International Journal of Cultic Studies ■ Vol. 10, 2019 17
Consensual standards of assessment enable
conflict resolution among competing theoretical
formulations on the basis of reason and evidence
as opposed to noncognitive social, economic,
ideological, or political factors. Furthermore,
disciplines with universally accepted paradigms
have firmly established foundations. Therefore,
debates between theories do not include disputes
over the foundations of the discipline.
Disciplines, however, without universally
accepted paradigms lack consensual standards of
assessment. Consequently, political/ideological
struggles and foundation questions dominate
conflicts between theories, conflicts remain
unresolved, and little or no theoretical growth
occurs (Cole, 2001b, pp. 55–56 see Berger et
al., 2005, p. 148 Kuhn, 2012, p. 94).
Highly developed paradigms perform the
functions necessary for theoretical growth. Thus,
according to the Kuhn-Cole argument,
universally accepted paradigms are a necessary
condition for a discipline’s theoretical progress.
Sociology, however, lacks a core of universally
accepted paradigms and therefore lacks
significant progress.
In response to Cole’s argument, sociologists
Joseph Berger, David Willer, and Morris
Zelditch (2005) argued that, in the absence of a
universally accepted core of knowledge,
theoretical research programs engender
theoretical growth. These programs, they assert,
define a set of problems as doable, and
researchers within programs share common
cognitive standards of assessing solutions to
problems. Consequently, theoretical growth
occurs within them (Berger et al., 2005).
Overview of Berger-Willer-Zelditch
Response
Berger et al. (2005) acknowledged that
sociology lacks universally accepted paradigms,
but they challenged the implicit assumption of
the Kuhn-Cole argument that universally
accepted paradigms are necessary for theoretical
progress. They argued that theoretical research
programs, which already exist within sociology,
perform similar functions for theoretical
progress as highly developed paradigms.
Berger et al. (2005, pp. 131–132) distinguished
three levels of theoretical activity.9 At the
elementary level is the unit theory, consisting of
a set of interrelated concepts and principles. Unit
theories employ empirical models to explain
specific concrete phenomena. At the overarching
level is the orienting strategy, a metatheoretical
structure that consists of broad aims, ontological
and epistemological presuppositions, and
substantive and methodological directives.
Orienting strategies guide the construction of
unit theories. At the intermediate level is the
theoretical research program, which combines
elements of both unit theories and orienting
strategies. Theoretical research programs
combine “a set of substantive and
methodological working strategies, a network of
interrelated unit theories embodying these
strategies, and a set of theory-based empirical
models that interpret these theories” (Berger et
al., 2005, p. 132).
A theoretical research program provides a
community of scientists with the conceptual and
methodological resources that normal science
requires (Berger et al., 2005, pp. 131–132). The
concepts and principles available in the program
enable researchers to formulate solutions to
problems. The information-gathering and
information-processing techniques of the
program enable researchers to determine the
empirical adequacy of the solutions.
Furthermore, a community of scientists
committed to a program share common
cognitive standards for assessing solutions to
theoretical problems. Therefore, researchers use
reason and evidence, as opposed to politics and
ideology, to resolve conflicts between
competing theoretical formulations. Theoretical
research programs grow because researchers
within a program are able to determine which
problems are doable given the conceptual and
methodological resources of the program and
researchers resolve conflicts between competing
theoretical formulations on rational grounds
(given that the standards of assessment are
9 Berger et al.’s analytic scheme comprises the three major types
of theoretical activity given in Wagner and Berger (1985), and
refined in Berger and Zelditch (1993 1997).

18 International Journal of Cultic Studies ■ Vol. 10, 2019
consensual within the program). Berger et al.
(2005, p. 150) argued that many theoretical
research programs already exist in contemporary
sociology. Thus, substantial theory growth is
occurring in sociology at the level of theoretical
research programs (Berger et al., 2005, p. 150).
Brainwashing Theory Debate
Berger et al. (2005, p. 148) argued that a
community of scientists who share common
cognitive standards of assessment can resolve
conflicts using agreed-upon procedures of
science without the interference of politics or
ideology. A relatively small community of social
scientists (especially sociologists) study newer,
controversial religions (or cults), so it will be
useful to examine aspects of the debates about
brainwashing in which a few of them are
engaged. In this section, therefore, we examine
the brainwashing theory debate associated with
the academic study of controversial religions to
determine (a) the extent to which noncognitive
factors influence the researchers, and (b) the
ability of the researchers to resolve disputes
using reason and evidence. Given the
controversial nature of the subject matter, the
academic study of these newer and often
marginal religions is a highly polarized area of
study. Sociologists Benjamin Zablocki and
Thomas Robbins (2001, p. x) addressed the
complexities of the phenomena under
investigation:
Cults are a genuine expression of
religious freedom deserving toleration.
At the same time, they are opportunities
for unchecked exploitation of followers
by leaders deserving civic scrutiny. As
fragile new belief systems, they need the
protective cover of benign neglect by
the state. But as religious movements, it
is always possible that a few of them
may turn into potential incubators of
terrorism or other forms of crime and
abuse.
Consequently, a polarization between scholars
concerned with repressive over-regulation of the
group (such as interference in rights to choose,
assemble, and practice a faith) and scholars
concerned with exploitation of individual
members (including a range of human rights
violations) defines the study of controversial,
often cultish, religions (Zablocki &Robbins,
2001, p. x).
The involvement of scholars in litigation relating
to controversial religions reinforces the
polarization (Zablocki &Robbins, 2001, p. 6).
Scholars from both sides of the polarization
testify as expert witnesses in court cases
involving allegations of brainwashing (Zablocki,
1997, p. 100) and related concepts. An
additional source of the polarization is the
collaboration between scholars and the
controversial religions themselves (Kent &
Krebs, 1998a 1998b). Controversial religions
searching for recognition and legitimacy
recognize the value of gaining scholarly support
(Balch &Langdon, 1998, pp. 205–206). Some
controversial religions sponsor scholarly
activities, and some leading scholars in the field
engage with controversial religions as
consultants to lend support in public relations
efforts (Beit-Hallahmi, 2001 Horowitz, 1978).
Scholars have raised concern over the extent to
which their colleagues can remain committed to
objectivity when they are either defending
freedom of religion or combating religious
exploitation (Robbins, 2001, p. 85). A related
concern is the extent to which litigation and
collaborationism further compromise objectivity
(Beit-Hallahmi, 2001 Horowitz, 1978
Zablocki, 1997). According to Robbins (2001, p.
78), scholars can establish “lucrative careers as
‘professional witnesses,’ lobbyists, or expert
consultants to various advocates and entities
embroiled in adversarial processes in law and
government.” Experts frequently engaged in
litigation may develop more extreme claims in
response to the requirements of the legal
situation (Robbins 2001, p. 78). Collaborations
between scholars and controversial religions, in
which the scholars regard the groups as allies
rather than foci of study, compromise the
credibility of the research (Beit-Hallahmi, 2001,
p. 46). Undisclosed financial arrangements
further undermine the credibility of research
findings (Beit-Hallahmi, 2001, p. 49 Zablocki,
1997, pp. 115–116).
In addition to possible compromises of
objectivity regarding controversial issues, Cole