aleph, not Aum) was not dangerous
