Cultic Studies Journal, Vol. 3, No. 2, 1986 Page 73
views will emerge.
The dichotomy in Professor Shepherd‘s approach is not unique to him. Many of us have run
across it in dealing with professional ―libertarians.‖ Indeed, the same bias was recently
pointed out by a reviewer of Professor Laurence Tribe‘s latest work on constitutional law. To
be sure, contradictions within analyses of broad constitutional issues are not in and of
themselves suspect They may represent well-thought-out pragmatic approaches to difficult
questions. But what is perplexing in Professor Shepherd‘s work is the apparently simplistic
thought and a refusal to recognize the inconsistencies and contradictions that result. One
reviewer champions To Secure the Blessings of liberty as a reasoned exposition of the
conflict between individual liberties and repressive judicial restraint. Yet after reading the
book, one is not persuaded that a diminishing number of deprogramming cases can
represent the tremendous threat to religious freedom that he sees. True, Professor
Shepherd refers briefly to other kinds of litigation involving the ―new religions,‖ but seems
to place them all, whatever the distinctions among them, in that all-embracing category
which reflects a conflict between commitment to freedom of religion and the prejudiced
imposition of ever-present strongly held majoritarian values (like life, liberty, and the
pursuit of happiness).
One heard this appeal to freedom again in the aftermath of the Reverend Moon‘s conviction
and jailing for conspiracy and tax evasion. Nevertheless, there is hope in the courts. In
cases decided by the Supreme Court since the publication of To Secure the Blessings, the
Court rejected the Alamo Foundation‘s attempt to insulate itself from such a strongly held
majoritarian value as the applicability of the minimum wage legislation the Court indicated
that the doctrine of state accommodation to religious beliefs cannot be so expanded as to
insulate all religiously motivated conduct from judicial scrutiny.
The preservation of individual rights, and our commitment to their preservation, is too
important to sacrifice in a campaign orchestrated on behalf of a narrow interest which
invokes totalistic religious commitments as above the rule of law and respect for the rights
of others. Before concluding that an individual must be free to act without restriction --in
order to preserve our commitment to liberty, and regardless of the resultant conflict with
society‘s interest --one must carefully examine the nature of the conduct for which
protection is claimed and its effect on the rights of others. Certainly, the scales of justice
should not be cast aside, especially without first removing the lady‘s blindfold.
*This review first appeared in the Cult Observer (a periodical published by the American
Family Foundation, publishers of the Cultic Studies Journal), Vol 3, Nos. 1 &2,
January/February 1986, pp. 24-27
Notes
1. R. Delgado (1977), Religious totalism: Gentle and ungentle persuasion under the First
Amendment. Southern California Law Review, 51, 1-98.
2. D. Aronin (1982), Cults, deprogramming, and guardianship: A model legislative proposal.
Columbia Journal of Law and Social Problems, 17, 163- 286.
Herbert L. Rosedale, a partner in the New York City law firm of Parker, Chapin, Flattau,
and Klimpl, has been observing the activities of cultic groups for over a decade. He is a
member of the Advisory Board of the American Family Foundation (which publishes the
Cultic Studies Journal) and has provided pro bono consultation to individuals and families
harmed by cult involvements.
views will emerge.
The dichotomy in Professor Shepherd‘s approach is not unique to him. Many of us have run
across it in dealing with professional ―libertarians.‖ Indeed, the same bias was recently
pointed out by a reviewer of Professor Laurence Tribe‘s latest work on constitutional law. To
be sure, contradictions within analyses of broad constitutional issues are not in and of
themselves suspect They may represent well-thought-out pragmatic approaches to difficult
questions. But what is perplexing in Professor Shepherd‘s work is the apparently simplistic
thought and a refusal to recognize the inconsistencies and contradictions that result. One
reviewer champions To Secure the Blessings of liberty as a reasoned exposition of the
conflict between individual liberties and repressive judicial restraint. Yet after reading the
book, one is not persuaded that a diminishing number of deprogramming cases can
represent the tremendous threat to religious freedom that he sees. True, Professor
Shepherd refers briefly to other kinds of litigation involving the ―new religions,‖ but seems
to place them all, whatever the distinctions among them, in that all-embracing category
which reflects a conflict between commitment to freedom of religion and the prejudiced
imposition of ever-present strongly held majoritarian values (like life, liberty, and the
pursuit of happiness).
One heard this appeal to freedom again in the aftermath of the Reverend Moon‘s conviction
and jailing for conspiracy and tax evasion. Nevertheless, there is hope in the courts. In
cases decided by the Supreme Court since the publication of To Secure the Blessings, the
Court rejected the Alamo Foundation‘s attempt to insulate itself from such a strongly held
majoritarian value as the applicability of the minimum wage legislation the Court indicated
that the doctrine of state accommodation to religious beliefs cannot be so expanded as to
insulate all religiously motivated conduct from judicial scrutiny.
The preservation of individual rights, and our commitment to their preservation, is too
important to sacrifice in a campaign orchestrated on behalf of a narrow interest which
invokes totalistic religious commitments as above the rule of law and respect for the rights
of others. Before concluding that an individual must be free to act without restriction --in
order to preserve our commitment to liberty, and regardless of the resultant conflict with
society‘s interest --one must carefully examine the nature of the conduct for which
protection is claimed and its effect on the rights of others. Certainly, the scales of justice
should not be cast aside, especially without first removing the lady‘s blindfold.
*This review first appeared in the Cult Observer (a periodical published by the American
Family Foundation, publishers of the Cultic Studies Journal), Vol 3, Nos. 1 &2,
January/February 1986, pp. 24-27
Notes
1. R. Delgado (1977), Religious totalism: Gentle and ungentle persuasion under the First
Amendment. Southern California Law Review, 51, 1-98.
2. D. Aronin (1982), Cults, deprogramming, and guardianship: A model legislative proposal.
Columbia Journal of Law and Social Problems, 17, 163- 286.
Herbert L. Rosedale, a partner in the New York City law firm of Parker, Chapin, Flattau,
and Klimpl, has been observing the activities of cultic groups for over a decade. He is a
member of the Advisory Board of the American Family Foundation (which publishes the
Cultic Studies Journal) and has provided pro bono consultation to individuals and families
harmed by cult involvements.
