Cultic Studies Review, Vol. 4, No. 2, 2005, Page 5
people from the next cohort (presumably born in the late 1970s and 1980s) will stay in the
group remains to be seen (Chancellor, 2000:242).
This failure to keep the loyalty of the first generation‘s children bodes ill for these sects
because ―without effective socialization a movement will suffer damaging rates of defection
as its youngest members grow up and leave the faith[s]‖ (Stark, 19877:24). If in fact I am
correct in suggesting that youth defection is a sectarian problem that cuts across the
ideological spectrum, then one must ask whether commonalities across belief boundaries
might be factors. In essence, the ways that sects, cults, and high-demand ideologies work
as units of social control alienate large portions of the second generation, whose members
were either born into, or brought into, groups not of their choosing. If research on second-
generation defections from major religions provides indications for what has gone on within
the smaller groups, then data suggests that poor relationships between parents and children
frequently contribute to the children‘s defection when they get old enough to leave (Hood,
et. al., 1996:98). Deficiencies apparently exist, therefore, in the socialization or education of
the young, but these deficiencies appear to be systemic to sects and ideological groups,
given that so many of them are witnessing the failure of the children to continue in their
parents‘ footsteps.
Certainly the doctrines, beliefs, and practices of particular groups heighten or lessen the
content and quality of second-generation education, and the unique chemistry of family
personalities has long-term consequences for all of the parties involved. Nevertheless, a
recently presented model about what psychologist Anthony Stahelski called ―the five phases
of social-psychological conditioning‖ (Stahelski, 2004:32) used by terrorists and cults
provides a construct within which I can identify those commonalities among first-generation
converts that likely have an impact upon members of the second generation.
Anthony Stahelski’s Five Phases of Social-Psychological Conditioning
Stahelski‘s primary concern was with the creation of terrorism. His research, however,
overlapped with studies on the origins of cults because he reported, ―[t]errorism
researchers have compared terrorist groups to cults, and they have concluded that the cult
model is applicable to terrorist groups‖ (Stahelski, 2004). That ―cult model‖ that he
identified, however, appears to have been his own creation. The model expanded upon
some concepts (such as dehumanization and demonization) that are commonplace in social-
psychological literature, but Stahelski also gave creative twists to the commonly used term
deindividuation, and apparently introduced a new term, depluralization, as part of his
resocialization model. He argued that ―[m]ost cults center on a charismatic leader‖ who
supplies ―joiners with meaningful existences‖ and fulfills ―their affiliative needs,‖ and in
return ―requests and receives unquestioning obedience from the joiners‖ (Stahelski,
2004:32). These joiners or recruits are ―extremely vulnerable to the five-phase social-
psychological conditioning process used in violent cults.‖ The phases are as follows:
Phase 1—Depluralization: stripping away all other group-member identities.
Phase 2—Self-deindividuation: stripping away each member‘s personal identity.
Phase 3—Other-deindividuation: stripping away the personal identities of enemies.
Phase 4—Dehumanization: identifying enemies as subhuman or nonhuman.
Phase 5—Demonization: identifying enemies as evil (Stahelski, 2004:32).
As a means of distinguishing among types of groups, Stahelski claimed, ―[t]he
dehumanization phase separates extremist hate groups and terrorist groups from non-
violent cults, which do not dehumanize out groups‖ (Stahelski, 2004:35). Apparently, too,
nonviolent cults do not demonize others since this phase prevents ―the occurrence of after-
action killing remorse‖ among those who seek to murder their presumed enemies
(Stahelski, 2004:35). Nor do nonviolent cults kill either defectors or their families
people from the next cohort (presumably born in the late 1970s and 1980s) will stay in the
group remains to be seen (Chancellor, 2000:242).
This failure to keep the loyalty of the first generation‘s children bodes ill for these sects
because ―without effective socialization a movement will suffer damaging rates of defection
as its youngest members grow up and leave the faith[s]‖ (Stark, 19877:24). If in fact I am
correct in suggesting that youth defection is a sectarian problem that cuts across the
ideological spectrum, then one must ask whether commonalities across belief boundaries
might be factors. In essence, the ways that sects, cults, and high-demand ideologies work
as units of social control alienate large portions of the second generation, whose members
were either born into, or brought into, groups not of their choosing. If research on second-
generation defections from major religions provides indications for what has gone on within
the smaller groups, then data suggests that poor relationships between parents and children
frequently contribute to the children‘s defection when they get old enough to leave (Hood,
et. al., 1996:98). Deficiencies apparently exist, therefore, in the socialization or education of
the young, but these deficiencies appear to be systemic to sects and ideological groups,
given that so many of them are witnessing the failure of the children to continue in their
parents‘ footsteps.
Certainly the doctrines, beliefs, and practices of particular groups heighten or lessen the
content and quality of second-generation education, and the unique chemistry of family
personalities has long-term consequences for all of the parties involved. Nevertheless, a
recently presented model about what psychologist Anthony Stahelski called ―the five phases
of social-psychological conditioning‖ (Stahelski, 2004:32) used by terrorists and cults
provides a construct within which I can identify those commonalities among first-generation
converts that likely have an impact upon members of the second generation.
Anthony Stahelski’s Five Phases of Social-Psychological Conditioning
Stahelski‘s primary concern was with the creation of terrorism. His research, however,
overlapped with studies on the origins of cults because he reported, ―[t]errorism
researchers have compared terrorist groups to cults, and they have concluded that the cult
model is applicable to terrorist groups‖ (Stahelski, 2004). That ―cult model‖ that he
identified, however, appears to have been his own creation. The model expanded upon
some concepts (such as dehumanization and demonization) that are commonplace in social-
psychological literature, but Stahelski also gave creative twists to the commonly used term
deindividuation, and apparently introduced a new term, depluralization, as part of his
resocialization model. He argued that ―[m]ost cults center on a charismatic leader‖ who
supplies ―joiners with meaningful existences‖ and fulfills ―their affiliative needs,‖ and in
return ―requests and receives unquestioning obedience from the joiners‖ (Stahelski,
2004:32). These joiners or recruits are ―extremely vulnerable to the five-phase social-
psychological conditioning process used in violent cults.‖ The phases are as follows:
Phase 1—Depluralization: stripping away all other group-member identities.
Phase 2—Self-deindividuation: stripping away each member‘s personal identity.
Phase 3—Other-deindividuation: stripping away the personal identities of enemies.
Phase 4—Dehumanization: identifying enemies as subhuman or nonhuman.
Phase 5—Demonization: identifying enemies as evil (Stahelski, 2004:32).
As a means of distinguishing among types of groups, Stahelski claimed, ―[t]he
dehumanization phase separates extremist hate groups and terrorist groups from non-
violent cults, which do not dehumanize out groups‖ (Stahelski, 2004:35). Apparently, too,
nonviolent cults do not demonize others since this phase prevents ―the occurrence of after-
action killing remorse‖ among those who seek to murder their presumed enemies
(Stahelski, 2004:35). Nor do nonviolent cults kill either defectors or their families
