Cultic Studies Journal, Vol. 14, No. 2, 1997, page 52
while some simulators may be very good at feigning the condition in the laboratory for a
relatively short period of time, it is a far different matter to feign the condition over an
extended period of time.
Fahy (1988) considered the relationship between hypnosis and MPD. He noted that Putnam,
Guroff, Silberman, Barban, and Post (1986) found that hypnosis was used to facilitate the
first report of an alter personality only in a minority (23%) of the cases. In an attempt to
study what influence clinicians have on the creation of MPD, hypnosis has been used to
“create” the condition. But, as Fahy noted, by using hypnotic suggestion Harriman (1942,
1943) “was unable to produce more-complex personalities, similar to those found in the
clinical setting” (1988, p. 601). Kampman (1976) similarly was unable to use hypnosis to
reproduce the complexity of the disorder. Fahy concluded:
There is scanty evidence that short-term exposure to hypnosis can induce well-
developed alternates through the use of hypnosis alone. The experimentally
induced personalities tend to be transitory, and their presence does not extend
beyond the hypnotic experience.... The effects of long-term exposure to hypnosis
within a clinical setting remain unknown, but there is little evidence that the
therapeutic use of hypnosis is directly responsible for the disorder. (1988, p. 601)
In rejecting the Karlin and Orne position on MPD, I agree with Loftus‟s (1995) observation
that ADID (or MPD), whether authentic or whether created in a therapeutic exchange, has a
reality to it that must be respected and treated with dignity.”
Karlin and Orne also address satanic cult activity and, once again, their “one size fits all”
explanation that everything is pseudomemory falls short of the mark. Most commentators
agree on four points. First, there is little or no hard evidence for the existence of an
international, intergenerational satanic cult network that “deals with large-scale baby
breeding, human sacrifice, and organized satanic conspiracies” (p. 40) (Lanning, 1992).
Second, there is no doubt that satanic crimes, including cannibalism (Martingale, 1993), do
occur (Humes, 1991 Scammell, 1991 St. Clair, 1987). Third, hard evidence does exist for
international child pornography rings that include ritual abuse of children (Lanning, 1992).
Fourth, ritual abuse, including religious ritual abuse, does occur, and not infrequently
(Goodman, Bottoms, &Shaver, 1995). Thus, as F.B.I. authority Ken Lanning (1992) has
noted, AI believe that the majority of victims alleging „ritual „abuse are in fact victims of
some form of abuse or trauma” (p. 39). Several states have passed legislation making ritual
abuse a separate crime.7
While explanations like pseudomemory suggestion and urban legend (Victor, 1993) may
provide partial explanations for some cases, they do not supply answers for all of the
available data. A full discussion of this topic is not possible at this point, but interested
readers are urged to examine Goodman and associates (1995) for the most thorough
empirical investigation of the problem.
Finally, space limitations also prohibit examination of the statistical analysis developed by
Karlin and Orne at pages 69B75. Readers are referred to Olio (1996) for a useful critique of
the numbers and methodology.
Forensic Hypnosis: The Per Se Exclusion Rule
Karlin and Orne would close the courthouse door to Sarah, in the illustration used at the
beginning of this response, simply because all of her relevant memories are posthypnotic.
The door would remain closed, in their view, even though Sarah‟s mother and sister claimed
that they were aware of the molesting at the time it occurred and had not lost their own
memories of the event. The mother and sister could testify, but not Sarah.

Cultic Studies Journal, Vol. 14, No. 2, 1997, page 53
Thus, under the view espoused by Karlin and Orne, a person who has been lobotomized
could testify in court, a person who had received massive electroshock treatments could
testify in court, a person who had taken enormous dosages of mind-altering psychiatric
drugs or psychedelics could testify in court, a person who had suffered substantial organic
brain damage could testify in court, but a person who had been competently hypnotized by
an experienced professional who followed strict guidelines and avoided undue suggestions
could not testify in court. Does that position make sense to you?
In Harker v. Maryland (1986), the Maryland appellate court observed that “Dr. Martin Orne,
a psychiatrist and frequent expert witness, believes that „hypnosis may be useful in some
instances to help bring back forgotten memories following an accident or a crime.‟” (p.
440).8 Why then slam the door in the face of this “useful” evidence?
The response that police may still use hypnosis on persons they do not intend to call as
witnesses is little consolation for crime victims or witnesses faced with the choice of being
disenfranchised from the courts, and thus re-victimized, if they seek to reacquire these
memories and to recover from traumatization with the use of a technique known to produce
additional accurate information. The burden of defending the per se rule has become
increasingly heavy.
Brief History of Forensic Rules
The first case to permit hypnotically refreshed recollection into testimony was Harding v.
State (1968). As a result of this decision, police departments across the country began
training thousands of officers in forensic (investigative) hypnosis. No guidelines existed for
the proper conduct of a forensic hypnotic interview, and the scientific literature was devoid
of careful studies concerning the impact of hypnosis on memory. Indeed, it was not until the
1970s that courts became especially alerted by scientists to the suggestive dangers of
eyewitness testimony, and it was not until the 1980s that courts were directly confronted
with the malleability of memory as a reconstructive, rather than reproductive, process
(Sporer, Malpass, &Koehnken, 1996).
In these early days of judicial evaluations of forensic hypnosis sessions, advocacy of a per
se rule made a good deal of sense. Without sufficient knowledge from scientific studies, and
with the threat that poorly trained police officers with a stake in the outcome of the cases
would contaminate memory by being unduly suggestive, there was a grave danger that
hypnosis could be so seriously abused that innocent citizens could be convicted of serious
felonies. Indeed, one famous case from this era involved a police officer who had hypnotized
a witness to obtain a description of a robber. The witness, in trance, said that the criminal
wore a mask. This offered no problem for the police hypnotist. He instructed the witness
that a person during hypnosis had the ability to remove the mask and see the face below.
So informed, the witness complied and provided a description. An innocent man was almost
convicted on the basis of this foolish evidence. Police misuse of hypnosis became known in
many other cases from across the country (Laurence &Perry, 1988 Orne, 1979).
An additional consideration encouraged the advocacy of a per se exclusion rule at this time.
Supporting the police use of hypnosis would have violated the ethics codes of the two major
professional hypnosis organizations in the country --the American Society of Clinical
Hypnosis and the Society for Clinical and Experimental Hypnosis --because the codes do
not permit assisting lay persons in the practice of hypnosis. Cooperating with police in cases
where the police do the hypnosis violated these codes. Furthermore, the Society for Clinical
and Experimental Hypnosis, in October 1978, passed a Resolution condemning the police
use of hypnosis. The International Society of Hypnosis, in August 1979, passed the identical
Resolution. Both Resolutions may be found in Society for Clinical and Experimental Hypnosis
(1979).