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Cruver (2003, p.37) reinforces the impression of a corporate culture resembling that of
cults. In describing the beginning of his Enron career, he observed: ―The first thing I noticed
about Enron traders is that they all looked very similar: A goatee was fairly common
otherwise they maintained a clean-cut yet outdoorsy look and if they didn‘t wear some
version of a blue shirt every day, then it was like they weren‘t on the team… I recall the first
time I showed up to work in a green button-down, only to realize I was completely
surrounded by a dozen guys wearing the same blue shirt. Not just blue shirts – but the
same blue shirt. I asked the group, ―When did they hand those out?‖ I said it with a smile,
but no one laughed.‖ Parallels between such a rigid corporate uniform and the uniform dress
code found in such cults as the Hare Krishnas are inescapable.
Language was crucial to the process. Again, the testimony of Swartz and Watkins (2003,
p.193) is typical. They describe language within Enron as follows: ―No one at Enron would
ever ―build consensus,‖ they would ―come to shore,‖ as in ―We have to come to shore on
this,‖ or ―Are you ready to come to shore on this?‖ One week somebody used the word
―metrics‖ to mean the numbers in a deal, as in ‗We‘ve got to massage the metrics!‘ Pretty
soon, everyone was using the term ―metrics‖ and anyone who used the term ―numbers‖ or
―calculations‖ was a ―loser,‖ the most popular Enron label of all.‖ Such constricted language,
baffling to outsiders, is typical of totalistic environments (Lifton, 1961), and has been
observed in a huge variety of cults. As Hardy and Phillips (2004, p.299) argue, power and
discourse are mutually constitutive: discourse can ―shape the system that exists in a
particular context by holding in place the categories and identities upon which it rests.‖
Control of language within Enron, in the manner described here, played precisely this
function. It engineered a uniform definition of reality, consistent with a managerially
sanctioned vision of the truth. In turn, this established an increasingly conformist culture,
similar to those found within cults, and in which the possibility of dissent and debate
retreated ever further from the group‘s practice.
3. Deception, and the Control of Information
Typically, cult leaders have extraordinary authority, privileged access to information, and a
hidden agenda of self aggrandisement that is concealed behind more idealistic statements.
The dominant culture is maintained because ordinary followers are denied full information
about the organisation‘s goals or practices, while a carefully contrived public display of
righteousness by the leaders prevents detailed scrutiny of actual behaviour as opposed to
avowed intentions. Consistent with this dynamic, and with what has been observed in a
variety of cults, information emanating from the top within Enron was also distorted in
nature. As Lalich (2004, p.235) noted, in a comprehensive comparison of two cults: ―…the
vast majority of members did not know such things as where the money went or how
overall strategic decisions were made. Strict policies controlled and contained information.‖
Information flow within Enron was indeed tightly regulated in this manner. The intended
effect was to reinforce the authority of Enron‘s leaders. People assumed that at least the
leaders knew what was happening, and that they had their followers‘ overall best interests
at heart. Given what is known as the false consensus effect, which causes honest people to
impute their honest motives to others (Prentice, 2003), it is not surprising that Enron
employees tended to assume that such people as Kenneth Lay were abiding by normal
accounting procedures. In reality, and again in practices that are consistent with those
widely found in cults, ―there was misrepresentation of hard data, that is, concealment of
debt, lying about accounting results, as well as about the stream of earnings, and the
distortion of the company‘s future prospects‖ (Cohan, 2002, p.280).
A particularly ironic example of misinformation, deception and double standards within
Enron can be found in its heavily promoted code of ethics, known as ―RICE‖ – an acronym
standing for Respect, Integrity, Communication and Excellence. A 64-booklet was produced,
explaining the code in depth. Kenneth Lay issued a memo on the code in July 2000, barely

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eighteen months before Enron declared bankruptcy, in which he concluded that ―We want to
be proud of Enron and to know it enjoys a reputation for fairness and honesty and that it is
respected… Let‟s keep that reputation high” (quoted in Cruver, 2003, p.333 – emphasis
in the original text). As is now known, Enron‘s leaders disregarded the code in their daily
practice – to such an extent that, to take but one of many examples, a 166-page report was
published in 1999 entitled ―The Enron Corporation: Corporate Complicity in Human Rights
Violations‖. It documented, amongst much else, how Enron executives paid local law
enforcement officers to suppress legitimate and peaceful opposition to its power plant near
Mumbai in India (Human Rights Watch, 2002). The code of ethics was thus a dramaturgical
device, whose theatrical display cultivated the illusion of noble ideals and generated a
convincing spectacle of ethical practice for both the organisation‘s internal and external
audiences (Boje et al., 2004). It also helped douse whatever suspicions people may have
been nurturing about the behaviour of the organisation‘s leaders.
The RICE code suggests that Enron was engaged essentially in the production and trading of
illusions. The dominant illusion, of course, was one of high profitability. But the main
spectacle was sustained, at a deep structure level, by myriad other theatrical discourses. In
this instance, the RICE code suggested that the organisation‘s activities were underpinned
by a strong ethical code. The cultivation of such a belief was intended to facilitate intense
belief, compliance, over-identification with the group‘s goals and leaders and heightened
dedication to the pursuit of declared ideals. Accordingly, the presentation of an image at
odds with a malignant reality is a standard leadership tactic in most documented cults. For
example, the leader of the suicidal Jonestown cult in Guyana in the 1970s, Jim Jones,
engaged in the dramaturgy of miraculous healing in front of large audiences, to generate
the illusion of exceptional powers, while simultaneously informing his closest aides that he
was the reincarnation of Lenin (Layton, 1999). It is now clear that the architects of the
Enron story also made ample use of drama, spectacle, and the projection of financial
illusions in their daily practice.
4. Producing the “Appropriate” Individual
Overall, it appears that Enron inculcated a powerful set of cultural norms in its employees.
These specified acceptable business dress, how people talked to each other, and what
values they were supposed to subscribe to. The culture attempted to regulate people‘s
identities – an increasingly common process, and one which has the effect of reinforcing
organizational control, through producing individuals deemed appropriate by the ruling
group (Alvesson and Willmott, 2002). It is a dynamic consistent with the role of culture
within cults, particular in terms of its role in defining a narrow range of acceptable
behaviours, attitudes and emotions.
Paradoxically, even from Enron‘s own perspective, the ultimate effect was dysfunctional –
after all, the organisation expired. This suggests that though the methods analysed here
may temporarily strengthen leadership control in small groups they are incompatible with
long term growth and success. Thus, Enron maintained a façade of teamwork. But behind
the façade lurked the ruthless self interest of its leaders – a self interest that others then
felt compelled to emulate. As Swartz and Watkins (2003, p.192) noted:
There was so much infighting over who got financial credit for a deal in the
Performance Review Committee that the total amount credited to individuals
far exceeded the total company income for the year. Even so, everyone felt
obliged to quibble over the smallest points, because if you didn‘t, you got a
reputation as a chump.
Those deemed to be chumps were thought to be exhibiting a purely personal weakness,
rather than demonstrating any systemic difficulties with the organisation. Such a fate and
set of labels again mirrors those directed against dissenters in all variety of cults. They had