International Journal of Cultic Studies Vol. 4, 2013 67
related offices (pp. 402-403). His atrocity tales
from disgruntled targets of intervention include
harangues, intimidation, physical abuse
(especially during the abduction phase), sexual
abuse, and psychological harm to cult members
who resisted deconversion. Shupe does indicate
with some cynicism that positive outcomes of
deprogramming received praise in many reports
by ACM organizations and news articles. Most
individuals who defected from a cult during
coercive intervention reported minimal lingering
distress regarding the “violence” associated with
the process. Shupe acknowledges this disparity,
which is at the crux of his argument against
violence during coercive intervention. But he
goes further.
Not so surprisingly, Shupe regards even legal
intervention as “violent” despite the noncoercive
narratives by practitioners: “It should be obvious
that a gentle, voluntary, or nonviolent
deprogramming is semantic waffling, a form of
what in the sociology of deviance is termed
neutralization and ultimately an oxymoron” (p.
411). He argues that in any intervention or exit-
counseling approach, the client is the family or
person who hires the interventionist and not the
NRM member therefore, there must be some
level of discomfort or a feeling of an assault on
the part of the member, at least initially, and
especially, again, if the intervention fails. I
would agree that there is discomfort and anxiety:
Most of the many hundreds of noncoercive
interventions I did alone with a family or spouse
who hired me did result in discomfort for the
cult member initially and that lasted until we
could gain some rapport and agreement. But to
call this approach violent is, well, in the realm of
an oxymoron, if not outright blindness to the
validity of duty to inform.
I mentioned that Shupe made errors in fact as
much from bias as from a failure to cite accurate
resources. I easily found and noted well over a
dozen errors in this article, but I will restrict my
comments to several. He claims that “After the
Cult Awareness Network declared bankruptcy in
1996, the North American anticult effort lost its
national-level clearinghouse for deprogramming
referrals” (p. 411). This statement is both
misleading and simplistic according to the
considerable information I had as an insider to
the field. The actual occurrence of coercive
deprogramming in the United States was always
tiny relative to the number of cult members, and
it declined after the early 1980s then it fell
precipitously after 1990 and by 1992 became
negligible as a potential threat to any cult
member. No new “apprentices” came into
deprogramming for many years because of
increased legal risks, often uncomfortable work
conditions, and uncertain income, not to mention
the considerable learning curve for layers of
knowledge and the individual fortitude
necessary to be effective in tense circumstances.
This reality holds true for apprentices for the
noncoercive approaches for similar reasons,
leaving aside the high risk of legal prosecution.
In others words, the field of intervention
specialists shrinking away had almost nothing to
do with CAN as a “clearinghouse” going under
in 1996.
Furthermore, CAN, as well as other ACM
organizations, always had divided sympathies
over approaches to intervention—most
individuals in the ACM were dead against
breaking the law to intervene. CAN, as I knew
it from 1986, had an uneasy relationship at best
with those who would ever entertain a coercive
approach. By 1996, the Internet had
significantly begun to replace CAN’s primary
role, which was to disseminate information
about cultic groups.
Shupe uses many examples culled from court
cases and testimonies from victims of failed
coercive interventions. I am intimately familiar
with several of the cases and have been aware of
the others he mentioned since they occurred. He
cites from a case I mentioned above that took
place in Idaho, the one I went to trial over.
Shupe (p. 406) describes Laverne C. as the
target of intervention and a “single mother” who
was “worrying about her children’s safety”
during the week-long intervention that began
with abduction from her home. This case is
complex and is outlined in detail in a statement I
made to a sociology professor who posted it on
the Internet in 1996.169 Shupe makes no
169 “A ‘Deprogrammer’s’ Viewpoint,”
http://www.psywww.com/psyrelig/szimhart.htm, 1996.
related offices (pp. 402-403). His atrocity tales
from disgruntled targets of intervention include
harangues, intimidation, physical abuse
(especially during the abduction phase), sexual
abuse, and psychological harm to cult members
who resisted deconversion. Shupe does indicate
with some cynicism that positive outcomes of
deprogramming received praise in many reports
by ACM organizations and news articles. Most
individuals who defected from a cult during
coercive intervention reported minimal lingering
distress regarding the “violence” associated with
the process. Shupe acknowledges this disparity,
which is at the crux of his argument against
violence during coercive intervention. But he
goes further.
Not so surprisingly, Shupe regards even legal
intervention as “violent” despite the noncoercive
narratives by practitioners: “It should be obvious
that a gentle, voluntary, or nonviolent
deprogramming is semantic waffling, a form of
what in the sociology of deviance is termed
neutralization and ultimately an oxymoron” (p.
411). He argues that in any intervention or exit-
counseling approach, the client is the family or
person who hires the interventionist and not the
NRM member therefore, there must be some
level of discomfort or a feeling of an assault on
the part of the member, at least initially, and
especially, again, if the intervention fails. I
would agree that there is discomfort and anxiety:
Most of the many hundreds of noncoercive
interventions I did alone with a family or spouse
who hired me did result in discomfort for the
cult member initially and that lasted until we
could gain some rapport and agreement. But to
call this approach violent is, well, in the realm of
an oxymoron, if not outright blindness to the
validity of duty to inform.
I mentioned that Shupe made errors in fact as
much from bias as from a failure to cite accurate
resources. I easily found and noted well over a
dozen errors in this article, but I will restrict my
comments to several. He claims that “After the
Cult Awareness Network declared bankruptcy in
1996, the North American anticult effort lost its
national-level clearinghouse for deprogramming
referrals” (p. 411). This statement is both
misleading and simplistic according to the
considerable information I had as an insider to
the field. The actual occurrence of coercive
deprogramming in the United States was always
tiny relative to the number of cult members, and
it declined after the early 1980s then it fell
precipitously after 1990 and by 1992 became
negligible as a potential threat to any cult
member. No new “apprentices” came into
deprogramming for many years because of
increased legal risks, often uncomfortable work
conditions, and uncertain income, not to mention
the considerable learning curve for layers of
knowledge and the individual fortitude
necessary to be effective in tense circumstances.
This reality holds true for apprentices for the
noncoercive approaches for similar reasons,
leaving aside the high risk of legal prosecution.
In others words, the field of intervention
specialists shrinking away had almost nothing to
do with CAN as a “clearinghouse” going under
in 1996.
Furthermore, CAN, as well as other ACM
organizations, always had divided sympathies
over approaches to intervention—most
individuals in the ACM were dead against
breaking the law to intervene. CAN, as I knew
it from 1986, had an uneasy relationship at best
with those who would ever entertain a coercive
approach. By 1996, the Internet had
significantly begun to replace CAN’s primary
role, which was to disseminate information
about cultic groups.
Shupe uses many examples culled from court
cases and testimonies from victims of failed
coercive interventions. I am intimately familiar
with several of the cases and have been aware of
the others he mentioned since they occurred. He
cites from a case I mentioned above that took
place in Idaho, the one I went to trial over.
Shupe (p. 406) describes Laverne C. as the
target of intervention and a “single mother” who
was “worrying about her children’s safety”
during the week-long intervention that began
with abduction from her home. This case is
complex and is outlined in detail in a statement I
made to a sociology professor who posted it on
the Internet in 1996.169 Shupe makes no
169 “A ‘Deprogrammer’s’ Viewpoint,”
http://www.psywww.com/psyrelig/szimhart.htm, 1996.
