Cultic Studies Journal, Vol. 6, No. 1, 1989, Page 21
the part of an actor the intent to achieve the foreseeable consequences of an act. No
volitional analysis is undertaken to see if the person actually contemplated those results.
Rather, they are imposed by implication of the necessary state of mind. Variations of this
implication occur when the level of intent deviates from that of an ordinary prudent man or
woman to determine if the conduct should be the subject of enhanced liability. In those
latter circumstances, an examination of the volition of individuals may be undertaken to
determine whether his special knowledge and proclivities would aid in the finding of a
particular intent different from that of the implied, ordinary standard.
Finally, classifications with respect to joint liability often require examination of intent or at
least are phrased as if they did. Are parties bound together in a common plan? Did they
share a common intent and purpose? If so, they may be jointly liable. Was one an active
participant and the other passive? If so, their liability may be apportioned. Is a volitional
examination necessary to determine whether actions for which the actors are sought to be
held responsible were outside their initial contemplation? Could it have been reasonably
foreseen that events would take that turn and if so, should liability be fastened upon them
through the vehicle of implied intent? In each of these instances, again, the process of
answering the question of intent is not solely or largely focused on psychological
examination of the actor but rather on the social desirability of holding the actor
accountable, or allocating responsibility for the consequences of the action.
Classification of Exculpation
Language analyzing or purporting to explain intent likewise appears in situations in which
the actors seek to avoid or diminish liability for an act. In the first general area, actors
sometimes seek to avoid or diminish liability by reducing or eliminating the intent and
character of an act so as to make it casual, erroneous, or fortuitous. In those
circumstances diminution of liability may be based on consideration of human fallibility, for
which no response may be assessed. In other instances, diminution may be achieved by
establishing a mixture of motivation and by introducing evidence of multiple causation of
behavior. An act may not be deemed malicious or aggravated if a neutral justification or
explanation derived from the setting or history of the act is inconsistent with a malevolent
motive. In other instances, liability can be transferred from the actor to another through
implication or through authority asserted in interpersonal relationships. An agent may seek
discharge from responsibility by fastening responsibility on his principal, regardless of the
agent‟s intent in committing the act.
Sometimes rather than diminution, total negation of liability is sought through a defense
such as fraud or misrepresentation. In those situations, it is very clear that the law
conducts a full inquiry, looking at the particular characteristics of actors and the parties
acting upon them. Actors‟ state of knowledge is relevant in determining the reasonability of
their relying upon a false representation. Sophisticated investors, for example, are treated
differently from widows and orphans in securities cases. Cases which involve deception or
manipulation look at gullibility and impairment of capacity of the object of the fraud, as well
as the conduct of the inducer. In some areas of tort law, this is explicit. A basis for civil
liability may expressly be identified as “outrageous” conduct “without justification” or
“intentional infliction of emotional distress” or “intentional interference with an economic
advantage without justification.” In those instances, the law recognizes that on the one
hand there must be “intent,” which is often implied from the action, but on the other hand
there is a countervailing social value which may negate the legal consequences of that
action and exculpate the actor from liability. If, for example, an officer of a corporation
seeks to obtain the benefit of a contract for his company by underbidding and thus
depriving a competitor of an economic gain, that act, although intentional and inflicting
injury on a third party, will not be a subject of liability on the part of a corporate officer.
The result changes, however, when that corporate officer seeks his own personal advantage
the part of an actor the intent to achieve the foreseeable consequences of an act. No
volitional analysis is undertaken to see if the person actually contemplated those results.
Rather, they are imposed by implication of the necessary state of mind. Variations of this
implication occur when the level of intent deviates from that of an ordinary prudent man or
woman to determine if the conduct should be the subject of enhanced liability. In those
latter circumstances, an examination of the volition of individuals may be undertaken to
determine whether his special knowledge and proclivities would aid in the finding of a
particular intent different from that of the implied, ordinary standard.
Finally, classifications with respect to joint liability often require examination of intent or at
least are phrased as if they did. Are parties bound together in a common plan? Did they
share a common intent and purpose? If so, they may be jointly liable. Was one an active
participant and the other passive? If so, their liability may be apportioned. Is a volitional
examination necessary to determine whether actions for which the actors are sought to be
held responsible were outside their initial contemplation? Could it have been reasonably
foreseen that events would take that turn and if so, should liability be fastened upon them
through the vehicle of implied intent? In each of these instances, again, the process of
answering the question of intent is not solely or largely focused on psychological
examination of the actor but rather on the social desirability of holding the actor
accountable, or allocating responsibility for the consequences of the action.
Classification of Exculpation
Language analyzing or purporting to explain intent likewise appears in situations in which
the actors seek to avoid or diminish liability for an act. In the first general area, actors
sometimes seek to avoid or diminish liability by reducing or eliminating the intent and
character of an act so as to make it casual, erroneous, or fortuitous. In those
circumstances diminution of liability may be based on consideration of human fallibility, for
which no response may be assessed. In other instances, diminution may be achieved by
establishing a mixture of motivation and by introducing evidence of multiple causation of
behavior. An act may not be deemed malicious or aggravated if a neutral justification or
explanation derived from the setting or history of the act is inconsistent with a malevolent
motive. In other instances, liability can be transferred from the actor to another through
implication or through authority asserted in interpersonal relationships. An agent may seek
discharge from responsibility by fastening responsibility on his principal, regardless of the
agent‟s intent in committing the act.
Sometimes rather than diminution, total negation of liability is sought through a defense
such as fraud or misrepresentation. In those situations, it is very clear that the law
conducts a full inquiry, looking at the particular characteristics of actors and the parties
acting upon them. Actors‟ state of knowledge is relevant in determining the reasonability of
their relying upon a false representation. Sophisticated investors, for example, are treated
differently from widows and orphans in securities cases. Cases which involve deception or
manipulation look at gullibility and impairment of capacity of the object of the fraud, as well
as the conduct of the inducer. In some areas of tort law, this is explicit. A basis for civil
liability may expressly be identified as “outrageous” conduct “without justification” or
“intentional infliction of emotional distress” or “intentional interference with an economic
advantage without justification.” In those instances, the law recognizes that on the one
hand there must be “intent,” which is often implied from the action, but on the other hand
there is a countervailing social value which may negate the legal consequences of that
action and exculpate the actor from liability. If, for example, an officer of a corporation
seeks to obtain the benefit of a contract for his company by underbidding and thus
depriving a competitor of an economic gain, that act, although intentional and inflicting
injury on a third party, will not be a subject of liability on the part of a corporate officer.
The result changes, however, when that corporate officer seeks his own personal advantage
