Cultic Studies Review, Vol. 5, No. 1, 2006, Page 69
leader deems is helpful to the corporate enterprise. It makes it even less likely that
employees will ask awkward questions of their leaders, and so be capable of correcting their
inevitable misjudgements. These may constitute fertile conditions for the emergence of
other Enrons in the future.
There is little evidence, to date, that Enron‘s employees were able to offer significant
resistance, least of all resistance that was effective. Rather, the evidence reviewed here
indicates that a totalistic environment was created, in which the penalties for dissent were
so severe and well known, while the benefits of conformity appeared so munificent, that
critical voice was almost wholly absent from the organisation‘s internal discourse. Of more
general significance, the increased primacy afforded to shareholder value, the growing
power of CEOs and market pressure for speedy results implies the further erosion of
cultures that embrace discussion, debate and dissent.
The dangers are considerable. Once people over-align themselves with a company, and
invest excessive faith in the wisdom of its leaders, they are liable to lose their original sense
of identity, tolerate ethical lapses they would have previously deplored, find a new and
possibly corrosive value system taking root, and leave themselves vulnerable to
manipulation by the leaders of the organisation, and to whom they have mistakenly
entrusted many of their vital interests. Human beings need to believe in something, are
frequently naïve in where they choose to invest their belief and are vulnerable to
dramaturgical spectacles designed to engage their loyalty. Enron ―traded‖ on the desire of
many people to believe that ever increasing profits could be manufactured by means of
accountancy conjuring tricks, by an organisation that was also serving a greater good – a
secular miracle. In that context, as we have argued above, it may bequeath a cultural
legacy that other business leaders increasingly seek to emulate. The phenomenon of
corporate cultism may thus become more widespread, and require much closer study, than
it has merited to date.
References
Alvesson, M., and Willmott, H. (2002) Identity regulation as organizational control:
Producing the appropriate individual, Journal of Management Studies, 39, 619-644.
American Family Foundation (1986) Cultism: A conference for scholars and policy makers,
Cultic Studies Journal, 3, 119-120.
Aronson, E., and Mills J. (1959) The effect of severity of initiation on liking for a group,
Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 59, 177-181.
Barker, J. (1993) Tightening the iron cage: Concertive control in self-managing teams,
Administrative Science Quarterly, 38, 408-437.
Bell, E., and Taylor, S. (2004) ―From outward bound to inward bound‖: The prophetic voices
and discursive practices of spiritual management development, Human Relations, 57,
439-466.
Biggart, N. (1989) Charismatic Capitalism: Direct Selling Organizations in America, Chicago:
University of Chicago Press.
Boje, D., Rosile, G., Durant, R., and Luhman, J. (2004) Enron spectacles: A critical
dramaturgical analysis, Organization Studies, 25, 751-774.
Cialdini, R. (2001) Influence: Science and Practice (4th Edition), New York: Harper Collins.
Cohan, J. (2002) ―I didn‘t know‖ and ―I was only doing my job‖: Has corporate governance
careened out of control? A case study of Enron‘s information myopia, Journal of
Business Ethics, 40, 275-299.
Collins, J. (2001) Good to Great: Why Some Companies Make the Leap… and Others Don‘t,
London: Random House Business Books.
Collinson, D. (2003) Identities and insecurities: selves at work, Organization, 10, 527-547.
Conger, J. (1990) The dark side of leadership, Organizational Dynamics, Autumn 1990, 44-
55.
leader deems is helpful to the corporate enterprise. It makes it even less likely that
employees will ask awkward questions of their leaders, and so be capable of correcting their
inevitable misjudgements. These may constitute fertile conditions for the emergence of
other Enrons in the future.
There is little evidence, to date, that Enron‘s employees were able to offer significant
resistance, least of all resistance that was effective. Rather, the evidence reviewed here
indicates that a totalistic environment was created, in which the penalties for dissent were
so severe and well known, while the benefits of conformity appeared so munificent, that
critical voice was almost wholly absent from the organisation‘s internal discourse. Of more
general significance, the increased primacy afforded to shareholder value, the growing
power of CEOs and market pressure for speedy results implies the further erosion of
cultures that embrace discussion, debate and dissent.
The dangers are considerable. Once people over-align themselves with a company, and
invest excessive faith in the wisdom of its leaders, they are liable to lose their original sense
of identity, tolerate ethical lapses they would have previously deplored, find a new and
possibly corrosive value system taking root, and leave themselves vulnerable to
manipulation by the leaders of the organisation, and to whom they have mistakenly
entrusted many of their vital interests. Human beings need to believe in something, are
frequently naïve in where they choose to invest their belief and are vulnerable to
dramaturgical spectacles designed to engage their loyalty. Enron ―traded‖ on the desire of
many people to believe that ever increasing profits could be manufactured by means of
accountancy conjuring tricks, by an organisation that was also serving a greater good – a
secular miracle. In that context, as we have argued above, it may bequeath a cultural
legacy that other business leaders increasingly seek to emulate. The phenomenon of
corporate cultism may thus become more widespread, and require much closer study, than
it has merited to date.
References
Alvesson, M., and Willmott, H. (2002) Identity regulation as organizational control:
Producing the appropriate individual, Journal of Management Studies, 39, 619-644.
American Family Foundation (1986) Cultism: A conference for scholars and policy makers,
Cultic Studies Journal, 3, 119-120.
Aronson, E., and Mills J. (1959) The effect of severity of initiation on liking for a group,
Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 59, 177-181.
Barker, J. (1993) Tightening the iron cage: Concertive control in self-managing teams,
Administrative Science Quarterly, 38, 408-437.
Bell, E., and Taylor, S. (2004) ―From outward bound to inward bound‖: The prophetic voices
and discursive practices of spiritual management development, Human Relations, 57,
439-466.
Biggart, N. (1989) Charismatic Capitalism: Direct Selling Organizations in America, Chicago:
University of Chicago Press.
Boje, D., Rosile, G., Durant, R., and Luhman, J. (2004) Enron spectacles: A critical
dramaturgical analysis, Organization Studies, 25, 751-774.
Cialdini, R. (2001) Influence: Science and Practice (4th Edition), New York: Harper Collins.
Cohan, J. (2002) ―I didn‘t know‖ and ―I was only doing my job‖: Has corporate governance
careened out of control? A case study of Enron‘s information myopia, Journal of
Business Ethics, 40, 275-299.
Collins, J. (2001) Good to Great: Why Some Companies Make the Leap… and Others Don‘t,
London: Random House Business Books.
Collinson, D. (2003) Identities and insecurities: selves at work, Organization, 10, 527-547.
Conger, J. (1990) The dark side of leadership, Organizational Dynamics, Autumn 1990, 44-
55.
