Cultic Studies Journal, Vol. 14, No. 2, 1997, page 32
It should also be noted that memory may be influenced by the very mechanism of retrieval
itself --without suggestion, without postevent misinformation, and without hypnosis. After
noting that memory does not work like a camera or a video recorder, Loftus (1980) states:
When a person wants to remember something he or she does not simply pluck a
whole memory intact out of a “memory store.” The memory is constructed from
stored and available bits of information any gaps in the information are filled in
unconsciously by inferences. When these fragments are integrated and make
sense, they form what we call a memory. (p. 163)
This process of “confabulation” is inherent to the nature of memory. A strict
reconstructionalist view of memory, such as the one proposed by Loftus and false memory
advocates, necessarily means that memory is always false in some respect by virtue of the
manner in which memories are stored and then retrieved. On top of this inevitable
confabulation effect is the postevent misinformation effect which may add an additional
layer of distortion. But, as we have seen, the postevent misinformation effect is a function
of the inherent malleability of memory. Most suggestions and subsequent events do not
distort memory, however only some do. Not all hypnotic retrieval suggestions distort
memory either, though some might if they are improperly constructed.
Karlin and Orne thus falsely attribute to hypnosis defects that belong to memory itself.
Remove the hypnosis, and memory would still have those defects.
Karlin and Orne also falsely attribute to hypnosis defects that belong to social influences on
memory. As Beahrs, Cannell, and Gutheil (1996) have noted, “false memories are more
likely to arise from social influence, either inside or outside of hypnosis or psychotherapy
intrinsic suggestibility (especially interrogative) and dissociative potential and less so,
simply from being hypnotized” (p. 50). Furthermore, in a comprehensive review of the last
decade of research on hypnosis, Sheehan (1996) reaches the conclusion generally accepted
by all except a few unwavering false memory advocates that “important conclusion that has
emerged from the literature is that memory contamination is a function of memory and
influence and not a danger specific to the use of hypnosis” (p. 13) (emphasis added). Karlin
(1997) begins to show an understanding of this point when he wrote about the alleged
increase in confidence that hypnosis, in his view, invariably produces:
As research during the past decade has shown ...,these factors are, in general, not
unique to hypnosis. For example, it has been well known for 2 decades that
repeated retrieval of a memory comprises an important learning experience....
Recently, Shaw (1996) has shown that events that increase ease of recall, such as
repeated recall trials, increase confidence in correct and incorrect information. As in
hypnosis, the increase in confidence is independent of the accuracy of the memory.
(p. 33)
The real point, which Karlin misses, is that social influence factors, including repeated
retrieval attempts, account for the increase in confidence, not hypnosis. For example, Clark
and Loftus (1996) have noted:
Social factors have been demonstrated in the laboratory as well. Luus and Wells
(1994) showed that a witness‟s confidence in an inaccurate identification can be
artificially inflated or deflated, depending on whether the witness is informed that
another witness picked the same or a different person from the lineup. (p. 142)
Because it is known that social influence factors can have an impact on confidence in
memory, these factors can be accounted for in the retrieval process. In addition, cautionary
warnings may prove helpful so that familiarity does not breed excess confidence. The point
Karlin actually makes, however, is wrong. Karlin assumes that hypnosis, even used once

Cultic Studies Journal, Vol. 14, No. 2, 1997, page 33
with strict adherence to safeguards, automatically elevates confidence. The recent hypnosis
literature demonstrates that this point is not accurate (Brown et al., 1997).
Thus, it is crucial to recognize two common mistakes made by those who fail to read the
scientific literature with sufficient care. First, it is a mistake to believe that if false memories
occur with hypnosis, hypnosis must have been the cause. Second, it is also a mistake to
consider these false reports as if they were false memories.
In order to justify their position, Karlin and Orne would have to cite studies that show that
the use of hypnosis, with strict adherence to carefully prepared guidelines, inevitably
contaminates memory by causing more memory distortion than other memory retrieval
techniques. But the scientific studies unequivocally show that this proposition is not correct
(Brown et al., 1997).
Karlin and Orne also severely overstate the extent to which memory is malleable. In fact, as
noted in Brown et al. (1997), analysis of the memory literature, the flashbulb memory
literature, the autobiographical memory literature, the emotional memory literature, and the
traumatic memory literature shows a profound consistency: memory is remarkably accurate
for what memory researchers call the “gist” of an event. Ceci (1996) has recently publicly
stated this same conclusion applies regarding the children‟s suggestibility and memory
literature.
Differentiating Between Proper Use and Abuse or Misuse
Karlin (1997) has recently extended his antihypnosis position to include an attack on the
Guidelines published by the American Society of Clinical Hypnosis (ASCH) (1995). He
describes two cases as important illustrations of the defect of the ASCH Guidelines, yet in
neither case were the Guidelines completely followed. The fallacy here is criticizing the
proper use of a technique by showing examples of harm caused when the technique is
improperly used.
Case 1 described by Karlin (1997) involved at least seven violations of the ASCH Guidelines,
including providing erroneous information about hypnosis, omitting factual information
about memory, failing to conduct objective testing, reinforcing erroneous beliefs, reinforcing
recalled material, and so on. Karlin himself notes many of these violations (pp. 20B26), but
then tells us that the judge concluded that the appropriate safeguards had been met. The
case was settled before trial. Despite the many violations listed by Karlin, he still states that
“the safeguards suggested in the ASCH (1995) report acted to legitimize what was almost
certainly created, not refreshed memory” (p. 26). This conclusion is clearly unwarranted. In
the first place, Karlin does not explicitly state that the judge was ruling on the ASCH
Guidelines. In a telephone conversation with him, Karlin confirmed to me that the judge‟s
ruling was not based on the ASCH Guidelines, but rather on the Hurd safeguards originally
articulated by Martin T. Orne. Thus, it is unfair to attack the ASCH Guidelines if they were
not followed, especially because the Hurd safeguards are substantially more lax than the
ASCH Guidelines. Furthermore, if the ASCH Guidelines are not followed, but a judge says
they were followed, the judge‟s error can hardly be blamed on the Guidelines. Finally, the
reasons for settlement are not given by Karlin. Had the case gone to trial, Karlin‟s
presentation of it makes it seem likely that the jury would disbelieve the hypnotically
refreshed recollection because eyewitness and expert testimony was so strong against it.
Case 2 described by Karlin (1997) also involved violations of safeguards, as Karlin readily
admits. The case was thrown out for that reason. This time Karlin is explicit that the Hurd
safeguards were involved, not the ASCH Guidelines, which are substantially more rigorous.
It is interesting to observe that the original title of Karlin‟s paper, as stated on page 87 of
the Karlin and Orne article in the Cultic Studies Journal, correctly identifies the paper as
involving the Hurd safeguards. The deliberate change of title, by someone in the editorial