58 International Journal of Cultic Studies ■ Vol. 1, No. 1, 2010
encounter in everyday life, as is stressed by
Galanter and Forest (2006) when they look at
the group The Supreme Truth. This intensity can
be described in colloquial terms thus: If, in the
pursuit of a series of extraordinary (no ordinary)
objectives, a series of extraordinary means is
used, the resulting experiences must necessarily
be extraordinary, and, of course, the people
involved in them must believe themselves to be
extraordinary people. Indeed, going from a high
level of dissatisfaction with one’s life and social
environment to a struggle on the edge of
heroism represents unquestionably extraordinary
transformation.
The strong social identity that provides
membership to such exclusive groups is what
serves to mark out the limits of the group,
permitting a clear categorisation between the in-
group to which they belong and the out-group.
For the cult, the out-group is formed generically
by all those persons who do not belong to it for
the terrorists, the fundamental out-group is
formed by those considered as the enemy of
their cause.
Nevertheless, certain groups can consider all
nonmembers as enemies of their cause, as
Osama Bin Laden indicated when he declared
war between “Islam and the infidels” or between
the “Islamic Nation and the rest of the world,”
exemplifying this simplistic dichotomist
structure typical of fanatical thought (Rodríguez-
Carballeira and Javaloy, 2005).
This separation between the in-group and the
out-group enables the Manichean dichotomy to
be created between us and them, this being
understood as the good and the bad. Beyond
representing the features of in-group favouritism
and out-group discrimination (Tajfel, 1978), the
glorification of the in-group in these groups is
clearly cultivated and, particularly among
terrorists, the rejection of the out-group, which is
blamed for all the ills against which the terrorists
are fighting, is fostered. In the terrorist group,
once the enemy has been clearly identified as the
cause of “all” ills, the feelings of rejection, hate,
and even revenge toward this community allow
the people who form part of it to be
dehumanised (an example is the ETA custom of
labelling the people who work as police officers
as dogs). If the people of the enemy group are no
longer seen as people, and are instead seen as
mere representative objects of Evil that must be
fought, they are using the logic that it is possible
to kill without suffering pangs of conscience,
through a process that Bandura (1999) calls
“moral disengagement.”
This construction of a Manichean dichotomy
between the in-group and the out-group, and the
terrible consequences that can arise from this,
are good examples of the important parallel or
point of intersection between the internal
dynamics of cults and terrorist groups, and they
invite more in-depth studies in this line of
research, which may improve on our knowledge
of both types of phenomena.
References
Almendros, C., Carrobles, J. A., Rodríguez-Carballeira, A., &
Jansá, J. M. (2004). Propiedades psicométricas de la versión
española de la Group Psychological Abuse Scale. Psicothema,
16(1), 132–138.
Alonso, R., &Reinares, F. (2005). Terrorism, human rights, and
law enforcement in Spain. Terrorism and Political Violence, 17(1),
265–278.
Bandura, A. (1999). Moral disengagement in the perpetration of
inhumanities. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 3(3),
193–209.
Bandura, A. (2006). Training for terrorism through selective moral
disengagement. In J. Forest (Ed.), The making of a terrorist:
Recruitment, training, and root causes (Vol. 2, pp. 34–50).
Westport, CT: Praeger Security.
Centner, C. (2003). Cults and terrorism: Similarities and
differences. Cultic Studies Review, 2(2), 1–18.
Crenshaw, M. (2000). The psychology of terrorism: An agenda for
the 21st Century. Political Psychology, 21(2), 405–420.
Comisión de la Verdad y de la Reconciliación. (2003). Final
report. Found at http://www.cverdad.org.pe/ifinal/index.php
(consulta: 2/6/2006)
De la Corte, L. (2006). La lógica del terrorismo. Madrid: Alianza.
De la Corte, L., Kruglanski, A. W., De Miguel, J. M., Sabucedo, J.
M., &Díaz, D. (2007). Siete principios psicosociales para explicar
el terrorismo. Psicothema, 19(3), 366–374.
De la Corte, L., Sabucedo, J. M., &Moreno, F. (2004).
Dimensiones psicosociales del terrorismo. In L. De la Corte, A.
Blanco, &J. M. Sabucedo (Eds.), Psicología y derechos humanos
(pp. 189–220). Madrid: Icaria.
Della Porta, D. (1990). Il terrorismo di sinistra. Bolonia: Il mulino.
Echeburúa, E., &Corral, P. (2004). Raíces psicológicas del
fanatismo politico. Análisis y Modificación de Conducta, 30, 161–
176.
Galanter, M., &Forest, F. (2006). Cults, charismatic groups and
social systems: Understanding the behavior of terrorist recruits. In
J. Forest (Ed.), The making of a terrorist: Recruitment, training,
encounter in everyday life, as is stressed by
Galanter and Forest (2006) when they look at
the group The Supreme Truth. This intensity can
be described in colloquial terms thus: If, in the
pursuit of a series of extraordinary (no ordinary)
objectives, a series of extraordinary means is
used, the resulting experiences must necessarily
be extraordinary, and, of course, the people
involved in them must believe themselves to be
extraordinary people. Indeed, going from a high
level of dissatisfaction with one’s life and social
environment to a struggle on the edge of
heroism represents unquestionably extraordinary
transformation.
The strong social identity that provides
membership to such exclusive groups is what
serves to mark out the limits of the group,
permitting a clear categorisation between the in-
group to which they belong and the out-group.
For the cult, the out-group is formed generically
by all those persons who do not belong to it for
the terrorists, the fundamental out-group is
formed by those considered as the enemy of
their cause.
Nevertheless, certain groups can consider all
nonmembers as enemies of their cause, as
Osama Bin Laden indicated when he declared
war between “Islam and the infidels” or between
the “Islamic Nation and the rest of the world,”
exemplifying this simplistic dichotomist
structure typical of fanatical thought (Rodríguez-
Carballeira and Javaloy, 2005).
This separation between the in-group and the
out-group enables the Manichean dichotomy to
be created between us and them, this being
understood as the good and the bad. Beyond
representing the features of in-group favouritism
and out-group discrimination (Tajfel, 1978), the
glorification of the in-group in these groups is
clearly cultivated and, particularly among
terrorists, the rejection of the out-group, which is
blamed for all the ills against which the terrorists
are fighting, is fostered. In the terrorist group,
once the enemy has been clearly identified as the
cause of “all” ills, the feelings of rejection, hate,
and even revenge toward this community allow
the people who form part of it to be
dehumanised (an example is the ETA custom of
labelling the people who work as police officers
as dogs). If the people of the enemy group are no
longer seen as people, and are instead seen as
mere representative objects of Evil that must be
fought, they are using the logic that it is possible
to kill without suffering pangs of conscience,
through a process that Bandura (1999) calls
“moral disengagement.”
This construction of a Manichean dichotomy
between the in-group and the out-group, and the
terrible consequences that can arise from this,
are good examples of the important parallel or
point of intersection between the internal
dynamics of cults and terrorist groups, and they
invite more in-depth studies in this line of
research, which may improve on our knowledge
of both types of phenomena.
References
Almendros, C., Carrobles, J. A., Rodríguez-Carballeira, A., &
Jansá, J. M. (2004). Propiedades psicométricas de la versión
española de la Group Psychological Abuse Scale. Psicothema,
16(1), 132–138.
Alonso, R., &Reinares, F. (2005). Terrorism, human rights, and
law enforcement in Spain. Terrorism and Political Violence, 17(1),
265–278.
Bandura, A. (1999). Moral disengagement in the perpetration of
inhumanities. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 3(3),
193–209.
Bandura, A. (2006). Training for terrorism through selective moral
disengagement. In J. Forest (Ed.), The making of a terrorist:
Recruitment, training, and root causes (Vol. 2, pp. 34–50).
Westport, CT: Praeger Security.
Centner, C. (2003). Cults and terrorism: Similarities and
differences. Cultic Studies Review, 2(2), 1–18.
Crenshaw, M. (2000). The psychology of terrorism: An agenda for
the 21st Century. Political Psychology, 21(2), 405–420.
Comisión de la Verdad y de la Reconciliación. (2003). Final
report. Found at http://www.cverdad.org.pe/ifinal/index.php
(consulta: 2/6/2006)
De la Corte, L. (2006). La lógica del terrorismo. Madrid: Alianza.
De la Corte, L., Kruglanski, A. W., De Miguel, J. M., Sabucedo, J.
M., &Díaz, D. (2007). Siete principios psicosociales para explicar
el terrorismo. Psicothema, 19(3), 366–374.
De la Corte, L., Sabucedo, J. M., &Moreno, F. (2004).
Dimensiones psicosociales del terrorismo. In L. De la Corte, A.
Blanco, &J. M. Sabucedo (Eds.), Psicología y derechos humanos
(pp. 189–220). Madrid: Icaria.
Della Porta, D. (1990). Il terrorismo di sinistra. Bolonia: Il mulino.
Echeburúa, E., &Corral, P. (2004). Raíces psicológicas del
fanatismo politico. Análisis y Modificación de Conducta, 30, 161–
176.
Galanter, M., &Forest, F. (2006). Cults, charismatic groups and
social systems: Understanding the behavior of terrorist recruits. In
J. Forest (Ed.), The making of a terrorist: Recruitment, training,
