Cultic Studies Review, Vol. 7, No. 3, 2008, Page 36
of how society should deal with the existing group and its former members, who were not
criminally charged, remains unresolved.
From 2001 through 2005, the local communities and educational institutions that had to
face this problem dealt with it by campaigning against the residency of former members or
by rejecting their enrollment in local schools—as if to say these communities and
institutions could not coexist with ―cults.‖ Local authorities initially refused to accept the
former members‘ registration of residence under the pretext of safeguarding the area‘s
―public welfare.‖ That such measures were taken is not surprising, given the anxiety of local
residents and the public‘s anti-cult sentiment in the late 1990s. Indeed, new laws had been
enacted to monitor the Aum cult. However, at the insistence of Aleph members and their
supporters, the courts demanded that local communities and schools comply with the law.
In other words, the courts reaffirmed the right of any Japanese citizen to enjoy freedom of
residence and the right to education, even if he or she was a ―cult‖ member. At that time,
human-rights groups strongly supported those related to Aleph critics and media pundits
admonished the ―morally panicked‖ Japanese and went on to criticize the logic of banishing
―cults‖ as an emotional reaction that was not in line with ―the public good‖ (Shimizu, 2004).
Journalists, writers, and the general public, who, since the late 1990s, have grown tired of
the endless ―Aum bashing,‖ now tend to share the view that ―cult‖ followers are ordinary
people. At this point, those who have campaigned against the residency or college
enrollment of Aleph-related persons and members in the local community are considered
obstinate, even socially isolated.
In this paper, the author explores the conflict between Aum and local communities—in
particular, cases that occurred between 1999 and 2001. Aleph members, the children of the
Aum leader and related persons, and a number of other members moved into the local
communities of Fujioka City, Gunma Prefecture, Ryugasaki City, Ibaraki Prefecture, and
Karasuyama, Setagaya Ward, Tokyo. In these areas, authorities refused to allow these
individuals to register as residents and to permit their children to enroll in school, and local
residents conducted a campaign urging Aleph members to leave the community.
Before discussing these cases, however, let me comment on the conflict between the anti-
―cult‖ movement and the logic of supporting human rights.
The Anti-“Cult” Movement and the Human-Rights Movement
The phrase ―anti-cult movement‖ refers to a variety of social activities promoted by those
who are critical of certain groups deemed ―cults,‖ as well as to experts working to educate
the public about the ―cult‖ issue (Shupe and Bromley, 1994). The term ―anti-cult
movement‖ was coined by sociologists of religion who took issue with the concept of ―cult‖
and preferred the term ―new religious movement.‖ However, to understand how the term
―cult‖ became so widespread in public discourse, it is necessary to explain who created the
concept and who has used the term to promote their own interests with the public (Barker,
2002). The Japan De-Cult Council (later The Japan Society for Cult Prevention and
Recovery) was founded in 1995 and consists of Aum victims and their families, former
members who support defectors from cults, lawyers and counselors, and clinical
psychologists. The council has devoted its time to educating the public on the issue. The
author, as a board member of this organization, has been involved in working to resolve the
cult issue in a practical and realistic manner. Thus, the cult issue was initially formulated as
a social problem by the anti-cult movement.
In recent years, criticism of the anti-cult movement has begun to dominate scholarly, if not
public, discourse. This trend has been particularly conspicuous in local anti-Aleph
movements, the leaders of which are local municipalities, councilpersons, city officials, and
local residents, all nonprofessionals who confronted the Aum cult with great determination
despite the ominous ―cult‖ images purveyed by the media. Those leaders were emotionally
Cultic Studies Review, Vol. 7, No. 3, 2008, Page 37
distressed, not only by the ―aliens‖ who appeared suddenly in their midst, but also by the
media who besieged their homes, city offices, and schools in search of live coverage. In
spite of that, Fujioka City and Ryugasaki City campaigned against Aum only for a limited
period of time. Chitose-Karasuyama in Setagaya Ward, conversely, has kept up its anti-Aum
activities for the past five years. Although they organized their movement by founding a
prevention council and continue to publish newsletters on a regular basis, they have not
proven adept at promoting themselves to the general public and utilizing the media
effectively. Therefore, with the exception of those directly involved and local residents,
people in general know the realities of the anti-cult movement only from books written by
supporters of human rights (Tezuka, Aiichiro Matsui, Takeshi Yamagiwa, Eizo and
Fukami, Fumi. 2001).
Since 2002 I have regularly interviewed the condominium residents and municipality
officials in Karasuyama who oppose the residency of Aleph members. I also visited Fujioka
and Ryugasaki in 2004. Based on government data and survey findings, I have striven to
identify the realities of the anti-cult movement and how it differed by region. Apart from the
regional differences in each movement, the typical image of anti-cult movements has been
characterized by outside sources in a monolithic, stereotypical manner as residents who
stubbornly oppose religious cults such as Aleph.
A typical example is the argument of Iwamoto (2001) and Mori (2002), who criticized the
Japanese attitude of moral alarmism toward Aum/Aleph, pointing out that Aleph members
and local residents, supposedly locked in conflict, have actually been reconciling. Miyadai
and Ohsawa, both well-known sociologists and social critics, have suggested the future
possibility of harmonious coexistence between residents and Aleph members in Japan
(Miyadai, 2002:259 Ohsawa, 2005:213). However, it is fallacious to generalize the one
example reported by Iwamoto and Mori to other cases. In point of fact, their contention
rested solely upon the exchange of farewell greetings by several residents and two Aleph
members in the last phase of a four-month conflict in Fujioka City, as will be described later.
At that time, residents did not worry about Aleph, since the Maebashi District Court had
ordered Aleph members to vacate the property they were renting, whose owner was
bankrupt and whose residence was sealed.
Another common argument was that of Asano (1999) and Tezuka (1999), who asserted that
the resident movement was a government-sponsored movement that the Public Security
Investigation Agency and police set up so that new anti-Aum laws could be passed. The
mainstream media have not officially picked up this contention of a human-rights activist.
Let us examine the theory of the resident movement as a government-sponsored
movement.
Asano and Tezuka belong to the Liaison Committee on Human Rights and Mass Media
Conduct (JIMPOREN). They did not join forces simply to protect the rights of Aleph-related
persons and members, for they have long handled human-rights cases in which they believe
the constitution, democracy, and freedom were threatened. They perceive the spread of the
anti-cult movement as a sign that conservative political forces, while calling for the
restoration of social risk management and social order, took advantage of the Aum problem
in an attempt to assert control over civil society. Thus, they criticize the Public Security
Investigation Agency‘s excessive interference with the Aum cult and the media‘s biased
―Aum-bashing‖ reporting.
Looking at the anti-Aum movements by local residents from the establishment viewpoint,
Asano and Tezuka claim that it is not a coincidence that those movements simultaneously
emerged in 1999 in several locations, including areas where Aum members had already
resided. Tezuka cites the following locations as suspect areas:
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