Cultic Studies Review, Vol. 5, No. 1, 2006, Page 65
There were no forums where employees could communicate about such concerns, beyond
whatever informal grapevines managed to survive in such a hostile climate.
Thus, within Enron, it was clear to all that dissent would not be tolerated. Anyone who
queried accountancy practices was likely, at best, to be reassigned or lose a bonus (Cohan,
2002). A 1995 survey of employees found that many were uncomfortable about voicing
their feelings and ―telling it like it is at Enron‖ (Swartz and Watkins, 2003, p.76). Cruver
(2003, p.176) quotes a former senior‘s manager‘s summary of the internal culture: ―There
was an unwritten rule… a rule of ‗no bad news.‘ If I came to them with bad news, it would
only hurt my career.‖ The example of Sherron Watkins illustrates the mindset. Watkins was
a senior employee who worked with Enron‘s Chief Financial Officer, Andy Fastow. When she
realised that the company‘s losses would become apparent sometime in 2003 or 2004, she
drew her concerns to the attention of Ken Lay, who had stepped back into the role of CEO.
Support was not forthcoming from other senior executives, who evidently feared that to
acknowledge the problems would damage their careers at Enron. Lay‘s own response
suggests these fears were well founded. Within days of meeting with Watkins, he contacted
the organization‘s lawyers to inquire if grounds could be found for firing her (Watkins,
2003a.b.). It should be noted that the intrinsically modest act of approaching the CEO to
voice concerns is amongst the most notable acts of resistance currently on record within
Enron. It is also notable that its impact was negligible. Enron‘s collapse was precipitated
when it was compelled to knock $1.2billion off shareholder equity, rather than because of a
widespread refusal to go along with its fraudulent practices or destructive culture by middle
managers and employees.
2. A Company of “Believers”?
In 1997, employees were interviewed about their attitudes, and, perhaps inevitably, a
―vision‖ was adopted in response (Swartz and Watkins, 2003)1. The process and its outcome
illustrate particularly well the extent of a common but totalistic culture within the
organisation and a widespread over-reliance on the supposedly superior insights of the
organisation‘s leaders. The advertising agency charged with developing the new vision
concluded that Enron was a company of ―believers.‖ In particular, employees had intense
faith in Ken Lay and Jeff Skilling. They were also convinced that Enron employees (often
dubbed ―Enronians‖) were the best and the brightest in the world, and they believed they
were doing good by opening new markets and creating new products and services. As a
result, an advertising campaign was launched, around a concept called ―What We Believe.‖
Those beliefs included ―the wisdom of open markets‖ and ―being a laboratory for
innovation.‖ A new Vision and Values team was created, which declared that ―Everything we
do is about change,‖ It added: ―Change is a goal. Change a habit. Change a mind.‖ From an
outside perspective, the slogans may appear rather vacuous, as indeed are those of more
well known and non-corporate cults. However, this may also be their strength. Slogans
bereft of real content often enable people to read into them whatever meanings they wish,
and thus ensures a much wider buy in. A video was also produced, for company wide
dissemination, in which Lay proclaimed that his main objective was ―to create an
environment where our employees can come in here and realize their potential.‖ He did not
specify whether this ambition extended only to those who survived the appraisal system. As
Swartz and Watkins (2003, p.103) observed: ―The whole campaign was not unlike a
religious tract from a New Age megachurch, but instead of directing disciples to God, Enron
hopes its congregation would be inspired to join its mission to make itself The World‘s
Leading Energy Company.‖
1 The following discussion of Enron‘s 1997 revisioning is taken from the account of Swartz and Watkins (2003). All
quotations used here can be found in their original form in their text, on pages 103-105.
There were no forums where employees could communicate about such concerns, beyond
whatever informal grapevines managed to survive in such a hostile climate.
Thus, within Enron, it was clear to all that dissent would not be tolerated. Anyone who
queried accountancy practices was likely, at best, to be reassigned or lose a bonus (Cohan,
2002). A 1995 survey of employees found that many were uncomfortable about voicing
their feelings and ―telling it like it is at Enron‖ (Swartz and Watkins, 2003, p.76). Cruver
(2003, p.176) quotes a former senior‘s manager‘s summary of the internal culture: ―There
was an unwritten rule… a rule of ‗no bad news.‘ If I came to them with bad news, it would
only hurt my career.‖ The example of Sherron Watkins illustrates the mindset. Watkins was
a senior employee who worked with Enron‘s Chief Financial Officer, Andy Fastow. When she
realised that the company‘s losses would become apparent sometime in 2003 or 2004, she
drew her concerns to the attention of Ken Lay, who had stepped back into the role of CEO.
Support was not forthcoming from other senior executives, who evidently feared that to
acknowledge the problems would damage their careers at Enron. Lay‘s own response
suggests these fears were well founded. Within days of meeting with Watkins, he contacted
the organization‘s lawyers to inquire if grounds could be found for firing her (Watkins,
2003a.b.). It should be noted that the intrinsically modest act of approaching the CEO to
voice concerns is amongst the most notable acts of resistance currently on record within
Enron. It is also notable that its impact was negligible. Enron‘s collapse was precipitated
when it was compelled to knock $1.2billion off shareholder equity, rather than because of a
widespread refusal to go along with its fraudulent practices or destructive culture by middle
managers and employees.
2. A Company of “Believers”?
In 1997, employees were interviewed about their attitudes, and, perhaps inevitably, a
―vision‖ was adopted in response (Swartz and Watkins, 2003)1. The process and its outcome
illustrate particularly well the extent of a common but totalistic culture within the
organisation and a widespread over-reliance on the supposedly superior insights of the
organisation‘s leaders. The advertising agency charged with developing the new vision
concluded that Enron was a company of ―believers.‖ In particular, employees had intense
faith in Ken Lay and Jeff Skilling. They were also convinced that Enron employees (often
dubbed ―Enronians‖) were the best and the brightest in the world, and they believed they
were doing good by opening new markets and creating new products and services. As a
result, an advertising campaign was launched, around a concept called ―What We Believe.‖
Those beliefs included ―the wisdom of open markets‖ and ―being a laboratory for
innovation.‖ A new Vision and Values team was created, which declared that ―Everything we
do is about change,‖ It added: ―Change is a goal. Change a habit. Change a mind.‖ From an
outside perspective, the slogans may appear rather vacuous, as indeed are those of more
well known and non-corporate cults. However, this may also be their strength. Slogans
bereft of real content often enable people to read into them whatever meanings they wish,
and thus ensures a much wider buy in. A video was also produced, for company wide
dissemination, in which Lay proclaimed that his main objective was ―to create an
environment where our employees can come in here and realize their potential.‖ He did not
specify whether this ambition extended only to those who survived the appraisal system. As
Swartz and Watkins (2003, p.103) observed: ―The whole campaign was not unlike a
religious tract from a New Age megachurch, but instead of directing disciples to God, Enron
hopes its congregation would be inspired to join its mission to make itself The World‘s
Leading Energy Company.‖
1 The following discussion of Enron‘s 1997 revisioning is taken from the account of Swartz and Watkins (2003). All
quotations used here can be found in their original form in their text, on pages 103-105.
