Cultic Studies Journal, Vol. 14, No. 2, 1997, page 64
In addition, the argument against suggestion misses the point. Suggestion is an
inevitable process of the communication and information processing systems central to
expression. Judges, as well as therapists and experimentalists, look for undue
suggestion. This point was recognized in the invitation extended by the Institute for
Experimental Psychiatry Research Foundation, where Dr. Orne works, to a reception
during the False Memory Syndrome Foundation Conference held on April 16, 1993. The
invitation said: “Mr. Alan Scheflin is cordially invited to a Reception, in honor of the
scientific speakers and families afflicted by the creation of false memories through the
misuse of suggestion” [italics added]. This phrasing is precise. It is when a phenomenon
is misused or abused that unacceptable distortion occurs.
Finally, another major point is missed by Karlin and Orne when their discussion of
hypnosis or suggestion is not specifically tailored to individual patients who vary in
terms of their susceptibility to hypnosis or suggestion. Very little research has been
done on the issue of individual differences related to hypnotizability versus
suggestibility scales. In other words, many people may be suggestible and have
memory contaminated without hypnosis, while others, even with hypnosis, may
score very low on hypnotizability or suggestibility scales so that hypnotic influences
will have no impact on their memories. It is likely that the malleability of memory is
itself a function of individual differences --that there is a relationship between
hypnotizability and/or suggestibility and the ease of memory alteration or
pseudomemory implantation/creation. Thus, the crucial issue is not whether hypnosis
was used, but rather whether it was likely to have had an undue influence. The
“totality-of-the-circumstances” test is essential to make this determination.
Otherwise we have the senseless rule in existence now that automatically excludes
hypnotically refreshed recollection whenever hypnosis is used even though no more
than 10% of the population are likely to be vulnerable high hypnotizables.
6. The 7.8% figure must be further reduced because, as the International Society for the
Study of Dissociation has noted in its Guidelines for Treating Dissociative Identity
Disorder in Adults (Glenview, IL, 1994), “the most common uses of hypnosis are for
calming, soothing, containment, and ego strengthening,” rather than for memory
retrieval.
7. California Penal Code, section 667.83 (added 1994) Idaho Code, section 18-1506A
(added 1990) Illinois Revised Statutes, chapter 720, section 5/12-33 (added 1992)
Louisiana Revised Statutes 14:107.1 (added 1989).
8. The court was quoting from Orne, The Use and Misuse of Hypnosis in Court,”
International Journal of Clinical and Experimental Hypnosis, 27, 311, 317-318 (1979).
9. I was a member of the ASCH task force and played a principal role in the drafting of the
Guidelines.
10. The cases reviewed by Perry are Isely v. Capuchin Province (1995), Shahzade v.
Gregory (1996), and State v. Hungerford (1995). The first two opinions recognize the
reality of repressed memory, but the third opinion does not. However, the third opinion
has now been replaced with the New Hampshire Supreme Court‟s decision in State v.
Hungerford (1997) which expressly recognizes the reality of repressed memory and
adopts a case-by-case analysis in repressed memory lawsuits. Hungerford itself rejects
the repressed memory claim based on the particular facts of that case. Thus, every
modern opinion in the repressed memory area accepts the reality of such memories and
urges a case-by-case determination.
11. The Borawick case was written up in an article by Karon Heller, Satan‟s Theater,”
Connecticut Magazine, 51-55, 84-89 (April 1996). Unfortunately, the article contains

Cultic Studies Journal, Vol. 14, No. 2, 1997, page 65
significant factual errors, a misunderstanding of the relevant science, and the omission
of information that the reader needs to know in order to make an informed choice about
crucial facts. For example, the article portrays the plaintiff as unable to hold a job
because she could not meet the high number of hours required by first-rank Los Angeles
law firms. The article does not tell the reader that the plaintiff underwent several heart
surgeries that prohibited her from meeting that schedule. Thus, the reader is left with
the view that the plaintiff was a failure, not that the plaintiff had severe medical
problems. After reading the correspondence between Helen L. McGonigle, plaintiff‟s
attorney, and the attorney for the magazine, it is clear that the magazine had little
interest in providing its readers with factually accurate information. I thank Ms. Gonigle
for supplying me with a 16-page response detailing several dozen biases, errors, and
omissions contained in the article.
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