Cultic Studies Journal, Vol. 8, No. 2, 1991, Page 60
of legal investigation. As demonstrated by the Scott Waterhouse case, and cited in the
judicial opinion, the satanic themes definitely dictated what was done and how and why it
was done. Waterhouse may have had a psychosexual need, but his acts met the criteria of a
satanic ritual.
Because his essay was written for a professional law enforcement audience, Lanning relies
upon accepted professional presuppositions, which makes it more difficult to challenge his
style. This style, however, also relies upon the same rhetorical shoddiness we find in the
main report. Lanning is more sophisticated, but he is not more coherent. The bulk of his
article is given over to a shopping list of obviously difficult questions. But he uses these as
the base of his apologia. He cites, for example, the problem presented by the army of
“experts” who conduct law enforcement seminars. Lanning is correct in pointing out that a
comprehensive review of what these “experts” label Satanism ranges from astrology to
Roman Catholicism. Certainly this demonstrates the existence of some bigotry. But bigotry
on the part of some does not mean that truth never exists, nor does false reasoning always
exclude valid conclusion. Lanning appears to think that it does.
After citing other reflections of religious bias, Lanning rejects responsibility by adding, “Yet,
it is just as difficult to precisely define Satanism as it is to define Christianity or any complex
belief system.”78 Religious authorities do not experience such difficulties. Why does
Lanning? A Buddhist, as the Dalai Lama has often said, cannot simultaneously be a
Christian. A Jew does not believe that Christ was the Messiah. A Satanist does not believe
that Jahweh‟s biblical religion ought to be practiced. Why does Lanning insist that this factor
be separated from criminal investigations, and then insist that when distinguishing between
satanic and non-satanic child abuse you must rely upon “specific satanic symbols, artifacts,
or doctrine” [emphasis added]? He then immediately segues into a rejection of the
significance of ritual when he adds, “rather than the mere presence of any ritualistic
element.”79 Can not a ritualistic element be examined for its relation to doctrine? Apparently
not.
Another of Lanning‟s lacunae involves a list of child abuse crimes perpetrated by Christian
parents. He asks the legitimate question, “How do we label [such] crimes?”80 But, again, he
fails to answer the question. Instead, in an elaborate argumentum ad hominem, Lanning
slides through the issues. He acknowledges that most people would say that these
“Christian” parents distorted Christianity, while Satanists abusing children are applying
Satanism. But he then proceeds into a list of questions. Who decides, he asks, what is a
misinterpretation? After all, the parents believed they were following their religion. Lanning
appears to think that makes this an insoluble issue. But all religions present the follower
with a sequence of beliefs ranging from the ethical to the mystical. Within this sequence
there is room for deviations. This does not alter the orthodox belief system. Even Lanning‟s
implication that because Christians believe in various forms of worship and dogma one can‟t
define Christianity does not hold up. The core beliefs of Christianity are constant as are
those of Buddhism, even if some adherents disagree on certain points. The generic
elements remain, are discernible, and have discernible effects. The same is true of satanic
variations. LaVey and Aquino have doctrinal differences. Each, as Aquino so conveniently
attests, believes in Satan and in the predatory cruelty he demands.
Lanning follows the pattern of the main report by establishing specific criteria that are
nearly impossible to meet, and then denying the existence of evidence for his criteria.
Satanic murder, for example, only occurs when two or more people rationally plan a crime
whose “primary motivation is to fulfill a prescribed satanic ritual calling for murder.”81 Scott
Waterhouse, therefore, cannot be a satanic murderer! But what about the Ricky Kasso case
in Northport, New York? Or the Sean Sellers case in Oklahoma? Are these, too, lacking in
evidence of a satanic ritual “rationally” perpetuated? And if so, why? In each of these cases
the prosecutor‟s evidence demonstrated a satanic influence, and the perpetrators
of legal investigation. As demonstrated by the Scott Waterhouse case, and cited in the
judicial opinion, the satanic themes definitely dictated what was done and how and why it
was done. Waterhouse may have had a psychosexual need, but his acts met the criteria of a
satanic ritual.
Because his essay was written for a professional law enforcement audience, Lanning relies
upon accepted professional presuppositions, which makes it more difficult to challenge his
style. This style, however, also relies upon the same rhetorical shoddiness we find in the
main report. Lanning is more sophisticated, but he is not more coherent. The bulk of his
article is given over to a shopping list of obviously difficult questions. But he uses these as
the base of his apologia. He cites, for example, the problem presented by the army of
“experts” who conduct law enforcement seminars. Lanning is correct in pointing out that a
comprehensive review of what these “experts” label Satanism ranges from astrology to
Roman Catholicism. Certainly this demonstrates the existence of some bigotry. But bigotry
on the part of some does not mean that truth never exists, nor does false reasoning always
exclude valid conclusion. Lanning appears to think that it does.
After citing other reflections of religious bias, Lanning rejects responsibility by adding, “Yet,
it is just as difficult to precisely define Satanism as it is to define Christianity or any complex
belief system.”78 Religious authorities do not experience such difficulties. Why does
Lanning? A Buddhist, as the Dalai Lama has often said, cannot simultaneously be a
Christian. A Jew does not believe that Christ was the Messiah. A Satanist does not believe
that Jahweh‟s biblical religion ought to be practiced. Why does Lanning insist that this factor
be separated from criminal investigations, and then insist that when distinguishing between
satanic and non-satanic child abuse you must rely upon “specific satanic symbols, artifacts,
or doctrine” [emphasis added]? He then immediately segues into a rejection of the
significance of ritual when he adds, “rather than the mere presence of any ritualistic
element.”79 Can not a ritualistic element be examined for its relation to doctrine? Apparently
not.
Another of Lanning‟s lacunae involves a list of child abuse crimes perpetrated by Christian
parents. He asks the legitimate question, “How do we label [such] crimes?”80 But, again, he
fails to answer the question. Instead, in an elaborate argumentum ad hominem, Lanning
slides through the issues. He acknowledges that most people would say that these
“Christian” parents distorted Christianity, while Satanists abusing children are applying
Satanism. But he then proceeds into a list of questions. Who decides, he asks, what is a
misinterpretation? After all, the parents believed they were following their religion. Lanning
appears to think that makes this an insoluble issue. But all religions present the follower
with a sequence of beliefs ranging from the ethical to the mystical. Within this sequence
there is room for deviations. This does not alter the orthodox belief system. Even Lanning‟s
implication that because Christians believe in various forms of worship and dogma one can‟t
define Christianity does not hold up. The core beliefs of Christianity are constant as are
those of Buddhism, even if some adherents disagree on certain points. The generic
elements remain, are discernible, and have discernible effects. The same is true of satanic
variations. LaVey and Aquino have doctrinal differences. Each, as Aquino so conveniently
attests, believes in Satan and in the predatory cruelty he demands.
Lanning follows the pattern of the main report by establishing specific criteria that are
nearly impossible to meet, and then denying the existence of evidence for his criteria.
Satanic murder, for example, only occurs when two or more people rationally plan a crime
whose “primary motivation is to fulfill a prescribed satanic ritual calling for murder.”81 Scott
Waterhouse, therefore, cannot be a satanic murderer! But what about the Ricky Kasso case
in Northport, New York? Or the Sean Sellers case in Oklahoma? Are these, too, lacking in
evidence of a satanic ritual “rationally” perpetuated? And if so, why? In each of these cases
the prosecutor‟s evidence demonstrated a satanic influence, and the perpetrators
