International Journal of Cultic Studies ■ Vol. 10, 2019 25
Bromley’s emphasis on the oppositional role of
apostates undermines the reliability of apostate
accounts. Sociologist Lewis Carter (1998, p.
227), however, argued that defining apostates
solely as oppositional leave-takers is
problematic because it leads researchers to
dismiss the potential value of moderate former
members.
The findings from Zablocki’s (1996) study,
which examined apostate accounts in relation to
believer accounts, provide support for the
reliability and validity of apostate accounts. The
study involved a sample of 281 members of new
religious communities, divided into a subsample
of 176 believers and 105 apostates, and a control
group consisting of 109 members of
nonreligious communes (Zablocki, 1996, p. 14).
Zablocki (1996, p. 15) concluded that “not only
are apostate responses no less consistent than
believer responses, but they are also no less
consistent than those of people with no
involvement at all with NRMs.”
Despite the evidence supporting the credibility
of former-member accounts, the issue remains
contentious. Researchers who use the accounts
of former members risk “being accused of being
an anticult-movement sympathizer, not getting
published in certain academic journals, not being
accepted as a conference participant, [or] being
pressured to conform” (Lalich, 2001, p. 140).
Furthermore, researchers who use information
from former members receive criticism for
committing an alleged methodological error
(Kent &Swanson, 2017, p. 15). The academics
who criticize their colleagues for using
information from former members tend to
formulate their critiques solely on the basis of
the alleged methodological error as opposed to
evaluating the content of the research (Kent &
Swanson 2017, p. 15).
The nature of the disagreements within the
brainwashing-theory debate prevents the
researchers from resolving disputes empirically.
Berger et al. (2005, p. 148) argued that
researchers within a theoretical research
program resolve disputes using reason and
evidence:
Theoretical research programs cannot
guarantee discipline-wide consensus in
the interpretation of evidence, but
because any given program is at the
same time a network of investigators
who share consensual standards of
assessment, it is possible to resolve such
disputes within programs there are in
fact many disputes they are in fact
resolved and the grounds on which they
are resolved are rational, in the sense
that they appeal to argument and
evidence, not politics or ideology.
The disagreements within the brainwashing
theory debate, however, concern theoretical
concepts and principles, as well as substantive
and methodological directives. Given the
disagreement over methodological directives,
researchers within the debate lack a set of
consensual information-gathering and
information-processing techniques by which to
determine the empirical adequacy of the
brainwashing concept. Therefore, a fundamental
issue of the debate is the researchers’ inability to
agree on the “doability” of the problem.
Furthermore, the lack of consensual standards of
assessment prevents the researchers from
resolving disputes using evidence and reason.
Implications for Theory Growth
This section examines the implications for
theory growth within the brainwashing debate,
given the lack of consensual standards of
assessment. Without consensual standards of
assessment, noncognitive factors prevent
researchers from resolving theoretical conflicts
(Cole, 2001b, pp. 53–54) see Berger et al.,
2005, p. 148). Consequently, little or no theory
growth occurs. Therefore, we examine
sociologist Stephen Kent’s application of the
brainwashing concept to Scientology’s
Rehabilitation Project Force (RPF) and
sociologist Lorne Dawson’s corresponding
critique to determine the extent to which
noncognitive factors influence how researchers
respond to new evidence that may contradict
existing views.
Kent’s application of the brainwashing concept
to Scientology’s RPF demonstrates Wagner and
Berger’s (1985) “theory proliferation.” Theory
proliferation is a type of relationship between
theories in which “ideas from one theory are
Bromley’s emphasis on the oppositional role of
apostates undermines the reliability of apostate
accounts. Sociologist Lewis Carter (1998, p.
227), however, argued that defining apostates
solely as oppositional leave-takers is
problematic because it leads researchers to
dismiss the potential value of moderate former
members.
The findings from Zablocki’s (1996) study,
which examined apostate accounts in relation to
believer accounts, provide support for the
reliability and validity of apostate accounts. The
study involved a sample of 281 members of new
religious communities, divided into a subsample
of 176 believers and 105 apostates, and a control
group consisting of 109 members of
nonreligious communes (Zablocki, 1996, p. 14).
Zablocki (1996, p. 15) concluded that “not only
are apostate responses no less consistent than
believer responses, but they are also no less
consistent than those of people with no
involvement at all with NRMs.”
Despite the evidence supporting the credibility
of former-member accounts, the issue remains
contentious. Researchers who use the accounts
of former members risk “being accused of being
an anticult-movement sympathizer, not getting
published in certain academic journals, not being
accepted as a conference participant, [or] being
pressured to conform” (Lalich, 2001, p. 140).
Furthermore, researchers who use information
from former members receive criticism for
committing an alleged methodological error
(Kent &Swanson, 2017, p. 15). The academics
who criticize their colleagues for using
information from former members tend to
formulate their critiques solely on the basis of
the alleged methodological error as opposed to
evaluating the content of the research (Kent &
Swanson 2017, p. 15).
The nature of the disagreements within the
brainwashing-theory debate prevents the
researchers from resolving disputes empirically.
Berger et al. (2005, p. 148) argued that
researchers within a theoretical research
program resolve disputes using reason and
evidence:
Theoretical research programs cannot
guarantee discipline-wide consensus in
the interpretation of evidence, but
because any given program is at the
same time a network of investigators
who share consensual standards of
assessment, it is possible to resolve such
disputes within programs there are in
fact many disputes they are in fact
resolved and the grounds on which they
are resolved are rational, in the sense
that they appeal to argument and
evidence, not politics or ideology.
The disagreements within the brainwashing
theory debate, however, concern theoretical
concepts and principles, as well as substantive
and methodological directives. Given the
disagreement over methodological directives,
researchers within the debate lack a set of
consensual information-gathering and
information-processing techniques by which to
determine the empirical adequacy of the
brainwashing concept. Therefore, a fundamental
issue of the debate is the researchers’ inability to
agree on the “doability” of the problem.
Furthermore, the lack of consensual standards of
assessment prevents the researchers from
resolving disputes using evidence and reason.
Implications for Theory Growth
This section examines the implications for
theory growth within the brainwashing debate,
given the lack of consensual standards of
assessment. Without consensual standards of
assessment, noncognitive factors prevent
researchers from resolving theoretical conflicts
(Cole, 2001b, pp. 53–54) see Berger et al.,
2005, p. 148). Consequently, little or no theory
growth occurs. Therefore, we examine
sociologist Stephen Kent’s application of the
brainwashing concept to Scientology’s
Rehabilitation Project Force (RPF) and
sociologist Lorne Dawson’s corresponding
critique to determine the extent to which
noncognitive factors influence how researchers
respond to new evidence that may contradict
existing views.
Kent’s application of the brainwashing concept
to Scientology’s RPF demonstrates Wagner and
Berger’s (1985) “theory proliferation.” Theory
proliferation is a type of relationship between
theories in which “ideas from one theory are
