Cultic Studies Review, Vol. 4, No. 2, 2005, Page 63
to determine which, if any, of them constitute valid scholarly criticisms of my theory as I
stated it. After I isolate only those propositions that meet the test of credibility, it should
then be possible to determine whether these propositions constitute a complete refutation
of my theory, a partial refutation, or no refutation at all.
Before I begin, I must set out three ground rules. First, I am limiting the discussion to the
social process that I have (wisely or unwisely) labeled brainwashing. Even if you hate the
word, or it conjures up images for you that are far different from those that I delineate in
my theory, the norms of scholarly discourse require that you allow me to distinguish the
term from the substance and to concentrate here on defending the substance of my theory.
Of course, you will still then be free to reject my theory if you choose, even if can
successfully defend the substance of its argument, on the grounds that the word I chose to
label the central concept is bad, misleading, or stupid. And, if you do so, that contention
may form the basis of an entirely separate debate.
Second, I must make a clear distinction between descriptive theories that identify a social
process that occurs, on the one hand, and explanatory theories that explain why the
process has the consequences associated with it, on the other. Both sorts of theories are
valuable in scientific enterprise. For example, in physics, the theory of gravity is purely a
descriptive theory. The theory of electricity started out as a descriptive theory but
eventually evolved, becoming an explanatory theory, as well. The only claims that I make
for my theory of brainwashing are that it describes a real social process (whose existence
has been disputed) and the behavioral consequences of that process to the individuals who
are its target. Although I do speculate in several of my publications about the reasons that
what I call brainwashing might have the effects it does, I make no theoretical claims for
these speculations, calling them instead ―conjectures,‖ which is all they are at this point.
This distinction is important to make because Anthony is not clear about it and, therefore,
sometimes goes astray by muddling together my descriptive arguments with my
explanatory speculations. Sometimes it even seems as if the heart and soul of Anthony‘s
argument with me lies in a mistaken assumption that I am trying to explain why
brainwashing has the effects it does rather than simply providing an empirically practical
observational schema that can be used to determine, in any particular setting, whether such
a social influence mechanism exists.
Third, I must make a clear and sharp distinction between the validity of a theory and the
amount of evidence that supports the theory. Some perfectly good theories describe
phenomena that occur rarely in nature. I believe that other individuals, as well as myself,
have gathered evidence that brainwashing occurs in the social world often enough to make
the phenomenon worthwhile to study. But to confound discussions of a theory arguing the
possible existence of a phenomenon with empirical discussions of the prevalence of that
phenomenon in the real world only breeds methodological confusion. My concern here is
exclusively with the former. The latter (which is also dealt with in a later portion of my
chapter in Misunderstanding Cults) could be a topic for another debate.
Let us turn now to Anthony‘s arguments. Although his prose tends to be rambling and
repetitive, I was able to isolate ninety-eight discrete propositions that Anthony makes
concerning my theory. Although I ransacked his chapter carefully searching for statements
in propositional form, it is always possible that I missed a few. If Anthony or anyone else
can point out additional overlooked propositions, I will, of course, be obliged to deal with
them. But, for now, I ask you to provisionally accept my statement that these ninety-eight
propositions constitute an exhaustive list of Anthony‘s arguments.
Ninety-eight is a lot of propositions to deal with. When I first saw the length of Anthony‘s
chapter, I admit I was taken aback. With so many points, it would seem that at least a few
of them were bound to have struck their target. But then I was reminded of the famous
to determine which, if any, of them constitute valid scholarly criticisms of my theory as I
stated it. After I isolate only those propositions that meet the test of credibility, it should
then be possible to determine whether these propositions constitute a complete refutation
of my theory, a partial refutation, or no refutation at all.
Before I begin, I must set out three ground rules. First, I am limiting the discussion to the
social process that I have (wisely or unwisely) labeled brainwashing. Even if you hate the
word, or it conjures up images for you that are far different from those that I delineate in
my theory, the norms of scholarly discourse require that you allow me to distinguish the
term from the substance and to concentrate here on defending the substance of my theory.
Of course, you will still then be free to reject my theory if you choose, even if can
successfully defend the substance of its argument, on the grounds that the word I chose to
label the central concept is bad, misleading, or stupid. And, if you do so, that contention
may form the basis of an entirely separate debate.
Second, I must make a clear distinction between descriptive theories that identify a social
process that occurs, on the one hand, and explanatory theories that explain why the
process has the consequences associated with it, on the other. Both sorts of theories are
valuable in scientific enterprise. For example, in physics, the theory of gravity is purely a
descriptive theory. The theory of electricity started out as a descriptive theory but
eventually evolved, becoming an explanatory theory, as well. The only claims that I make
for my theory of brainwashing are that it describes a real social process (whose existence
has been disputed) and the behavioral consequences of that process to the individuals who
are its target. Although I do speculate in several of my publications about the reasons that
what I call brainwashing might have the effects it does, I make no theoretical claims for
these speculations, calling them instead ―conjectures,‖ which is all they are at this point.
This distinction is important to make because Anthony is not clear about it and, therefore,
sometimes goes astray by muddling together my descriptive arguments with my
explanatory speculations. Sometimes it even seems as if the heart and soul of Anthony‘s
argument with me lies in a mistaken assumption that I am trying to explain why
brainwashing has the effects it does rather than simply providing an empirically practical
observational schema that can be used to determine, in any particular setting, whether such
a social influence mechanism exists.
Third, I must make a clear and sharp distinction between the validity of a theory and the
amount of evidence that supports the theory. Some perfectly good theories describe
phenomena that occur rarely in nature. I believe that other individuals, as well as myself,
have gathered evidence that brainwashing occurs in the social world often enough to make
the phenomenon worthwhile to study. But to confound discussions of a theory arguing the
possible existence of a phenomenon with empirical discussions of the prevalence of that
phenomenon in the real world only breeds methodological confusion. My concern here is
exclusively with the former. The latter (which is also dealt with in a later portion of my
chapter in Misunderstanding Cults) could be a topic for another debate.
Let us turn now to Anthony‘s arguments. Although his prose tends to be rambling and
repetitive, I was able to isolate ninety-eight discrete propositions that Anthony makes
concerning my theory. Although I ransacked his chapter carefully searching for statements
in propositional form, it is always possible that I missed a few. If Anthony or anyone else
can point out additional overlooked propositions, I will, of course, be obliged to deal with
them. But, for now, I ask you to provisionally accept my statement that these ninety-eight
propositions constitute an exhaustive list of Anthony‘s arguments.
Ninety-eight is a lot of propositions to deal with. When I first saw the length of Anthony‘s
chapter, I admit I was taken aback. With so many points, it would seem that at least a few
of them were bound to have struck their target. But then I was reminded of the famous
