Cultic Studies Journal, Vol. 3, No. 2, 1986 Page 70
intricate legal arguments culminating in the vindication of the applicability of federal
legislation to individuals‘ claims that their constitutional rights have been violated.
(Although I wonder what Professor Shepherd‘s response would have been to the historical
arguments of the current states‘ rights movement, which run counter to his civil rights
sentiments.) But the reader must be alerted that the author has not followed his own
admonition to seek a balanced analysis of correct information (p. 42 my emphases) when
dealing with the highly emotional and controversial area of ―new religions.‖ I am distressed
to find that what Professor Shepherd espouses and asserts is often neither balanced nor
correct.
An example which will strike home to many readers is the assertion that the ―Anti-cult
contingent is highly organized and well funded‖ (p.42). Cult education and family support
groups are in fact quite poor and not well organized. I also note with dismay that Professor
Shepherd all too easily implies that ―forcible and coercive deprogramming‖ is hardly
different from counseling or communication, which may be considered, in effect
deprogramming that is voluntarily sought. Although he drops the qualifying adjectives
―coercive‖ and ―forcible‖ when talking about the latter situation, he substitutes descriptions
which have a similar import.
One is impressed similarly, and strikingly, when the author sets out to demolish Professor
Richard Delgado‘s argument about deprogramming. (1) Professor Shepherd first supports
the concept that joining a group is an affirmative waiver of the claim that there has been
deception or coercion in the initial conversion process. But then, the author disparages the
very same argument when it is presented in a case like Peterson, or in legislation aimed to
assist deprogrammers or facilitate the granting of conservatorships. Professor Shepherd is
also critical of Douglas Aronin‘s model conservatorship law, which was carefully constructed
to protect the rights of the subject, because Mr. Aronin is allegedly biased against new
religious groups and, therefore, stacks the deck against them. (2)
Indeed, the author‘s own analysis of judicial decisions included much passion and zeal. Let
me elucidate an instance about which I have personal knowledge. Referring to a supposedly
heinous example of violent deprogramming, Professor Shepherd cites ―One notorious case
where a $2 million suit was brought because the alleged victim was held incommunicado for
fifteen days.‖ The author describes this alleged victim as a doctor, the graduate of a
prestigious medical school. Well, the case was only notorious because the attorney for the
plaintiff, a source cited with approbation in the book, issued a press release at the time that
he filed his complaint Moreover, a complaint is a complaint, not an adjudication of fact, only
an assertion of a claim. The ―notorious‖ case was settled, and not a penny of damages- was
paid to the plaintiff despite the $2 million claimed. (It might as well have been $200
million.) The victim was not held incommunicado for fifteen days, and the facts were such
that, had the me gone forward, the plaintiff would most probably have lost it, but at very
substantial cost to the defense. Similarly, Professor Shepherd reiterates the stylized and
routine language in complaints dealing with deprogramming and its alleged violence as if
these assertions were proven facts.
Again, Professor Shepherd does not clearly advise the reader of the procedural significance
of the fact that when a legal challenge is made to the legal sufficiency of a complaint, all of
the allegations in the complaint are taken as true, even though at a trial they may be
disputed or disproved, and even though the witness asserting the alleged facts may not be
believed by the court. Many of the cases described in this book‘s chapter on deprogramming
do not deal with factual determinations made in such trial situations where, for example,
the credibility of a witness can be assessed through cross examination. The cases cited deal,
rather, with legal decisions made on motions challenging the legal sufficiency of complaints
by defendants --parents or deprogrammers, for example --who did not have the financial
resources to go through extended pretrial and motion practice, much less the expense of
intricate legal arguments culminating in the vindication of the applicability of federal
legislation to individuals‘ claims that their constitutional rights have been violated.
(Although I wonder what Professor Shepherd‘s response would have been to the historical
arguments of the current states‘ rights movement, which run counter to his civil rights
sentiments.) But the reader must be alerted that the author has not followed his own
admonition to seek a balanced analysis of correct information (p. 42 my emphases) when
dealing with the highly emotional and controversial area of ―new religions.‖ I am distressed
to find that what Professor Shepherd espouses and asserts is often neither balanced nor
correct.
An example which will strike home to many readers is the assertion that the ―Anti-cult
contingent is highly organized and well funded‖ (p.42). Cult education and family support
groups are in fact quite poor and not well organized. I also note with dismay that Professor
Shepherd all too easily implies that ―forcible and coercive deprogramming‖ is hardly
different from counseling or communication, which may be considered, in effect
deprogramming that is voluntarily sought. Although he drops the qualifying adjectives
―coercive‖ and ―forcible‖ when talking about the latter situation, he substitutes descriptions
which have a similar import.
One is impressed similarly, and strikingly, when the author sets out to demolish Professor
Richard Delgado‘s argument about deprogramming. (1) Professor Shepherd first supports
the concept that joining a group is an affirmative waiver of the claim that there has been
deception or coercion in the initial conversion process. But then, the author disparages the
very same argument when it is presented in a case like Peterson, or in legislation aimed to
assist deprogrammers or facilitate the granting of conservatorships. Professor Shepherd is
also critical of Douglas Aronin‘s model conservatorship law, which was carefully constructed
to protect the rights of the subject, because Mr. Aronin is allegedly biased against new
religious groups and, therefore, stacks the deck against them. (2)
Indeed, the author‘s own analysis of judicial decisions included much passion and zeal. Let
me elucidate an instance about which I have personal knowledge. Referring to a supposedly
heinous example of violent deprogramming, Professor Shepherd cites ―One notorious case
where a $2 million suit was brought because the alleged victim was held incommunicado for
fifteen days.‖ The author describes this alleged victim as a doctor, the graduate of a
prestigious medical school. Well, the case was only notorious because the attorney for the
plaintiff, a source cited with approbation in the book, issued a press release at the time that
he filed his complaint Moreover, a complaint is a complaint, not an adjudication of fact, only
an assertion of a claim. The ―notorious‖ case was settled, and not a penny of damages- was
paid to the plaintiff despite the $2 million claimed. (It might as well have been $200
million.) The victim was not held incommunicado for fifteen days, and the facts were such
that, had the me gone forward, the plaintiff would most probably have lost it, but at very
substantial cost to the defense. Similarly, Professor Shepherd reiterates the stylized and
routine language in complaints dealing with deprogramming and its alleged violence as if
these assertions were proven facts.
Again, Professor Shepherd does not clearly advise the reader of the procedural significance
of the fact that when a legal challenge is made to the legal sufficiency of a complaint, all of
the allegations in the complaint are taken as true, even though at a trial they may be
disputed or disproved, and even though the witness asserting the alleged facts may not be
believed by the court. Many of the cases described in this book‘s chapter on deprogramming
do not deal with factual determinations made in such trial situations where, for example,
the credibility of a witness can be assessed through cross examination. The cases cited deal,
rather, with legal decisions made on motions challenging the legal sufficiency of complaints
by defendants --parents or deprogrammers, for example --who did not have the financial
resources to go through extended pretrial and motion practice, much less the expense of
