International Journal of Cultic Studies ■ Vol. 10, 2019 23
may have influenced their position that new
religions did not brainwash. From Cole’s
perspective:
Unlike physicists, sociologists study
phenomena which they personally
participate in—not as sociologists but as
people. This means that the choice of
topics and decisions made in the course
of doing research are more likely for
sociologists than for physicists to be
influenced by non-cognitive concerns.
My assumption is that research will
advance and accumulate most rapidly
when cognitive criteria are the most
significant influence on the decisions
made by scientists (Cole, 2001b: 49).
The influence of autobiographical experiences
increases the likelihood of introducing “non-
scientific values” into research, thereby reducing
“the chances that the results of the research will
be important in answering any significant
theoretical questions ...[that] may have any
theoretical significance given the current state of
the discipline” (Cole, 2001b, p. 51).
Although it is true that some of the current
players within the brainwashing debate have had
firsthand experiences with controversial
religions or other high-demand ideologies, it by
no means is the case that all researchers on
brainwashing have had such experiences.
Indeed, the foundational studies about
brainwashing and thought reform from the
1950s and 1960s (including J. A. C. Brown,
Robert J. Lifton, William Sargant, Edgar H.
Schein, Margaret Singer, Albert Somit, and
Louis Jocelyn West) involved researchers who
cases (and based upon his interpretations of his own experiences),
Anthony wondered, “how can we distinguish between socially
unconventional behavior that is determined by the inappropriate
influence of an illegitimate civil religious cult on the one hand, and
that associated with authentic mystical awakening on the other?”
(Anthony, 1982, p. 13). He concluded, “I think the constitutional
protection of freedom of religion should be pretty nearly absolute”
(Anthony, 1982, p. 13). It seems, therefore, that Anthony rejected a
brainwashing interpretation for his own involvement with Meher
Baba, and extended that rejection as an explanation for anyone’s
intense involvement in a controversial religion. Perhaps worth
noting is that Anthony reproduced the essay in which he discussed
his reputed mystical experiences in a book that he coedited that
was published by a Unification Church publisher, Paragon House
(Anthony, Ecker, &Wilber [Eds.], 1987 see Streitfeld, 1993).
had no particular involvement with such groups.
Furthermore, one cannot assume that
autobiographical experiences deflect attention
away from what should be central sociological
questions. Experiences of systematic, coercive
indoctrination programs may lead to insights
about the sociology of free-will restrictions,
which—if it were not for a clash with another
sociological concept—might be identified as a
core sociological concept.
Perhaps what keeps the reality of free-will
restrictions from serving as a foundational
sociological concept is the related debate within
the discipline over agency, which (in simple
terms) involves people’s ability to make
decisions for themselves and act accordingly.
Sociologist David Bromley, for example, even
proposed reformulating the issue of free will
using the more empirically measurable concepts
around structure/agency (see Bromley 1998a,
pp. 258–261). His proffering of agency (broadly
meant as “the capacity for willed [voluntary]
action” [Scott &Marshall, 2005, p. 9]) as a
sociologically measurable concept took place in
the same year (1998) that an important article
about the topic appeared in a leading
sociological journal (Emirbayer &Mische,
1998).13
Sociologists Mustafa Emirbayer and Ann
Mische indicated that “agency itself remains a
dimension that is present in (but conceptually
distinct from) all empirical instances of human
action hence there are no concrete agents, but
only actors who engage agentically with their
structuring environments” (Emirbayer &
Mische, 1998, p. 1004). Their analysis of
agency, therefore, primarily assumed people
acting in more or less open societies in which
actors can: have “selective reactivation ...of
past patterns of thought and action” (called
iteration [Emirbayer &Mische, 1998, p. 971)
have the ability to imaginatively generate
13 Emirbayer and Mische’s definition of agency is as follows: “the
temporally constructed engagement by actors of different structural
environments—the temporal-relational contexts of action—which,
through the interplay of habit, imagination, and judgement, both
reproduces and transforms those structures in interactive response
to the problems posed by changing historical situations”
(Emirbayer &Mische, 1998, p. 970 [italics in original]).
may have influenced their position that new
religions did not brainwash. From Cole’s
perspective:
Unlike physicists, sociologists study
phenomena which they personally
participate in—not as sociologists but as
people. This means that the choice of
topics and decisions made in the course
of doing research are more likely for
sociologists than for physicists to be
influenced by non-cognitive concerns.
My assumption is that research will
advance and accumulate most rapidly
when cognitive criteria are the most
significant influence on the decisions
made by scientists (Cole, 2001b: 49).
The influence of autobiographical experiences
increases the likelihood of introducing “non-
scientific values” into research, thereby reducing
“the chances that the results of the research will
be important in answering any significant
theoretical questions ...[that] may have any
theoretical significance given the current state of
the discipline” (Cole, 2001b, p. 51).
Although it is true that some of the current
players within the brainwashing debate have had
firsthand experiences with controversial
religions or other high-demand ideologies, it by
no means is the case that all researchers on
brainwashing have had such experiences.
Indeed, the foundational studies about
brainwashing and thought reform from the
1950s and 1960s (including J. A. C. Brown,
Robert J. Lifton, William Sargant, Edgar H.
Schein, Margaret Singer, Albert Somit, and
Louis Jocelyn West) involved researchers who
cases (and based upon his interpretations of his own experiences),
Anthony wondered, “how can we distinguish between socially
unconventional behavior that is determined by the inappropriate
influence of an illegitimate civil religious cult on the one hand, and
that associated with authentic mystical awakening on the other?”
(Anthony, 1982, p. 13). He concluded, “I think the constitutional
protection of freedom of religion should be pretty nearly absolute”
(Anthony, 1982, p. 13). It seems, therefore, that Anthony rejected a
brainwashing interpretation for his own involvement with Meher
Baba, and extended that rejection as an explanation for anyone’s
intense involvement in a controversial religion. Perhaps worth
noting is that Anthony reproduced the essay in which he discussed
his reputed mystical experiences in a book that he coedited that
was published by a Unification Church publisher, Paragon House
(Anthony, Ecker, &Wilber [Eds.], 1987 see Streitfeld, 1993).
had no particular involvement with such groups.
Furthermore, one cannot assume that
autobiographical experiences deflect attention
away from what should be central sociological
questions. Experiences of systematic, coercive
indoctrination programs may lead to insights
about the sociology of free-will restrictions,
which—if it were not for a clash with another
sociological concept—might be identified as a
core sociological concept.
Perhaps what keeps the reality of free-will
restrictions from serving as a foundational
sociological concept is the related debate within
the discipline over agency, which (in simple
terms) involves people’s ability to make
decisions for themselves and act accordingly.
Sociologist David Bromley, for example, even
proposed reformulating the issue of free will
using the more empirically measurable concepts
around structure/agency (see Bromley 1998a,
pp. 258–261). His proffering of agency (broadly
meant as “the capacity for willed [voluntary]
action” [Scott &Marshall, 2005, p. 9]) as a
sociologically measurable concept took place in
the same year (1998) that an important article
about the topic appeared in a leading
sociological journal (Emirbayer &Mische,
1998).13
Sociologists Mustafa Emirbayer and Ann
Mische indicated that “agency itself remains a
dimension that is present in (but conceptually
distinct from) all empirical instances of human
action hence there are no concrete agents, but
only actors who engage agentically with their
structuring environments” (Emirbayer &
Mische, 1998, p. 1004). Their analysis of
agency, therefore, primarily assumed people
acting in more or less open societies in which
actors can: have “selective reactivation ...of
past patterns of thought and action” (called
iteration [Emirbayer &Mische, 1998, p. 971)
have the ability to imaginatively generate
13 Emirbayer and Mische’s definition of agency is as follows: “the
temporally constructed engagement by actors of different structural
environments—the temporal-relational contexts of action—which,
through the interplay of habit, imagination, and judgement, both
reproduces and transforms those structures in interactive response
to the problems posed by changing historical situations”
(Emirbayer &Mische, 1998, p. 970 [italics in original]).
