20 International Journal of Cultic Studies ■ Vol. 10, 2019
scientific validity of brainwashing theories.
Many (but not all) researchers agree that free
will is a philosophical assumption rather than an
empirical concept (see Barker, 1984, p. 281, n.
45 Robbins &Anthony, 1980, p. 67 Zablocki,
1997, p. 102), even as some social psychologists
are in fact studying aspects of it scientifically
(for example, Baumeister &Moore, 2014 Crone
&Levy, 2018). Researchers disagree, however,
on whether brainwashing theories concern
notions of free will.
Some critics of brainwashing theories argue that
brainwashing theories assert the loss of the
alleged brainwashing victim’s free will and
therefore involve unfalsifiable criteria (see
Anthony, 2001, pp. 222, 262 Robbins, Anthony,
&McCarthy, 1983, p. 323). As far back as 1980,
for example, Thomas Robbins and Dick
Anthony argued along these lines:
When brainwashing, mind control, or
coercive persuasion concepts are applied
to social movements, certain
assumptions are often made that are not
really intrinsic to scholarly coercive
persuasion models. One such
assumption is the notion that “mind
controlled” converts lack free will and
personal autonomy. Free will is not
really an empirical concept it is more of
a philosophical assumption that we
assign to adult human behavior and
withhold only in extreme cases (e.g.,
psychosis, senility). (Robbins &
Anthony, 1980, pp. 67–68 [italics in
original])
Conversely, some defenders of brainwashing
theories argue that the overthrow of free will is
not a component of brainwashing theories (see
Zablocki, 1997, p. 102).
Interestingly, Zablocki, who defends the utility
of the brainwashing term, concluded that
“brainwashing has absolutely nothing to do with
the overthrow of ‘free will’ or any other such
mystical or non-scientific concept” (Zablocki,
2001, p. 204 see also pp. 170–171, 182).10 The
10 Zablocki’s (1997 2001) argument that brainwashing theories do
not involve notions of free will refers to brainwashing theories in
qualification to this statement, which he added
to it, however, is central to the sociological
discipline: “People who have been brainwashed
are ‘not free’ only in the sense that all of us,
hemmed in on all sides as we are by social and
cultural constraints, are not free” (Zablocki,
2001, p. 204). We return to this insight shortly.
Since these arguments about whether free will
was only a philosophical (not a social scientific)
concept appeared, however, at least two
philosophical articles (one of which is in a law
journal) actually mention brainwashing as a
coercive practice that specifically limits if not
eliminates free will. Some philosophers seem
willing to recognize brainwashing’s implications
for free will even if some social scientists are
unwilling to recognize the implications of free
will within the brainwashing debate. Philosopher
Ileana Marcoulesco (1929–2011) was definite
about the impact of brainwashing on the
philosophical free-will issue: “For the will to be
free it is therefore necessary that there be no
direct coercion, serious compulsion, or distortion
of truth (for example, through propaganda or
brainwashing) and also that alternative choice be
at hand” (Marcoulesco, 1987/2005, p. 2).
Similarly, in an article about free will and the
law, Greg Simmons indicated that “attitudes
generated by indoctrination, brainwashing or
elaborate delusion ...do not sit well with our
notions of free will” (Simmons, 2017, p. 228).
Neglected, too, in the debate about free will and
brainwashing is the fact that, more or less, the
relation between the two now may be settled.
Intentionally or unintentionally, a major figure
in apparently settling this debate is Eileen
Barker, whose 1984 study of conversions to the
Unification Church found that the high failure
rate of workshop attendees converting (and a
subsequently high defection rate of the
subsequent converts) refuted a simplistic
interpretation about brainwashing in relation to
the converts (Barker, 1984, p. 147). Moreover,
she felt that the brainwashing term lacked
the scientific literature. Zablocki (2001, p. 170) acknowledged that
the free will of alleged brainwashing victims is a significant factor
in legal cases concerning brainwashing.
scientific validity of brainwashing theories.
Many (but not all) researchers agree that free
will is a philosophical assumption rather than an
empirical concept (see Barker, 1984, p. 281, n.
45 Robbins &Anthony, 1980, p. 67 Zablocki,
1997, p. 102), even as some social psychologists
are in fact studying aspects of it scientifically
(for example, Baumeister &Moore, 2014 Crone
&Levy, 2018). Researchers disagree, however,
on whether brainwashing theories concern
notions of free will.
Some critics of brainwashing theories argue that
brainwashing theories assert the loss of the
alleged brainwashing victim’s free will and
therefore involve unfalsifiable criteria (see
Anthony, 2001, pp. 222, 262 Robbins, Anthony,
&McCarthy, 1983, p. 323). As far back as 1980,
for example, Thomas Robbins and Dick
Anthony argued along these lines:
When brainwashing, mind control, or
coercive persuasion concepts are applied
to social movements, certain
assumptions are often made that are not
really intrinsic to scholarly coercive
persuasion models. One such
assumption is the notion that “mind
controlled” converts lack free will and
personal autonomy. Free will is not
really an empirical concept it is more of
a philosophical assumption that we
assign to adult human behavior and
withhold only in extreme cases (e.g.,
psychosis, senility). (Robbins &
Anthony, 1980, pp. 67–68 [italics in
original])
Conversely, some defenders of brainwashing
theories argue that the overthrow of free will is
not a component of brainwashing theories (see
Zablocki, 1997, p. 102).
Interestingly, Zablocki, who defends the utility
of the brainwashing term, concluded that
“brainwashing has absolutely nothing to do with
the overthrow of ‘free will’ or any other such
mystical or non-scientific concept” (Zablocki,
2001, p. 204 see also pp. 170–171, 182).10 The
10 Zablocki’s (1997 2001) argument that brainwashing theories do
not involve notions of free will refers to brainwashing theories in
qualification to this statement, which he added
to it, however, is central to the sociological
discipline: “People who have been brainwashed
are ‘not free’ only in the sense that all of us,
hemmed in on all sides as we are by social and
cultural constraints, are not free” (Zablocki,
2001, p. 204). We return to this insight shortly.
Since these arguments about whether free will
was only a philosophical (not a social scientific)
concept appeared, however, at least two
philosophical articles (one of which is in a law
journal) actually mention brainwashing as a
coercive practice that specifically limits if not
eliminates free will. Some philosophers seem
willing to recognize brainwashing’s implications
for free will even if some social scientists are
unwilling to recognize the implications of free
will within the brainwashing debate. Philosopher
Ileana Marcoulesco (1929–2011) was definite
about the impact of brainwashing on the
philosophical free-will issue: “For the will to be
free it is therefore necessary that there be no
direct coercion, serious compulsion, or distortion
of truth (for example, through propaganda or
brainwashing) and also that alternative choice be
at hand” (Marcoulesco, 1987/2005, p. 2).
Similarly, in an article about free will and the
law, Greg Simmons indicated that “attitudes
generated by indoctrination, brainwashing or
elaborate delusion ...do not sit well with our
notions of free will” (Simmons, 2017, p. 228).
Neglected, too, in the debate about free will and
brainwashing is the fact that, more or less, the
relation between the two now may be settled.
Intentionally or unintentionally, a major figure
in apparently settling this debate is Eileen
Barker, whose 1984 study of conversions to the
Unification Church found that the high failure
rate of workshop attendees converting (and a
subsequently high defection rate of the
subsequent converts) refuted a simplistic
interpretation about brainwashing in relation to
the converts (Barker, 1984, p. 147). Moreover,
she felt that the brainwashing term lacked
the scientific literature. Zablocki (2001, p. 170) acknowledged that
the free will of alleged brainwashing victims is a significant factor
in legal cases concerning brainwashing.
