Cultic Studies Journal, Vol. 3, No. 2, 1986 Page 71
the trial itself. Because of such constraints, these defendants try to abbreviate the process,
thus minimizing their legal fees, by challenging the proceedings solely on technical and legal
grounds, rather then through pretrial discovery or during an actual trial. Undoubtedly, this
course of action would not be advised or adopted if defendants had legal and financial
resources equal to those of the plaintiff or his supporters. The result is that a complaint can
be cited as if it were, ipso facto, true, when it may not be.
While Professor Shepherd sometimes does recognize this distinction by inserting a sentence
indicating that the legal survival of a complaint was really only a success in stating a cause
of action, the thrust of his overall argument tends to disguise such qualifications by
immersing them in a massive exhortation to uphold the rights of new religious movements
against ―majoritarian prejudices.‖
Another contradiction arises in the author‘s analysis of whether techniques of coercive
persuasion deprive the subject of free choice. He first asserts that mind control issues are
matters of fact and subject to proof (p. 33). But then he concludes, simplistically, that
claims of mind control are negated by the existence of conflicting psychological views, and
that in such instances conflicting expert testimony leaves a court powerless to determine
the issue unfavorably to the ―new religions.‖ Such a conclusion is absolutely unwarranted.
In other litigated controversies involving expert opinion, the courts cannot and do not
simply withdraw from making determinations because there is disagreement Indeed, it is
the resolution of such disputes through the application of the fact-finding process that is the
basis of adjudication.
I also take umbrage at the use of the paradigm of family structure to characterize conflicts
with constitutional dimensions. One cannot view conflicts between an individual‘s
constitutional rights and the claims made on behalf of the ―new religious movements‖
simply as disputes between children and parents who are attempting to impose traditional
values on their bright but wayward offspring. Cult victims are not hippies or flower children
who are persecuted because they wear their hair long or shave their heads or dress in
distinctive clothes. They are not downtrodden victims of majoritarian persecution or
impoverished souls lacking the influence and ability to defend their rights without aid from
some sensitive, benevolent group dedicated to the preservation of civil liberties. All too
often, it is the ―new religion,‖ under the guise of religious discipline, which initiates physical
brutality or emotional abuse, not the parent.
The entire history of the First and Fourteenth Amendments belies the author‘s assertion that
―constitutionally the happy slaves‖ rights are what must be protected even if, as a
consequence, society must put up with a lot of spiritual poison‖ (p. 34). American society
made a determination over a hundred years ago to reject such an argument when
considering the abolition of slavery. It is absolutely irrelevant whether a sociologist or
psychologist taking a poll finds many ―happy slaves‖ clamoring for protection of their
constitutional right continue in their condition. (Consider, in this regard, apartheid and
religious bigotry, and whether these are the kinds of ―spiritual poison‖ we ought to put up
with if espoused by a ―new religion.‖) Still less would one consider a Poll of slave-owners on
the subject Indeed, the List time that such a doctrine of judicial abstention arose was in
response to desegregation cases when, under the guise of individual and states‘ rights, the
courts were urged to withdraw, and not to disturb domestic tranquility. Similar arguments
are heard today about the applicability of the Bill of Rights to the several states.
These arguments were urged and rejected a generation ago in the attempt to preserve
protected individual ―libertarian‖ rights in the face of a challenge by ―majoritarian social
values‖ related to child factory labor. We all remember, if we are old enough, the pictures of
small smiling children working in sweat shops. We also recall the establishment of social
programs, the vindication of the rights of minorities, and the affirmation of women‘s rights
the trial itself. Because of such constraints, these defendants try to abbreviate the process,
thus minimizing their legal fees, by challenging the proceedings solely on technical and legal
grounds, rather then through pretrial discovery or during an actual trial. Undoubtedly, this
course of action would not be advised or adopted if defendants had legal and financial
resources equal to those of the plaintiff or his supporters. The result is that a complaint can
be cited as if it were, ipso facto, true, when it may not be.
While Professor Shepherd sometimes does recognize this distinction by inserting a sentence
indicating that the legal survival of a complaint was really only a success in stating a cause
of action, the thrust of his overall argument tends to disguise such qualifications by
immersing them in a massive exhortation to uphold the rights of new religious movements
against ―majoritarian prejudices.‖
Another contradiction arises in the author‘s analysis of whether techniques of coercive
persuasion deprive the subject of free choice. He first asserts that mind control issues are
matters of fact and subject to proof (p. 33). But then he concludes, simplistically, that
claims of mind control are negated by the existence of conflicting psychological views, and
that in such instances conflicting expert testimony leaves a court powerless to determine
the issue unfavorably to the ―new religions.‖ Such a conclusion is absolutely unwarranted.
In other litigated controversies involving expert opinion, the courts cannot and do not
simply withdraw from making determinations because there is disagreement Indeed, it is
the resolution of such disputes through the application of the fact-finding process that is the
basis of adjudication.
I also take umbrage at the use of the paradigm of family structure to characterize conflicts
with constitutional dimensions. One cannot view conflicts between an individual‘s
constitutional rights and the claims made on behalf of the ―new religious movements‖
simply as disputes between children and parents who are attempting to impose traditional
values on their bright but wayward offspring. Cult victims are not hippies or flower children
who are persecuted because they wear their hair long or shave their heads or dress in
distinctive clothes. They are not downtrodden victims of majoritarian persecution or
impoverished souls lacking the influence and ability to defend their rights without aid from
some sensitive, benevolent group dedicated to the preservation of civil liberties. All too
often, it is the ―new religion,‖ under the guise of religious discipline, which initiates physical
brutality or emotional abuse, not the parent.
The entire history of the First and Fourteenth Amendments belies the author‘s assertion that
―constitutionally the happy slaves‖ rights are what must be protected even if, as a
consequence, society must put up with a lot of spiritual poison‖ (p. 34). American society
made a determination over a hundred years ago to reject such an argument when
considering the abolition of slavery. It is absolutely irrelevant whether a sociologist or
psychologist taking a poll finds many ―happy slaves‖ clamoring for protection of their
constitutional right continue in their condition. (Consider, in this regard, apartheid and
religious bigotry, and whether these are the kinds of ―spiritual poison‖ we ought to put up
with if espoused by a ―new religion.‖) Still less would one consider a Poll of slave-owners on
the subject Indeed, the List time that such a doctrine of judicial abstention arose was in
response to desegregation cases when, under the guise of individual and states‘ rights, the
courts were urged to withdraw, and not to disturb domestic tranquility. Similar arguments
are heard today about the applicability of the Bill of Rights to the several states.
These arguments were urged and rejected a generation ago in the attempt to preserve
protected individual ―libertarian‖ rights in the face of a challenge by ―majoritarian social
values‖ related to child factory labor. We all remember, if we are old enough, the pictures of
small smiling children working in sweat shops. We also recall the establishment of social
programs, the vindication of the rights of minorities, and the affirmation of women‘s rights
