Cultic Studies Journal, Vol. 12, No. 2, 1995, page 32
(setta, secte, secta), which in English usually refers to a group that has broken off from a
mainstream religion. (In my opinion, setta, secta, and secte should be translated as cult,
rather than sect, which in English does not have as negative a connotation as cult has come
to have.) These European organizations, so far as I know, do not routinely distinguish
between benign and destructive sette, sectes, or sectas, although their writings often imply
the distinction. Thus, despite some attempts in the United States to emphasize the
distinction between cult and new religious movement, the preferred terms --whether new
religious movement, sect, or cult --are often used in a way that implicitly lumps together a
wide variety of groups, thereby lending some credence to the sociologists‟ claims that NRMs
(I would say “some NRMs”) are unfairly persecuted by a majority suspicious of deviants.
This problem is not easily resolvable because, practically speaking, there is no way that all
of the thousands of new religious movements and religious cults (not to mention the
numerous psychotherapy, political, and other groups that are cultic to varying degrees) can
be studied in sufficient depth to classify them reliably, if the classification system requires
an analysis of anything but superficial features (e.g., Eastern vs. Bible-based). Those
organizations, such as the Dialog Center, that evaluate NRMs according to established
theological criteria have an advantage over secular organizations, such as AFF (American
Family Foundation). The religious critic can simply analyze the NRMs‟ theological writings
one at a time, relating each to the critic‟s theological criteria. The secular critic, though
having definitional criteria, focuses on behavior and, therefore, confronts the question of
quality and quantity of behavioral evidence used to make the classification decision. Lower-
quality evidence can include certain stated policies (e.g., the group‟s leader demands
absolute obedience from his followers) and informal testimonies from former members or
family members. Sometimes a high quantity of lower-quality evidence can be compelling
(e.g., 90% of the former members of a small group independently report that the group‟s
leader sexually abuses selected female members).
Moderate-quality evidence includes observations of professionals (e.g., psychologists
working with former cultists sociologists doing participant observation studies). The major
problems with such scientific observations are (1) different theoretical frameworks will lead
observers to different conclusions, and (2) the observers may see only a select sample of
the broader population of group members (e.g., research subjects selected by group
leaders former members seeking professional help). A large quantity of converging
evidence (e.g., the combined clinical observations of the contributors to Recovery from Cults
[Langone, 1993]) increases the credibility of the observers‟ conclusions, but if the sample is
biased, the conclusions may not apply to other, or even possibly the majority, of the
cult/NRM population.
High-quality evidence includes formal scientific studies meeting the methodological
demands of the behavioral and social sciences. Unfortunately, such high-quality evidence is
usually scarce (low quantity), in part because few studies meet rigorous methodological
standards and because these studies demand considerable resources.
Thus, those of us who focus on behavior rather than theology --that is, on deed rather than
creed --sometimes have to base our case-by-case conclusions and actions on
less-than-optimal evidence. Mental health professionals are, perhaps, more comfortable
with this state of affairs than are academicians, because the former regularly function in a
world where decisions must be made on the basis of sometimes very limited evidence (e.g.,
psychiatric crisis intervention). Some academicians may interpret the mental health
professionals‟ conclusions and decision making as arrogant or stupid (certainly, the snide
tone of many of Introvigne‟s remarks indicates that his level of respect for my and my
colleagues‟ position on the issues is as low as --and interferes with --his understanding of
our position). That the general public and the media tend to side with the mental health
professionals may add to the animosity of academicians, especially sociologists, who,
(setta, secte, secta), which in English usually refers to a group that has broken off from a
mainstream religion. (In my opinion, setta, secta, and secte should be translated as cult,
rather than sect, which in English does not have as negative a connotation as cult has come
to have.) These European organizations, so far as I know, do not routinely distinguish
between benign and destructive sette, sectes, or sectas, although their writings often imply
the distinction. Thus, despite some attempts in the United States to emphasize the
distinction between cult and new religious movement, the preferred terms --whether new
religious movement, sect, or cult --are often used in a way that implicitly lumps together a
wide variety of groups, thereby lending some credence to the sociologists‟ claims that NRMs
(I would say “some NRMs”) are unfairly persecuted by a majority suspicious of deviants.
This problem is not easily resolvable because, practically speaking, there is no way that all
of the thousands of new religious movements and religious cults (not to mention the
numerous psychotherapy, political, and other groups that are cultic to varying degrees) can
be studied in sufficient depth to classify them reliably, if the classification system requires
an analysis of anything but superficial features (e.g., Eastern vs. Bible-based). Those
organizations, such as the Dialog Center, that evaluate NRMs according to established
theological criteria have an advantage over secular organizations, such as AFF (American
Family Foundation). The religious critic can simply analyze the NRMs‟ theological writings
one at a time, relating each to the critic‟s theological criteria. The secular critic, though
having definitional criteria, focuses on behavior and, therefore, confronts the question of
quality and quantity of behavioral evidence used to make the classification decision. Lower-
quality evidence can include certain stated policies (e.g., the group‟s leader demands
absolute obedience from his followers) and informal testimonies from former members or
family members. Sometimes a high quantity of lower-quality evidence can be compelling
(e.g., 90% of the former members of a small group independently report that the group‟s
leader sexually abuses selected female members).
Moderate-quality evidence includes observations of professionals (e.g., psychologists
working with former cultists sociologists doing participant observation studies). The major
problems with such scientific observations are (1) different theoretical frameworks will lead
observers to different conclusions, and (2) the observers may see only a select sample of
the broader population of group members (e.g., research subjects selected by group
leaders former members seeking professional help). A large quantity of converging
evidence (e.g., the combined clinical observations of the contributors to Recovery from Cults
[Langone, 1993]) increases the credibility of the observers‟ conclusions, but if the sample is
biased, the conclusions may not apply to other, or even possibly the majority, of the
cult/NRM population.
High-quality evidence includes formal scientific studies meeting the methodological
demands of the behavioral and social sciences. Unfortunately, such high-quality evidence is
usually scarce (low quantity), in part because few studies meet rigorous methodological
standards and because these studies demand considerable resources.
Thus, those of us who focus on behavior rather than theology --that is, on deed rather than
creed --sometimes have to base our case-by-case conclusions and actions on
less-than-optimal evidence. Mental health professionals are, perhaps, more comfortable
with this state of affairs than are academicians, because the former regularly function in a
world where decisions must be made on the basis of sometimes very limited evidence (e.g.,
psychiatric crisis intervention). Some academicians may interpret the mental health
professionals‟ conclusions and decision making as arrogant or stupid (certainly, the snide
tone of many of Introvigne‟s remarks indicates that his level of respect for my and my
colleagues‟ position on the issues is as low as --and interferes with --his understanding of
our position). That the general public and the media tend to side with the mental health
professionals may add to the animosity of academicians, especially sociologists, who,
