Cultic Studies Journal, Vol. 12, No. 2, 1995, page 33
ironically, seem enamored of conflict-model explanations of other people‟s behavior, but not
of their own. Unfortunately, the arrogance and animosity that often taint this field are the
opposite of what its ambiguity and uncertainty demand --namely, humility and respect. I
hope this essay can help move at least a few of us in the right direction.
Introvigne’s Argument
Introvigne proposes that religious and secular critiques of cults fall into a four-category
classification system. Secular critics (or what he calls “anti-cult” approaches) are either
“rationalist” and concerned with the fraudulent claims of cultic groups, or “post-rationalist,”
which Introvigne defines as relying “almost exclusively on brainwashing as a preferred
explanation for the success of „cults‟” (p. 15). Religious critics (what Introvigne calls
“counter-cult” approaches) may also be divided into rationalist and post-rationalist
subgroups. Representative of rationalist religious critiques are groups such as the Dialog
Center and the Christian Research Institute, both of which focus on theological critiques of
cultic groups. Post-rationalist counter-cultists “invest „cult‟ leaders with almost superhuman
powers and abilities ...[and they are said to be] in contact with Satan or the occult.”
Building upon Introvigne‟s use of Sai Baba as an example, one could say that rationalist
anti-cultists would try to expose the fraudulent nature of his miracles, post-rationalist
anti-cultists would focus on how Sai Baba‟s manipulations may be used to control and
exploit followers, rationalist counter-cultists would offer an orthodox Christian critique of Sai
Baba‟s theology, while post-rationalist counter-cultists would accept Sai Baba‟s “miracles,”
but attribute them to his demonic powers.
This typology, in Introvigne‟s view, helps to explain what he believes are the following
sources of conflict between religious and secular views of cultism:
1. Secular critics, or the anti-cult movement, “true to its program of watching deeds not
creeds --would not care for orthodoxy or Christianity,” particularly when “the religious
pressure exerted by a group on its members is too high” (p. 16).
2. Groups such as Mormons, Freemasons, and even Roman Catholics will often be
categorized as cults by at least certain religious critics, while secular critics generally view
these groups as mainstream and relatively nonmanipulative.
3. The secular critics‟ emphasis on “the deed not the creed” leads some religious critics to
conclude that the secularists are dodging the truth issue and do not care what religious
views people adopt after they leave cults.
4. Introvigne‟s “rationalist” critics --whether secular or religious --are uncomfortable with
the “post-rationalist” critics‟ propensity to use “brainwashing” or “demons” to explain the
workings of cults.
Introvigne offers “a possible way out of antagonism” at the end of his article, although I
must admit that I find his prescription unclear. He seems to be saying that respectful
dialogue is possible if theological and secular scholars distinguish between theological truth
and factual truth concerning deeds and creeds. Although they may at best agree to disagree
about the former type of truth, they can, if they remain committed to rationality and
fairness, arrive at a consensus about factual truth. I agree, however, with Leslie Newbegin‟s
comment, in her postscript to Introvigne, that “this concept of a „science of religion‟ which is
theologically neutral is an illusion.”
A Revision of Introvigne’s Typology
Fortunately, Introvigne‟s typology is not totally off the mark. It does indeed shed some light
on the different approaches of secular and religious critics, although his classification
scheme requires revision to square it with reality. He is partly correct in dividing cult critics
into four general categories, two of which are religious and two of which use secular
ironically, seem enamored of conflict-model explanations of other people‟s behavior, but not
of their own. Unfortunately, the arrogance and animosity that often taint this field are the
opposite of what its ambiguity and uncertainty demand --namely, humility and respect. I
hope this essay can help move at least a few of us in the right direction.
Introvigne’s Argument
Introvigne proposes that religious and secular critiques of cults fall into a four-category
classification system. Secular critics (or what he calls “anti-cult” approaches) are either
“rationalist” and concerned with the fraudulent claims of cultic groups, or “post-rationalist,”
which Introvigne defines as relying “almost exclusively on brainwashing as a preferred
explanation for the success of „cults‟” (p. 15). Religious critics (what Introvigne calls
“counter-cult” approaches) may also be divided into rationalist and post-rationalist
subgroups. Representative of rationalist religious critiques are groups such as the Dialog
Center and the Christian Research Institute, both of which focus on theological critiques of
cultic groups. Post-rationalist counter-cultists “invest „cult‟ leaders with almost superhuman
powers and abilities ...[and they are said to be] in contact with Satan or the occult.”
Building upon Introvigne‟s use of Sai Baba as an example, one could say that rationalist
anti-cultists would try to expose the fraudulent nature of his miracles, post-rationalist
anti-cultists would focus on how Sai Baba‟s manipulations may be used to control and
exploit followers, rationalist counter-cultists would offer an orthodox Christian critique of Sai
Baba‟s theology, while post-rationalist counter-cultists would accept Sai Baba‟s “miracles,”
but attribute them to his demonic powers.
This typology, in Introvigne‟s view, helps to explain what he believes are the following
sources of conflict between religious and secular views of cultism:
1. Secular critics, or the anti-cult movement, “true to its program of watching deeds not
creeds --would not care for orthodoxy or Christianity,” particularly when “the religious
pressure exerted by a group on its members is too high” (p. 16).
2. Groups such as Mormons, Freemasons, and even Roman Catholics will often be
categorized as cults by at least certain religious critics, while secular critics generally view
these groups as mainstream and relatively nonmanipulative.
3. The secular critics‟ emphasis on “the deed not the creed” leads some religious critics to
conclude that the secularists are dodging the truth issue and do not care what religious
views people adopt after they leave cults.
4. Introvigne‟s “rationalist” critics --whether secular or religious --are uncomfortable with
the “post-rationalist” critics‟ propensity to use “brainwashing” or “demons” to explain the
workings of cults.
Introvigne offers “a possible way out of antagonism” at the end of his article, although I
must admit that I find his prescription unclear. He seems to be saying that respectful
dialogue is possible if theological and secular scholars distinguish between theological truth
and factual truth concerning deeds and creeds. Although they may at best agree to disagree
about the former type of truth, they can, if they remain committed to rationality and
fairness, arrive at a consensus about factual truth. I agree, however, with Leslie Newbegin‟s
comment, in her postscript to Introvigne, that “this concept of a „science of religion‟ which is
theologically neutral is an illusion.”
A Revision of Introvigne’s Typology
Fortunately, Introvigne‟s typology is not totally off the mark. It does indeed shed some light
on the different approaches of secular and religious critics, although his classification
scheme requires revision to square it with reality. He is partly correct in dividing cult critics
into four general categories, two of which are religious and two of which use secular
