Cultic Studies Review, Vol. 4, No. 2, 2005, Page 29
organizations. And I certainly wouldn‘t generalize from my N of 1 (ICSA/AFF) to the entire
group.
What body of evidence have sociologists used to make generalizations about the ―ACM‖?
Kropveld and a colleague searched approximately 20 databases ―for studies on individual
‗ACM‘ groups, and were unable to find even one sociological study that was systematically
researched‖ (Kropveld, 2003, p. 132). This lack of empirical data (surveys or in-depth field
work) is consistent with my own N-of-one experience at AFF. Until Eileen Barker began
attending our conferences a few years ago, the only sociologist who ever visited AFF, so far
as I can remember, was Dr. Larry Shinn, back in the early 80s, and he only stayed for a
couple of hours, mostly talking to my colleague Dr. Robert Schecter. I had some long and
interesting conversations with Dr. Thomas Robbins in the early 80s, but these were usually
about intellectual issues, not the ―ACM‖ as an organization.
Sociologists have correctly criticized my colleagues and me for sometimes over generalizing
from limited clinical observations to the broad population of ―cults.‖ But in my opinion
sociologists have had a huge blind spot when it comes to their own over generalizations
about the so-called ―ACM.‖
Scholarship on NRMs
Sociological research on NRMs has been reviewed elsewhere (e.g., Ofshe, 1991 Robbins,
1988).
Clinical experience, for the most part, has shaped the opinions of mental health
professionals, for better and worse. On the plus side, clinical experience can provide
profound insights into the dynamics of the individual case, which may sometimes illuminate
other cases. On the negative side, clinical experience tends to reflect selection factors (e.g.,
only psychologically troubled people come for counseling) that limit the generalizability of
the clinical findings.
I have argued elsewhere (Langone, 2002) that the driving force behind clinical interest in
cults/NRMs is the fact that some groups under some circumstances harm some people. We
can debate the merits of various theories advanced to explain this phenomenon. Given the
current state of empirical research in the area, we can debate the prevalence of harm within
and across groups. But that harm exists and is not inconsequential seems to me to be
beyond dispute. Collectively, my colleagues and I have worked with thousands of former
group-members. The ―bad‖ things that they report cannot all be simplistically attributed to
―face-saving‖ or ―sour grapes.‖ ―Atrocity tales‖ (a term some sociologists have used to
denigrate former member reports Bromley, Shupe, &Ventimiglia, 1979) are often
―atrocity facts.‖ Moreover, psychological and physical pain can sometimes be severe
without being an ―atrocity.‖
During the past 10-15 years research-oriented clinicians and a few academic psychologists
have conducted empirical studies to help us better understand the nature and magnitude of
harm. There has also been some effort devoted to the question of prevalence
(Bloomgarden &Langone, 1984 Hulet, 1984 ICR Survey Research Group, 1993 Lottick,
1993 Zimbardo &Hartley, 1985.
Nature and Magnitude of Harm
In a review of the psychological literature, Aronoff-McKibben, Malinowski, &Lynn (2000)
conclude:
The available evidence warrants three conclusions: (a) persons entering cults do not
necessarily exhibit psychopathology (b) current cult members appear psychologically well-
adjusted generally, and demonstrate few conspicuous symptoms of psychopathology.
However, pathology may be masked by conformity pressures and demand characteristics
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