Cultic Studies Journal, Vol. 14, No. 2, 1997, page 36
hypnosis is used is obtained before the hypnosis was used --a fact reinforcing the possible
etiologic role of preexisting beliefs held by subjects. But even more damning of the
conjecture that hypnosis creates such false memories is the fact that studies have
documented that persons alleging alien abduction are not highly hypnotizable (Rodeghier,
Goodpaster, &Blatterbauer, 1991), including when they have been compared to control
subjects (Spanos, Cross, Dickson, &DuBreuil, 1993). Furthermore, when abduction reports
which were elaborated through hypnosis were compared with material elicited in a
nonhypnotic state from persons alleging a clear waking memory for the events without the
use of hypnosis, the material was not found to differ in basic structure.
In short, when used carelessly, hypnosis can assist in the creation of false memories. When
used carefully, however, hypnosis is a valuable method for retrieving memories that can be
proven to be accurate. As Kline (1983) noted many years ago:
When the context within which any procedure, particularly hypnosis, is so altered
as to bring about coercion, pressure, and heightened suggestibility, then we are
likely to be faced with confabulation or pseudomemories. When any interrogation
procedure of investigative process, including hypnosis, is used carefully and is part
of the total evaluation of mental process, the results relating to recollections and
thoughts may offer a very different picture for evaluation and eventual
presentation within the courtroom. (pp. 122-123)
Interestingly, hypnosis has had a dual affiliation with the creation of false memories. A
century ago, hypnosis researchers like Bernheim (1891/1980) had already explored the
abuse of hypnosis in forensic settings. German hypnotist Albert Moll (1889/1958) cautiously
observed that “retroactive hallucinations,” his term for “false memories,” “can be used to
falsify testimony. People can be made to believe that they have witnessed certain scenes, or
even crimes” (pp. 345-346).
While hypnotists for over a century have been accused of implanting false memories, they
have also used false memory as a defense. Staples (1961) cautioned that a rarely
acknowledged danger of hypnosis was the possibility that the hypnotist would be sued on
the basis of a “false accusation of criminal assault” (p. 238). His paper reports a case of a
physician who used relaxation in preparation for a manual ovary manipulation, which was
brief and successful. The patient knew the doctor used hypnosis in his practice, though the
doctor did not use that term with the patient. Experts agreed that the patient was a good
hypnotic subject and that the manipulation might have inadvertently triggered an erotic
fantasy or daydream. The physician was acquitted after experts testified that the patient
“could have had a fantasy without the intent or knowledge of [the physician] and could have
misremembered it as an actual fact.” (p. 241). Staples suggests that, in certain types of
cases, a third person should be present or the entire session should be recorded.
Venn (1988) reports two cases, three years apart, where a colonel was accused of using
hypnosis to obtain homosexual favors from two enlisted men. In each case, the colonel‟s
defense was that the men had “fantasized” the events while dreaming. AI cannot be
responsible for [their] dreams,” the colonel complained (p. 15).
We shall certainly see a good deal more of the false memory defense in cases of alleged
sexual assault.
Misconstruing the Nature of Therapy
I certainly agree with Karlin and Orne on the following points: (1) “psychotherapy is an
influence process” (p. 66) (2) outcome studies uniformly find that psychotherapy is by far
more beneficial than no treatment (p. 65) and newer techniques are even better for therapy
patient improvement compared to controls (pp. 65-66) and (3) “with rare exceptions,
psychotherapy has been a beneficent force during the past 100 years” (p. 65). I further

Cultic Studies Journal, Vol. 14, No. 2, 1997, page 37
agree with them that there are therapists who are performing below the standard of care,
and that these therapists are causing harm to patients and others. Therapists who have a
confirmatory bias in believing that every adult must harbor hidden memories of abuse, and
who conduct the therapy solely to excavate these alleged memories, are practicing below
the standard of care. In my own experience, I have seen these therapists in several
contexts. In one court case, I testified that, in my opinion, an accusation against a father of
molesting his daughter was false (In re Jennifer C., 1992). I suggested to the father‟s
attorney that she might want to break the cardinal rule of cross-examination: never ask a
question unless you know the answer (Wellman, 1936). The attorney followed my advice
and asked the therapist who diagnosed the child as abused whether the therapist had ever
seen a child who was not abused. The therapist testified that she had never seen a child
who was not abused. That testimony blew the case apart, and the father was vindicated
against the false allegations by a court judgment in his favor.
In another instance, when I was lecturing in Cambridge, Massachusetts on “false memory”
matters, my wife called me to tell about a visit from a friend who had recently suffered a
triple tragedy: the development of an excruciatingly painful jaw problem, the death of her
mother, and the death of her sister. Our friend, whom I will call Iris, went to a therapist
who immediately asked if she had been sexually abused. Iris said that she had not been
abused and was in therapy to deal with other matters. The therapist responded that people
often are depressed because of things that happened to them as children that they no
longer remember. Iris, with anger, retorted that people are also depressed when they are in
constant pain and have lost two dear relatives. The therapy session ended at an impasse as
the therapist still groped for hidden memories and Iris struggled to center the discussion on
her grief. Iris never went back, but she did see another therapist who requested the medical
record from the first therapist. Sure enough, the first therapist had written in the record
that “the patient denies childhood sexual abuse.”
These two illustrations of bad therapists, practicing what Margaret Singer and Janja Lalich
might call “crazy therapy” (M. Singer &Lalich, 1996), give the overwhelming number of
good therapists a bad name. Along with Karlin and Orne, and Singer and Lalich, I too speak
out against them.
I part company with Karlin and Orne, however, in several matters that generally involve
what I consider to be their exaggeration of the influence of therapy and their suggestions
for curing what they call “recovered memory” therapy.
While it is obviously true that psychotherapy is “an influence process,” so too is life in
general. Influences are all around us and we too, in turn, seek to influence others. But
Karlin and Orne, as well as the other “false memory” writers, depict the therapy session as
if it were akin to a brainwashing program or a police interrogation in which irresistible
Svengali-like authority figures manipulate their helpless, subservient patients. A mildly
stated version of this belief appears in Loftus and Yapko, 1995:
The psychological literature is replete with examples of people who blindly obey
authority figures whom they perceive as credible, and who conform to others‟
perceptions of ambiguous events (Aronson, 1992). Suggestibility is an inherent
dimension of human personality, and is evident to some degree in virtually every
interaction (Yapko, 1990, 1995). The interaction that takes place in the context of
psychotherapy is predicated on the inevitable influence on the client by the clinician
(Haley, 1973). It is not a question of whether such influence ensues, but one of to
what degree and with what consequences [emphasis in original]. (Zeig, 1980)
Someone seeking therapy is already immersed in a perceptual frame that includes
the following characteristics: (1) a belief that he or she is personally powerless to
effect meaningful change (2) a feeling of hopefulness that a trained “expert” can,