Cultic Studies Journal, Vol. 13, No. 1, 1996, page 48
and research, the second author has encountered two clearly, other cases exist (cf.
Raginsky, 1969). However, the possibility of created memory is so high that the rare cases
should not be allowed to justify the admission of highly unreliable testimony produced by
the combination of hypnosis and psychotherapy. Hypnosis is an excellent tool for obtaining
useful clinical data, but we have known for more than 100 years that the data are largely
historically inaccurate. They pertain to a subjective universe, not an objective, historical
one.
Like correlation, hypnosis will fool. Hypnotic phenomena represent a complex interface of
cognitive variables, social-psychological factors, genetic propensities, psychopathology,
stable individual differences, and cultural artifacts. Understanding the role of these factors is
a lifetime work for numerous behavioral scientists. However, we do know something about
when not to use hypnosis. In the forensic context, it should not be used to influence the
memory of anyone called upon to testify about information recalled during hypnosis (AMA,
1985, 1994).
There are exceptions to this rule. As the Supreme Court ruled in Rock v. Arkansas, the
defendant in a criminal trial has the constitutional right to testify in her own behalf whether
or not she has been hypnotized. Similarly, if patients believe that they were abused during
hypnosis, the fact that they were hypnotized should not prevent them from testifying about
the alleged abuse (cf. McConkey &Sheehan, 1995). However, these are exceptions to a
general rule. Per se exclusion of testimony influenced by the use of hypnosis in
psychotherapy seems the best response to this situation, with specific provision being made
for the obvious exceptions just noted. Per se exclusion has costs, but they would seem
lower than those attendant to any other solution.
Conclusion
Hypnotically influenced testimony constitutes an unusual threat to the fact-finding process:
memory is often irreversibly altered without awareness by either subject or hypnotist that
anything untoward has occurred. The resulting testimony is less reliable but more certain,
vivid, and detailed than that resulting from ordinary recall. The admission of hypnotically
influenced testimony has led to potential and actual miscarriages of justice in the criminal
arena. In civil cases, where the burden of proof is lower, the prejudicial effects of hypnosis
may be even more extreme.
So far, we know of two kinds of civil cases: those involving automobile accidents and those
involving memories of child sexual abuse. In the automobile cases, memories retrieved
during hypnosis have been universally self-serving. Since simulation and lying, as well as
honest fantasy and confabulation, are possible, we can expect further examples of such
memories to be far more prejudicial than probative. Unfortunately, given its effects on the
resolution of auto accident cases, extension of hypnosis into areas such as child custody
suits is both foreseeable and potentially tragic.
In cases involving recovered memories of ICA, testimony based on psychopathology and the
demand characteristics of the clinical setting will be routine. Our computation of the range
of false positives in the diagnosis of ICA errs, if anything, on the side of underestimating the
incidence of misdiagnosis, and we have estimated that well over half the cases will be false
positives.
Admitting hypnotically based recall will encourage an enormous waste of judicial resources
and professional time. Also, it will inevitably result in what Laurence and Perry (1988) have
called “trial by fantasy.” Excluding hypnotically influenced recall per se (with rare and easily
specifiable exceptions) will have some costs. Compared to the costs attendant on other
alternatives, however, these costs are minimal. While a totality-of-the-circumstances test is

Cultic Studies Journal, Vol. 13, No. 1, 1996, page 49
the only reasonable alternative to a per se exclusion, to paraphrase the Shirley court, the
game is really not worth the candle.
If it is not possible to exclude hypnotic testimony per se, the totality-of- the-circumstances
test ordered by the Borawick court is the next best alternative, although it is costly in
judicial and psychological resources. If this latter view is adopted, we would strongly prefer
that the party advocating admission bear the burden of “clear and convincing” evidence of
the probative value of hypnotic testimony. Given the rarity with which hypnosis to refresh
memory will be helpful and the frequency with which it will be prejudicial, this burden is
reasonable.
Satanic ritual abuse and multiple personality disorder, two of the three broader issues, can
be treated with relative certainty. Since there is no multigenerational, baby-killing, sex-
enslaving, satanic cult, reports of SRA are inherently unbelievable and place any report of
ICA at risk of being dismissed. While it is logically possible that a report of SRA may
coincide with or act as a screen memory for a historically accurate report of ICA, reports of
SRA generally provide easy recognition that fantasy, not history, underlies an accusation.
Given that psychogenic amnesia is rare, fugue states even rarer, and reports of MPD during
childhood, when the alters are said to form, hard to obtain, we strongly suggest that MPD is
almost universally if not entirely formed in adulthood in response to the availability of a
legitimate, dramatic social role in which psychopathology can be expressed and
responsibility for one‟s actions and feelings avoided.
The most appropriate treatment seems to be to encourage patients to accept and come to
terms with all their impulses, thoughts, and feelings. This is a classic task for
psychotherapy, and can be accomplished without calling forth and integrating ever-growing
groups of alters. Unless outcome data demonstrate that the alter-integration approach is
preferable, the time and expense required and the potential harm to the patient dictate the
careful therapist both question a diagnosis of MPD when a case is referred and proceed with
undramatic psychotherapy, emphasizing acceptance of and responsibility for all one‟s needs,
thoughts, feelings, and behavior. Both the present authors have used this approach to treat
such cases successfully.
In understanding SRA and MPD, another issue must be considered: the role of patients with
borderline personality disorder. Such patients may well be eager to enact the roles of incest
survivor, victim of cult abuse, and the alters of a multiple personality. They are all dramatic,
attention-getting symptoms that allow the patient to avoid responsibility for destructive and
antisocial impulses and to experience relief from chronic feelings of emptiness. Thus, the
causal direction ordinarily may be the reverse of that usually suggested: borderline
personality disorder may lead to reports of ICA, rather than childhood sexual abuse causing
borderline personality disorder.
Finally, the most difficult issue is the proportion of true and illusory memories of incestuous
childhood abuse. There will be no ultimate answer to this question until and unless we
obtain relatively accurate and objective incidence and prevalence data for ICA. If we knew
the frequency of such abuse, we could hope for less debate in this field. We do not have
such data (Gardner, 1992 Ludwig, 1992) and, unfortunately, it is not apparent how
appropriate data can be obtained. We are talking about secret acts that, if discovered, will
result in abhorrence for the perpetrator even among institutionalized felons. Further, the
definition of incestuous child abuse remains debatable. Are casually naked families engaged
in child abuse? When a father washes the itchy anus and genitals of his 4- or 5-year-old,
how should the act be interpreted? If a mother similarly washes the same area of the same
child in the same way, is the meaning different? Does it matter if the child is a boy or a girl?
When the bottom is washed, who is to decide whether it was incestuous child abuse: the