Cultic Studies Journal, Vol. 12, No. 2, 1995, page 34
frameworks vis-à-vis cults. The latter phrase is used deliberately because many critics who
use secular frameworks vis-à-vis cults are not secularists (e.g., evangelical Christians and
conservative Jews associated with AFF). Thus, the division of critics into secular and
religious (I believe Introvigne‟s use of anti-cultist and counter-cultist is an oversimplification
and subtly derogatory) refers, in my revision, not to the personal beliefs of the critics but to
the conceptual frameworks from which they choose to operate in the matter of cults.
Religious critics use theological frameworks to evaluate cults, while secular critics --even if
personally devout and orthodox Christians --operate within the framework of the dominant
secular culture. To be sure, there are differences between these two approaches, which I
will discuss later. But first let me conclude my revision of Introvigne‟s typology.
The two categories that Introvigne calls rationalist and post-rationalist would more
appropriately be called “content focused” and “process focused.” Content-focused critiques
of cults examine the validity (the truth value) of cults‟ claims--doctrinal (e.g., Jesus studied
Yoga in the Himalayas) and outcome (e.g., help members develop their psychic powers).
Religious-content critiques will focus on how cults‟ theological claims measure up against
objective evidence and the belief systems of the critics. Secular-content critiques will tend
to focus on claims that are amenable to empirical testing (e.g., demonstrating that the
“miracles” of Sai Baba are tricks of a magician scientifically testing the “Maharishi Effect,”
which claims that a sufficiently large number of Siddha meditators will produce peace and
harmony in their geographical region).
Process-focused critiques attempt to explain how cults bring about changes in their
members. Secular process critiques will tend to focus on explanations that emphasize
techniques of psychological influence, with the most extreme instances being categorized as
thought reform, coercive persuasion, mind control, or related terms, including brainwashing
--a term that most professionals and scholars prefer to leave to journalists and
filmmakers. Religious process critiques will tend to attribute changes in cult members to the
influence of spiritual entities (e.g., Satan or other demons).
This typology has utility only if one views the categories as reflecting emphasis or focus,
rather than an inflexible, exclusive framework, which seems to be one of Introvigne‟s
mistake. For example, people associated with AFF, which emphasizes a secular,
process-oriented critique of cults, do not necessarily exclude the criticisms of cults made by
people emphasizing other cells in the four-part Introvigne classification (overlap occurs in
the other directions as well). Many of my colleagues, for example, subscribe to the Skeptical
Inquirer (published by the Committee for the Scientific Investigation of Claims of the
Paranormal, or CSICOP) and attend CSICOP‟s annual convention. A recent CSICOP
convention focused on the psychology of belief --that is, the process by which beliefs come
to be held. Exit counselors regularly rely on theological critiques of cults provided by
religious content critics, such as the Christian Research Institute (CRI). Religious critics,
such as Aagaard, will often indicate a belief in mind control (Eckstein, 1993). Even the
religious process view (spiritual warfare), which is probably the most exclusive of the
Introvigne classifications, leaks into other classifications, and vice versa. For example, a
Christian psychologist who subscribes to the mind control model (Ash, 1985) also believes
that some cases cannot be understood or properly treated without positing the existence of
demonic entities (personal communication). The picture is not as clear as Introvigne
implies.
My goal here is not to argue for the superiority of one perspective over another, or to argue
for a mush of nonthinking agreeableness that sees all as somehow equally valid. I am
merely trying to show that a simple-minded application of the Introvigne classification leads
to the construction or exaggeration of differences, as well as an underestimation of
similarities. Let us take Opus Dei as a case in point because Introvigne criticizes “most
anti-cult movements” for including Opus Dei in their lists of cults (by the way, what “list” is
frameworks vis-à-vis cults. The latter phrase is used deliberately because many critics who
use secular frameworks vis-à-vis cults are not secularists (e.g., evangelical Christians and
conservative Jews associated with AFF). Thus, the division of critics into secular and
religious (I believe Introvigne‟s use of anti-cultist and counter-cultist is an oversimplification
and subtly derogatory) refers, in my revision, not to the personal beliefs of the critics but to
the conceptual frameworks from which they choose to operate in the matter of cults.
Religious critics use theological frameworks to evaluate cults, while secular critics --even if
personally devout and orthodox Christians --operate within the framework of the dominant
secular culture. To be sure, there are differences between these two approaches, which I
will discuss later. But first let me conclude my revision of Introvigne‟s typology.
The two categories that Introvigne calls rationalist and post-rationalist would more
appropriately be called “content focused” and “process focused.” Content-focused critiques
of cults examine the validity (the truth value) of cults‟ claims--doctrinal (e.g., Jesus studied
Yoga in the Himalayas) and outcome (e.g., help members develop their psychic powers).
Religious-content critiques will focus on how cults‟ theological claims measure up against
objective evidence and the belief systems of the critics. Secular-content critiques will tend
to focus on claims that are amenable to empirical testing (e.g., demonstrating that the
“miracles” of Sai Baba are tricks of a magician scientifically testing the “Maharishi Effect,”
which claims that a sufficiently large number of Siddha meditators will produce peace and
harmony in their geographical region).
Process-focused critiques attempt to explain how cults bring about changes in their
members. Secular process critiques will tend to focus on explanations that emphasize
techniques of psychological influence, with the most extreme instances being categorized as
thought reform, coercive persuasion, mind control, or related terms, including brainwashing
--a term that most professionals and scholars prefer to leave to journalists and
filmmakers. Religious process critiques will tend to attribute changes in cult members to the
influence of spiritual entities (e.g., Satan or other demons).
This typology has utility only if one views the categories as reflecting emphasis or focus,
rather than an inflexible, exclusive framework, which seems to be one of Introvigne‟s
mistake. For example, people associated with AFF, which emphasizes a secular,
process-oriented critique of cults, do not necessarily exclude the criticisms of cults made by
people emphasizing other cells in the four-part Introvigne classification (overlap occurs in
the other directions as well). Many of my colleagues, for example, subscribe to the Skeptical
Inquirer (published by the Committee for the Scientific Investigation of Claims of the
Paranormal, or CSICOP) and attend CSICOP‟s annual convention. A recent CSICOP
convention focused on the psychology of belief --that is, the process by which beliefs come
to be held. Exit counselors regularly rely on theological critiques of cults provided by
religious content critics, such as the Christian Research Institute (CRI). Religious critics,
such as Aagaard, will often indicate a belief in mind control (Eckstein, 1993). Even the
religious process view (spiritual warfare), which is probably the most exclusive of the
Introvigne classifications, leaks into other classifications, and vice versa. For example, a
Christian psychologist who subscribes to the mind control model (Ash, 1985) also believes
that some cases cannot be understood or properly treated without positing the existence of
demonic entities (personal communication). The picture is not as clear as Introvigne
implies.
My goal here is not to argue for the superiority of one perspective over another, or to argue
for a mush of nonthinking agreeableness that sees all as somehow equally valid. I am
merely trying to show that a simple-minded application of the Introvigne classification leads
to the construction or exaggeration of differences, as well as an underestimation of
similarities. Let us take Opus Dei as a case in point because Introvigne criticizes “most
anti-cult movements” for including Opus Dei in their lists of cults (by the way, what “list” is
