International Journal of Cultic Studies ■ Vol. 10, 2019 27
In addition, Dawson’s (2001, p. 387) primary
argument against the validity of apostate
accounts concerned the influence that
deprogramming and exit counseling have on
apostates’ brainwashing claims and their
negative posture toward the former group. Kent
(2001b, p. 408) indicated, however, that none of
the former members he interviewed had
undergone deprogramming or exit counselling.
Furthermore, in focusing on the supposed
methodological inadequacies rather than
assessing the evidence, Dawson avoided
evaluating the content of Kent’s theory. Dawson
argued that, given the methodological issues, he
could not verify Kent’s evidence therefore,
...little attempt will be made to
question directly the veracity of the
evidence reported by Kent, derived
largely from media reports, court
documents, religious texts, and
organizational memoranda, and
interviews with ex-members done by
Kent. ...The specific factual claims
Kent makes may or may not be true. I
do not have access to the materials he
uses in order to make my own
assessment. But in some respects it is
not relevant whether or not the facts are
true (Dawson, 2001, p. 380 emphasis
added).
Thus, Dawson’s critique reflects the Kuhn-Cole
argument that, without consensual standards of
assessment, conflicts concern foundation issues
rather than the theory.
Kent’s theory proliferation demonstrates that
theory growth is possible. Dawson’s critique,
however, indicates that a lack of consensual
standards of assessment, in combination with
noncognitive factors, constrains theory growth.
According to Cole (2001b, p. 39), “a field is
making progress if it has a core and is
developing new knowledge which is being
added to the core.” Analysis of the
brainwashing-theory debate reveals that the
researchers involved in it lack consensual
cognitive standards of assessment with which to
resolve theoretical problems.
Noncognitive factors, which have polarized the
researchers into opposing factions, influence
how the researchers respond to theoretical
conflict. Thus, it is unlikely that the researchers
will accept the development of new and possibly
contradictory knowledge. Furthermore, the
grounds on which the researchers dismiss new
knowledge are political and ideological rather
than scientific. Zablocki (1997, p. 106–107)
referred to the dismissal of brainwashing as
“blacklisting,” in that the dominant faction of
researchers seeks to “defame, ridicule, or ignore
the theory and to marginalize its adherents,” as
opposed to refuting the theory on an empirical
basis. Zablocki (1997, p. 97) concluded that “the
majority camp (debunkers of the brainwashing
conjecture) has declared victory and demanded
premature closure to the scientific debate.”
For example, Anthony and Robbins (2004, p.
285) contend that all brainwashing formulations
are essentially modifications of the same core
brainwashing theory, which “has been
conclusively disconfirmed in all of the realms in
which it has been scientifically evaluated.” The
dismissal of brainwashing without scientific
refutation minimizes the valuable potential of
further research. In contrast to this blanket
dismissal, Kent (2008, p. 99) demonstrated that
brainwashing remains applicable “in a wide
variety of legal, political, and social contexts.”
Articles supporting brainwashing, however,
appear in marginalized journals, as opposed to
the leading journals concerning the sociology of
religion (Zablocki, 2001, pp. 168–169).
Conclusion
In response to the Kuhn-Cole argument that
sociological theory cannot progress without
highly developed paradigms, Berger et al.
(2005) argued that theoretical research programs
are sufficient for theoretical progress. Berger et
al. (2005) further argued that sociology already
has many programs, and theory growth is
occurring at the level of theoretical research
programs. Sociology, however, is a diverse and
divided field, encompassing several very
different orienting strategies (Szmatka &Mazur,
1996, p. 267). Consequently, researchers
disagree over methodological directives.
Conflict between communities of researchers,

28 International Journal of Cultic Studies ■ Vol. 10, 2019
whose members do not share consensual
standards of assessment, constrains the theory
growth that occurs within theoretical research
programs. Thus, the current structure of
sociology limits theory growth beyond the level
of theoretical research programs. To further
advance theory growth, sociology needs to
develop methods of engagement, in which
competing theoretical research programs can
resolve conflicts on the basis of reason and
evidence.
Specifically regarding the brainwashing issue,
researchers, while realizing the intimate
relationship among the levels, must specify to
which level of analysis they are applying the
term. Most likely, their application will be to a
program (either organizational or individual, as
may be the case of some forms of family
violence [see Boulette &Andersen, 1986]), or to
a social psychological effect. Clarity about the
level of analysis will facilitate the scientific
discussion of the concept. Therefore, measuring
the levels of restriction that programs are
designed to achieve, and measuring the
“success” of such programs on the social
psychological lives of individuals, may become
possible (at least for some brainwashing efforts).
So perhaps at some time in the near future,
social scientists will be able to use agreed-upon
evidence to resolve the brainwashing debate.
Research on paradigmatic or core issues in the
natural sciences insulates scientists from degrees
of social pressure, which social scientists
experience “to defend their choice of a research
problem ...in terms of the social importance of
achieving a solution” to a societal problem
(Kuhn, 2012, p. 164). Even “the research
enterprise” in the natural sciences, however,
“does from time to time prove useful, open up
new territory, display, order, and test long-
accepted belief” (Kuhn, 2012, p. 38). If framed
and conducted with attention paid to theoretical
implications along with social relevance, the
research enterprise in the social sciences can be,
simultaneously, scientifically enriching and
socially relevant. Such may be the case with
empirically designed sociological studies of
brainwashing, a term whose use already has real
consequences. In recent years, brainwashing
charges have appeared against (and denied by)
the Chinese government concerning camps to
reeducate Falun Gong members (McDonald,
2004) and now credible allegations exist that
the government has placed at least 1,000,000
Chinese (Islamic) Uyghurs in reeducation
programs (Zenz, 2018, p. 22 see Denyer, 2018,
and Vanderklippe, 2018). In addition, escapees
from North Korea continue to describe their
indoctrination in that country as brainwashing
(Il, as told to Lasley, 2014 Leistedt, 2013, p. 23
Loza, 2007, p. 151 Walker, 2014) as do some
people who interpret forms of Islamic terrorist
training (Omar &Smith, 2017 Sullivan, 2018
also see Argo, 2006, p. 2 Nuraniyah, 2018, p.
2). The term brainwashing appears in the current
(5th) edition of psychiatry’s Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual within “Other Specified
Dissociative Disorder” (APA, 2013, p. 306), 15
and going through a process of being
brainwashed likely has neurological implications
(Taylor, 2004).16
Obviously, the brainwashing concept has utility,
even if a consensus forms around using a
different term (such as systematic, coercive
indoctrination). Whatever the case may be,
social scientists would benefit from refining the
meaning of the concept and then designing
measurement tests of its validity and reliability
within sociology, the social sciences, and
elsewhere.
15 In the second subcategory within “Other Specified Disorder,”
the DSM states the following: “Identity disturbance due to
prolonged and intense coercive persuasion: Individuals who have
been subjected to intense coercive persuasion (e.g., brainwashing,
thought reform, indoctrination while captive, torture, long-term
political imprisonment, recruitment by sects/cults or by terror
organizations) may present with prolonged changes in, or
conscious questioning of, their identity” (APA, 2013, p. 306).
16 Taylor acknowledges, “direct modern scientific evidence of what
happens to brains during brainwashing is non-existent: ethical
objections forbid such research from taking place” (Taylor, 2004,
p. x). However, she identified brain functions that likely are
impacted from brainwashing techniques. For example, she
identified “emotions” as “one of the most potent tools in a
brainwasher’s armoury” (Taylor, 2004, p. 147) and devoted a
chapter to the likely neurological impact of brainwashing programs
on emotions (Taylor, 2004, pp. 147–165). Likewise, she identified
how the prefrontal cortex likely “implements the brain’s ideology”
created through brainwashing (Taylor, 2004, p. 185 see 167–186).
She defined brainwashing as “a systematic processing of non-
compliant human beings which, if successful, refashions their very
identities” (Taylor, 2004, p. 9).