Cultic Studies Journal, Vol. 12, No. 2, 1995, page 41
The relative contribution of thought reform processes and cognitive deliberation can vary
greatly from cult to cult. For example, I suspect that cognitive deliberations, however
erroneous, may play a greater role in “conversion” to some Eastern and New Age groups
than proponents of the thought reform model tend to think. The fundamental problem is
that we do not yet have a systematic procedure for quantitatively evaluating the role of
thought reform and other factors in conversion, although some promising research is finally
being conducted (Chambers, Langone, Dole, &Grice, 1994). Thus far we have been limited
to clinical evaluations of particular cases. This comment is not meant as a disparagement of
clinical approaches. The field of clinical psychology has utterly depended on them for most
of its history. I am simply saying that although proponents of the thought reform model are
not the cultural Neanderthals that Introvigne seems to imply they are, they don‟t know all
there is to know about cult conversion. I believe that we can learn from those who disagree
with us, as they can learn from us.
Toward Enhanced Dialogue
I hope that my comments have made clear that productive dialogue between secular and
religious perspectives on cults depends on understanding the different foci and assumptions
of these perspectives. I propose the following propositions to summarize and clarify my
view on conversion and cults. Keeping these points in mind will enhance dialogue.
1. Conversion to nonmanipulative groups is related more to the converted person‟s needs,
aspirations, and cognitive evaluations of the group than to what the group does to the
individual. These cognitive evaluations, if erroneous (whether scientifically or theologically),
may lead to harmful consequences for the individual.
2. Conversion to highly manipulative, exploitative groups (regardless of the orthodoxy of
their professed theology), though certainly influenced by factors within the individual (what
the person thinks about the group), is more influenced by factors in the environment, by
what the group does to the individual. Elaboration of these environmental factors and how
they interact with factors within the individual is the special contribution of the
thought-reform model.
3. Religious-process models, which posit spiritual entities as important influences in at least
some conversions, are conceivably also potentially operable in some conversions. However,
many of these models, as with sensationalized brainwashing models (which Introvigne
incorrectly attributes to the entire “anti-cult movement”), are crude and unconvincing.
Nevertheless, nuanced spiritual models may exist (I don‟t know of any) or be capable of
development. But the tendency in these models is to give “more than the devil‟s due,” the
title of an article on the psychological function of exorcism in certain fringe Christian groups
(Reimers, 1994).
4. Creeds imply deeds, so the analysis of creed is relevant to analyses of behavior in
conversion, although the quantitative contribution of creedal explanations in the individual
case will tend to diminish as the level of manipulation increases. Nevertheless, creedal
analyses can be valuable in attempts to understand the social structure in which manipula-
tion occurs and to identify the ruling presuppositions that a particular individual may have
been manipulated into adopting.
5. Creedal analysis and dialogue (especially among the competing Judeo-Christian, New
Age, and secular/scientific worldviews that dominate contemporary culture) is vital if our
“adolescent” culture is to develop an identity that is high in cognitive consistency and
integrative complexity. The thought reform model can contribute to the development of
process “rules” for evaluating cultural dialogue by showing how subtle manipulations can
infect communication and undermine the respect that genuine dialogue requires.
The relative contribution of thought reform processes and cognitive deliberation can vary
greatly from cult to cult. For example, I suspect that cognitive deliberations, however
erroneous, may play a greater role in “conversion” to some Eastern and New Age groups
than proponents of the thought reform model tend to think. The fundamental problem is
that we do not yet have a systematic procedure for quantitatively evaluating the role of
thought reform and other factors in conversion, although some promising research is finally
being conducted (Chambers, Langone, Dole, &Grice, 1994). Thus far we have been limited
to clinical evaluations of particular cases. This comment is not meant as a disparagement of
clinical approaches. The field of clinical psychology has utterly depended on them for most
of its history. I am simply saying that although proponents of the thought reform model are
not the cultural Neanderthals that Introvigne seems to imply they are, they don‟t know all
there is to know about cult conversion. I believe that we can learn from those who disagree
with us, as they can learn from us.
Toward Enhanced Dialogue
I hope that my comments have made clear that productive dialogue between secular and
religious perspectives on cults depends on understanding the different foci and assumptions
of these perspectives. I propose the following propositions to summarize and clarify my
view on conversion and cults. Keeping these points in mind will enhance dialogue.
1. Conversion to nonmanipulative groups is related more to the converted person‟s needs,
aspirations, and cognitive evaluations of the group than to what the group does to the
individual. These cognitive evaluations, if erroneous (whether scientifically or theologically),
may lead to harmful consequences for the individual.
2. Conversion to highly manipulative, exploitative groups (regardless of the orthodoxy of
their professed theology), though certainly influenced by factors within the individual (what
the person thinks about the group), is more influenced by factors in the environment, by
what the group does to the individual. Elaboration of these environmental factors and how
they interact with factors within the individual is the special contribution of the
thought-reform model.
3. Religious-process models, which posit spiritual entities as important influences in at least
some conversions, are conceivably also potentially operable in some conversions. However,
many of these models, as with sensationalized brainwashing models (which Introvigne
incorrectly attributes to the entire “anti-cult movement”), are crude and unconvincing.
Nevertheless, nuanced spiritual models may exist (I don‟t know of any) or be capable of
development. But the tendency in these models is to give “more than the devil‟s due,” the
title of an article on the psychological function of exorcism in certain fringe Christian groups
(Reimers, 1994).
4. Creeds imply deeds, so the analysis of creed is relevant to analyses of behavior in
conversion, although the quantitative contribution of creedal explanations in the individual
case will tend to diminish as the level of manipulation increases. Nevertheless, creedal
analyses can be valuable in attempts to understand the social structure in which manipula-
tion occurs and to identify the ruling presuppositions that a particular individual may have
been manipulated into adopting.
5. Creedal analysis and dialogue (especially among the competing Judeo-Christian, New
Age, and secular/scientific worldviews that dominate contemporary culture) is vital if our
“adolescent” culture is to develop an identity that is high in cognitive consistency and
integrative complexity. The thought reform model can contribute to the development of
process “rules” for evaluating cultural dialogue by showing how subtle manipulations can
infect communication and undermine the respect that genuine dialogue requires.
