Cultic Studies Journal, Vol. 12, No. 2, 1995, page 35
Introvigne referring to?), even though “this group has been endorsed by the Roman Catholic
Church.” A purely content-focused approach (especially a Roman Catholic approach) to
Opus Dei may very well conclude that its theology and stated practices are orthodox and
noncultic. But when such a content-focused approach ignores process-focused perspectives,
blind spots can arise. This is Ronald Enroth‟s point in Churches That Abuse (1992): a
group‟s advocating an orthodox theology does not immunize it against hypocrisy and
inconsistency. One must look at behavior as well as theology in order to appreciate the
essence of a cult (a word Enroth understandably avoids because his evangelical audience
associates it with theology). The critiques of Opus Dei are, to my knowledge, mainly
critiques of behavior that is inconsistent with official policy and orthodox Christianity.
Human beings --even those in religious orders --sin, and sometimes their sin may consist
of abusing other human beings by manipulating their intellect and emotions and exploiting
their needs. And it may possibly be the case that secular psychologists might have
something useful to say --even for orthodox Christians --about how people can be
manipulated and exploited.
Therefore the appropriate question should not be Introvigne‟s rhetorical subtitle, AIs the
split between the secular anti-cult and the religious counter-cult movement bound to grow
into open antagonism?” It should be “How can religious and secular perspectives on cults
complement and enrich one another?” Before attempting to answer this question, let me
first examine the points of conflict that Introvigne believes (the tone of his article tempts
me to say “hopes,” rather than “believes”) will undermine the increasing number of positive
interactions between secular and religious cult critics. These points of conflict are real
(although I believe Introvigne‟s analysis is faulty), but they do not --and indeed should not-
-prevent cooperation and respectful disagreement.
Potential Points of Conflict Between
Secular and Religious Critiques of Cults
Introvigne is correct in saying that secular and religious critiques of cults have points of
conflict. However, he overestimates the magnitude and irresolvability of these conflicts.
Introvigne implies that conflict has developed with regard to secular criticisms of
Christianity, secular attitudes toward certain non-Christian groups, such as Mormons, the
supposed indifference of secularists toward post-cult religious views, and supposed
implications of the “brainwashing” explanation.
Secular Criticism of Christianity
As noted earlier, Introvigne says that the deed emphasis of secular approaches will lead to
criticism of Christianity, particularly when “the religious pressure exerted by a group on its
members is too high.” The latter part of this statement is true. But it is also true, as it
should be, for Christians (including Introvigne, I hope) concerned about abusive churches.
The Vatican is explicit in its condemnation of emotional pressure in conversion:
In spreading religious faith and in introducing religious practices everyone ought at
all times to refrain from any manner of action which might seem to carry a hint of
coercion or of a kind of persuasion that would be dishonorable or unworthy,
especially when dealing with poor or uneducated people. Such a manner of action
would have to be considered an abuse of one‟s rights and a violation of the rights of
others. (“Selections from the Second Vatican Council‟s Declaration on Religious
Freedom,” 1985, p. 274)
Therefore, nothing in secular critiques of high-pressure, abusive Christian groups
necessarily threatens Christianity. On the contrary, such critiques can help honest Christians
keep their own houses in order. Recognition of this fact motivated a team of evangelicals to
cooperate in the development of an ethical code for Christian evangelists, published in this
Introvigne referring to?), even though “this group has been endorsed by the Roman Catholic
Church.” A purely content-focused approach (especially a Roman Catholic approach) to
Opus Dei may very well conclude that its theology and stated practices are orthodox and
noncultic. But when such a content-focused approach ignores process-focused perspectives,
blind spots can arise. This is Ronald Enroth‟s point in Churches That Abuse (1992): a
group‟s advocating an orthodox theology does not immunize it against hypocrisy and
inconsistency. One must look at behavior as well as theology in order to appreciate the
essence of a cult (a word Enroth understandably avoids because his evangelical audience
associates it with theology). The critiques of Opus Dei are, to my knowledge, mainly
critiques of behavior that is inconsistent with official policy and orthodox Christianity.
Human beings --even those in religious orders --sin, and sometimes their sin may consist
of abusing other human beings by manipulating their intellect and emotions and exploiting
their needs. And it may possibly be the case that secular psychologists might have
something useful to say --even for orthodox Christians --about how people can be
manipulated and exploited.
Therefore the appropriate question should not be Introvigne‟s rhetorical subtitle, AIs the
split between the secular anti-cult and the religious counter-cult movement bound to grow
into open antagonism?” It should be “How can religious and secular perspectives on cults
complement and enrich one another?” Before attempting to answer this question, let me
first examine the points of conflict that Introvigne believes (the tone of his article tempts
me to say “hopes,” rather than “believes”) will undermine the increasing number of positive
interactions between secular and religious cult critics. These points of conflict are real
(although I believe Introvigne‟s analysis is faulty), but they do not --and indeed should not-
-prevent cooperation and respectful disagreement.
Potential Points of Conflict Between
Secular and Religious Critiques of Cults
Introvigne is correct in saying that secular and religious critiques of cults have points of
conflict. However, he overestimates the magnitude and irresolvability of these conflicts.
Introvigne implies that conflict has developed with regard to secular criticisms of
Christianity, secular attitudes toward certain non-Christian groups, such as Mormons, the
supposed indifference of secularists toward post-cult religious views, and supposed
implications of the “brainwashing” explanation.
Secular Criticism of Christianity
As noted earlier, Introvigne says that the deed emphasis of secular approaches will lead to
criticism of Christianity, particularly when “the religious pressure exerted by a group on its
members is too high.” The latter part of this statement is true. But it is also true, as it
should be, for Christians (including Introvigne, I hope) concerned about abusive churches.
The Vatican is explicit in its condemnation of emotional pressure in conversion:
In spreading religious faith and in introducing religious practices everyone ought at
all times to refrain from any manner of action which might seem to carry a hint of
coercion or of a kind of persuasion that would be dishonorable or unworthy,
especially when dealing with poor or uneducated people. Such a manner of action
would have to be considered an abuse of one‟s rights and a violation of the rights of
others. (“Selections from the Second Vatican Council‟s Declaration on Religious
Freedom,” 1985, p. 274)
Therefore, nothing in secular critiques of high-pressure, abusive Christian groups
necessarily threatens Christianity. On the contrary, such critiques can help honest Christians
keep their own houses in order. Recognition of this fact motivated a team of evangelicals to
cooperate in the development of an ethical code for Christian evangelists, published in this
