Cultic Studies Journal, Vol. 13, No. 1, 1996, page 36
And I believe this was in 1961 in the summer and that we had been brought up to
the attic to play dress-up. And that we were in the attic and there were several
boxes of clothes in cardboard boxes that were old clothes that belonged to my
cousins and that there were other boxes up there. The walls I remember were not
finished and there was some exposed house insulation that was a pinkish salmon
color. There was a very, very large house fan built into the wall of the attic and
there were two wooden chairs.
Many of us spent time in such an attic room when we were children. If not, movies and
television shows make the scene easy to visualize. Ms. Borawick continues:
And th[en] she had my little sister and I take off our pants and our underpants and
th[en] she tied --she put the chairs facing each other and she had my sister and I
sit in the chairs and we were going to play some other game. And she tied us to
the chairs with what looked like pieces of cloth or like small scarves that were I
think like a pink color and some were white. And th[en] at some point in time she
untied me and had me lie prone on the attic floor in the center of the attic. And
then she inserted --tried to push this broomstick into me. And I remember that in
the course of this she held up, I think, a stuffed animal, I think it was like a stuffed
rabbit, told me that if I ever told anybody what happened, and I think she
squeezed the neck of the rabbit and said that‟s what was going to happen to me
and that this was just our little secret. And that was the conclusion. That‟s all I‟ve
remembered of that episode in the attic with the chairs and the broomstick.
(Plaintiff‟s deposition transcript from July 29, 1992, labeled as Exhibit D [a part of
the record not under seal] and included as part of the Plaintiff‟s Submission Re:
Ruling on Defendant‟s Motion in Limine submitted to the U.S. District Court, District
of Connecticut)
Given the richness of detail, certainty of memory, Matisse-like coloration, and normative
biases against the public disclosure of such information, a jury member might be hard-
pressed to disbelieve Ms. Borawick‟s account. It is only when the above passage is placed in
the context of devil-worshiping rituals conducted by Masons in black robes that the nature
of Ms. Borawick‟s deposition emerges as seeming fantasy, not historically accurate memory.
It is sobering to imagine what would have happened in this case without the satanic rituals,
especially when one recognizes that not all apparent fantasies include such bizarre
elements.
Hypnosis and the Creation of Unreliable Memories
Why does hypnosis produce such unreliable memories, even in subjects not particularly
responsive to the procedure (Carota Orne et al., 1996)? Several reasons have been
suggested, including (1) a lowering of critical judgment and reality orientation combined
with heightened suggestibility, and an attendant lowered criterion for calling a guess or
image a memory (Orne, Soskis, Dinges, &Carota Orne, 1984 Whitehouse, Dinges, Carota
Orne, &Orne, 1988) (2) increased vividness of recall and a resultant false sense of
familiarity (Dywan, 1995) (3) the belief of many hypnotists and subjects that hypnosis
allows one to transcend one‟s ordinary ability to remember (O‟Connell et al., 1970 Reiser,
1980) and (4) increased openness to fantasy and primary process thinking (Fromm, 1978-
79). With the possible exception of vividness of recall and increased openness to fantasy,
these factors are not strongly related to response to hypnotizability. Therefore, relatively
unhypnotizable subjects continue to display major cognitive distortions in recall after
hypnosis (Carota Orne et al., 1996). We shall examine these factors, starting with the
lowering of critical judgment, the factor that may underlie the others.
The lowering of critical judgment is central to hypnosis. Even the simplest and easiest
hypnotic suggestions require the subject to accept the logically absurd as possible. Hypnotic

Cultic Studies Journal, Vol. 13, No. 1, 1996, page 37
induction usually involves the suggestion that some part of the body, often the eyelids, will
move without conscious volition and close “by themselves.” After completing the formal
induction, the subject is usually asked to make some gross motor movement, that, once
again, will occur “by itself.” For example, it may be suggested that one‟s arms and hands,
held out at shoulder height, will feel a force pulling them together and “they will move
together.”
Obviously, the only way for the subject‟s arms to make a major movement without the
nonexistent external force is for the subject to move them. Even attempting to comply with
this suggestion necessitates testing whether one‟s arms will move without volition, thus
putting one‟s critical judgment on temporary hold so as to ignore the logical absurdity of the
suggestion. A large majority of cooperative subjects will accept the absurdity, respond to
such suggestions, and feel the force and their hands moving without experiencing volition.
More difficult hypnotic suggestions require acceptance of even more logically absurd
instructions, again requiring lowered critical judgment.
The second factor noted above is the false sense of familiarity with the remembered
material provided by increased vividness of recall (Dywan, 1995). Vivid memories tend to
convince everyone of historical accuracy, especially the person remembering them. This is
one reason why flashbacks are frequently viewed as veridical representations of past
events, when, in fact, often they are not (Frankel, 1994). If a subject experiences a vivid
revivification of the past during age regression or confabulates details after direct
suggestions for hypermnesia, he or she is not unlike someone who is able to view his or her
own very personal videotape. Previous memory of the event will be contaminated or
usurped by this experience. Of course, the vivid mental videotape contains all the problems
of memory creation and distortion noted above. However, it is understandable that the
subject accepts the hypnotically influenced vivid images as playbacks of events as they
actually occurred earlier, especially if the social environment supports this view.
The belief that hypnosis allows the subject to transcend the ability to remember is endemic
to our cultural view of hypnosis. There is no reason to induce hypnosis and give
hyperamnesia suggestions unless the hypnotist expects hypnosis to allow greater access to
memory. Even if the subject is not explicitly told that hypnosis will increase recall, the
message is inherent in the use of the procedure.
Finally, agreeing to be hypnotized is accepting an invitation to engage in fantasy. To the
degree a “neutral” form of hypnosis can be induced, it involves greater openness to fantasy
and primary process (idiosyncratic) thinking (Fromm, 1978-79 Fromm &Kahn, 1990).
Such thinking is less reality oriented and subject to social constraint than ordinary,
secondary process thought.
Each factor contributes to the unreliability of hypnotically influenced testimony. Their
cumulative effect makes it clear why hypnotically influenced recall is less reliable, but often
presented more credibly than ordinary recall.
Civil Suits and Hypnosis
Until recently, landmark cases involving forensic hypnosis have been criminal prosecutions.
If one grants that hypnosis has largely proved detrimental to the cause of justice when
influencing testimony in criminal cases, what will be its effects in civil litigation? As Scheflin
and Shapiro (1989) predicted, the civil arena is becoming the setting for more litigation
involving hypnotically influenced testimony. The present authors have encountered two
types of civil cases: (1) those involving the attribution of blame and liability in automobile
accidents, and (2) those involving recovered memories of incestuous child abuse (ICA).
Given the issues raised by Borawick v. Shay, most of the rest of this article will discuss ICA.